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supposed trade-off between these two goals. The global financial and economic crisis that erupted in 
2008 – which was preceded by rising social inequalities – has shown that this is simply not the case. In 
fact, if properly designed, equity-enhancing policies can also promote prosperity and reduce the risk of 
future crises. 
The purpose of this report on Kenya, published under the series Studies on Growth with Equity, is to show 
how such policy complementarities can be achieved. Given the complementarities between 
macroeconomic policy on the one hand and employment and social policy on the other, the International 
Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) has joined forces with the United Nations Department of Economic and 
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Employment, Vocational Training and Social Dialogue and the IILS of the ILO. 
In particular, the report examines how employment and social policies can contribute to a more stable 
and equitable growth pattern. Indeed, growth in Kenya has been characterized by considerable volatility 
due in part to a narrow growth base and weak investment patterns. This has adversely affected formal job 
creation and hampered improvements in living standards, particularly among Kenyan youth, despite 
considerable efforts by the government to support the labour market. 
Moving forward, Kenya needs, first, additional efforts to support a job-centred macroeconomic 
framework. A stable, employment-oriented macroeconomic strategy that addresses the current 
vulnerabilities will be essential in order for Kenya to attain a level of growth that will allow for sufficient 
employment creation. Second, Kenya needs to encourage the formalization of formal-sector enterprises 
and improve the working conditions of workers in informal-sector employment. Finally, it is of upmost 
importance to develop a national employment strategy with a particular focus on encouraging job 
creation among youth. To that end, this report highlights a number of policy areas and recommendations 
intended to help guide the government and social partners, namely the Central Organization of Trade 
Unions (COTU) and Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE), in achieving growth with equity. 
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 fOREWORD
It is often argued that the cost of social equity is less economic growth, 
highlighting the supposed trade-off between these two goals. The global 
financial and economic crisis that erupted in 2008 – which was preceded 
by rising social inequalities – has shown that this is simply not the case. 
In fact, if properly designed, equity-enhancing policies can also promote 
prosperity and reduce the risk of future crises.
The purpose of this report on Kenya, published under the series Studies 
on Growth with Equity, is to show how such policy complementarities can 
be achieved. Given the complementarities between macroeconomic poli-
cy on the one hand and employment and social policy on the other, the 
International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) has joined forces with the 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). 
The report is an outcome of a joint project of the French Ministry of 
Labour, Employment, Vocational Training and Social Dialogue and the 
IILS of the ILO.
In particular, the report examines how employment and social policies can 
contribute to a more stable and equitable growth pattern. Indeed, growth 
in Kenya has been characterized by considerable volatility due in part to 
a narrow growth base and weak investment patterns. This has adversely 
affected formal job creation and hampered improvements in living stand-
ards, particularly among Kenyan youth, despite considerable efforts by the 
government to support the labour market. 
Moving forward, Kenya needs, first, additional efforts to support a job-cen-
tred macroeconomic framework. A stable, employment-oriented macroeco-
nomic strategy that addresses the current vulnerabilities will be essential 
in order for Kenya to attain a level of growth that will allow for sufficient 
employment creation. Second, Kenya needs to encourage the formaliza-
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tion of formal-sector enterprises and improve the working conditions of 
workers in informal-sector employment. Finally, it is of upmost impor-
tance to develop a national employment strategy with a particular focus on 
encouraging job creation among youth. To that end, this report highlights 
a number of policy areas and recommendations intended to help guide 
the government and social partners, namely the Central Organization of  
Trade Unions (COTU) and Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE), in 
achieving growth with equity.
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EXECUTIvE SUMMARY AND pOlICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Economic growth in Kenya has improved in recent years… 
In 2003, Kenya’s economic performance accelerated: real GDP growth 
increased on an annual basis from 0.3 per cent in 2002 to almost 7 per 
cent in 2007 – on a par with growth in sub-Saharan Africa and slightly 
above the global growth rate of 5.4 per cent at that time. Growth during 
this period took place in spite of a resurgence of drought that negatively 
affected the agricultural sector and was a result of the emergence or revival 
of other sectors, notably tourism.
In 2008, however, the strong expansionary phases ended abruptly as both 
investment and exports collapsed. The decline was partly a result of the post-
election violence that broke out at the beginning of the year, which adversely 
affected most sectors of the economy during the first half of 2008. The down-
turn was exacerbated by the global financial and economic crisis  and a rise in 
commodity prices. Yet, after a period of instability and adjustment, a strong 
recovery took hold in 2010 as exports and investment fully recovered. By the 
end of 2010 the economy had achieved an impressive growth rate of 7.3 per 
cent – on par with emerging economies during the same period. Real GDP 
growth in the third quarter of 2012 fell moderately to 4.7 per cent and is 
expected to reach 5.7 per cent in 2013.
…but has been relatively unstable due in part  
to a narrow growth base and weak investment patterns... 
Economic growth has been 2 per cent or less at least one-third of the time 
in the past 30 years and is considerably lower than the average of least 
developed countries (LDCs). Part of the relatively poor performance lies 
in the comparably slow transformation to an industrial-based economy. 
The size of the industrial sector has remained unchanged during the past 
two decades. The reliance on agriculture – which represents 25 per cent 
Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations
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of GDP – has made the economy particularly vulnerable to rising costs 
of inputs such as oil and inclement weather conditions – exacerbated by 
the fact that tea and coffee alone account for nearly one-fifth of all export 
earnings.
The pace of transformation has been adversely affected by a declining 
savings rate and stagnant investment. In fact, Kenya experienced one of 
the sharpest declines in the gross domestic savings rate in the developing 
world. The majority of the emerging, developing and LDCs managed 
to steadily increase their savings rates and reduce their reliance on more 
unpredictable sources of external finance, such as foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and foreign borrowings. By contrast, Kenya’s domestic savings rate 
fell from 18.6 per cent in 1990 to 8.9 per cent in 2010. As a consequence, 
gross fixed capital formation did not keep pace with the rates in other 
developing countries. Gross fixed capital formation has remained stagnant 
at around 20 per cent of GDP over the past decade.
 
... which has adversely affected formal job creation  
and hampered improvements in living standards...     
The relatively weak economic performance has meant that labour market 
improvements have been slow. Between 1991 and 2003, the employment 
rate in Kenya fell by over 7 percentage points from 67 per cent to 59.7 
per cent and even during the most recent period of strong and persistent 
growth, employment growth only kept pace with the working-age popula-
tion. As a result, in 2012 the employment rate – at just over 60 per cent 
– remained well below the levels achieved in the 1990s and considerably 
lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa (65.1 per cent). 
Moreover, the majority of job creation has been in informal-sector 
enterprises. In the past decade alone, non-agricultural informal-sector 
employment rose by approximately 5.1 million or 7.2 per cent per year 
– far outstripping the growth in formal waged employment. As a result, 
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employment in informal-sector enterprises constituted 64 per cent of total 
employment in 2011 – and 85 per cent when agricultural self-employed 
and workers engaged in small-scale agricultural activities are considered. 
Importantly, manufacturing was the second largest contributor to infor-
mal-sector employment growth. Moreover, the vast majority of formal jobs 
have been casual in nature: between 2003 and 2011, regular employment 
grew by 7 per cent compared to 87 per cent growth in casual employ-
ment.
As a result, there has been little or no improvement in the standard of 
living as measured by GDP per capita growth. In fact, Kenya’s per capita 
growth rate has averaged about 0.32 per cent a year during the past 30 
years, compared to 1.5 per cent a year, on average, in LDCs. The moderate 
improvements in living standards have been affected by the trend increase 
in informal-sector workers who earn, on average, less per month than the 
established international and national poverty lines and one fifth of what 
public workers earn in the formal sector (and less than half compared to 
private formal-sector workers). 
 
… particularly among Kenyan youth...
Youth have been particularly affected by the weak formal job creation, 
with adults benefiting from a disproportionate share of the jobs created. 
In particular, in 2012, youth aged 15 to 24 accounted for less than 19 per 
cent of total employment, whereas they made up over 35 per cent of the 
working-age population. As such, the youth employment rate, at 32.8 per 
cent, is less than half the adult employment rate and one of the lowest in 
the region. Many youth have become discouraged and have begun to leave 
the labour market entirely. In 2012, the inactivity rate for people aged 15 
to 24 in Kenya reached 60.5 per cent – an increase of 5 percentage points 
since 2000 alone. The problem is particularly acute among young women 
whose rate of inactivity is 8 percentage points higher than that of young 
men. 
Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations
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Yet, there has been some considerable progress in terms of literacy rates 
and access to primary education for both men and women. In 2009, only 
13 per cent of the Kenyan population aged 15 years and over were illiter-
ate – 13 percentages points lower than in 2000 and 24 percentage points 
lower than in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. However, improvements have 
been slow with regard to tertiary education where the enrolment rates are 
far below international standards. Indeed, in 2009 only 4 per cent of the 
Kenyan population were enrolled in tertiary education – an increase of 
only 1.3 percentage points since 2000.
Importantly, high and persistent inactivity rates can impede future eco-
nomic growth due to skills erosion and reduced labour participation – espe-
cially in light of the higher education rates among the Kenyan population. 
Labour market detachment can also have important social implications 
and is increasingly associated with a sense of discontent leading to social 
unrest – evidenced by recent uprisings in North Africa and elsewhere. 
Indeed, in the case of Kenya, there is growing sense of pessimism among 
young people regarding their employment prospects and their role in soci-
ety more broadly. In 2011, only 15.8 per cent of the population aged 15 
to 34 in Kenya believed the economic conditions of the area where they 
lived were getting better and only one quarter believed it was a good time 
to find a job – among the lowest in Africa.  
    
... despite considerable efforts by the government 
to support the labour market. 
At the national level, two major development plans were formulated dur-
ing the last decade – the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and 
Employment Creation (ERS) for the period 2003–2007 and Vision 2030 
for 2008–2030 (that superseded the ERS). Vision 2030 is the long-term 
development plan aimed to improve the quality of life in Kenya. It includes 
over 120 projects implemented in five-year Medium-Term Plans with the 
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first one being completed in 2012. In terms of employment, as formu-
lated in Vision 2030, labour market improvements are expected to occur 
principally as a result of actions taken to strengthen economic growth 
and thus, specific job-centred measures or a labour market strategy are 
noticeably absent.
The Vision does however highlight the need for making young people more 
“competitive” and “prosperous”. Plans for youth are proposed in several 
areas including improving practical skills and identifying specific barriers to 
youth employment. This complements a series of government programmes, 
institutions and policy frameworks that have been implemented in recent 
years to address the challenges confronting youth, notably: (i) in 2005, a 
new Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports was established; (ii) in 2007, 
the government established the Kenya National Youth Policy, a legislative 
framework to enhance youth participation in national development; (iii) 
in 2008, the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports launched the Youth 
Employment Marshall Plan to address the long-term challenges of youth 
employment; and, (iv) in 2010, the Kenya Youth Empowerment Program 
was launched in cooperation with the World Bank. The latter absorbed 
some of the activities of the Marshall Plan, but included a wider spectrum 
of activities – e.g. training and policy development. 
Recent policy platforms and growth strategies, however, have not been 
enough to properly integrate labour market policies as part of a coherent 
mutually reinforcing macroeconomic policy framework. Indeed, strong 
GDP growth in Kenya has not necessarily translated into improved labour 
market conditions, especially for youth. Therefore, in order to benefit from 
the high growth rates expected, a stronger link between growth, employ-
ment and equity is necessary. Going forward, the government could consider 
focusing on three areas: (i) promoting stable economic growth and produc-
tivity gains; (ii) increasing efforts to encourage formal job creation; and (iii) 
ensure there is an equitable distribution of the gains from growth.
Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations
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Moving forward, international experience would lend support, 
first, to a greater focus on a job-centred macroeconomic framework…  
Kenya will require an annual rate of economic growth of about 5 per cent, 
which is the forecast growth rate for 2013 to absorb the growing working-
age population; and a much higher rate to ensure meaningful gains in 
employment, notably among youth. Further progress in ensuring job-rich 
growth depends on action in the following areas: 
•	 Creating an enabling environment for investment: While macroeconomic 
policies to reduce the cost of borrowing and increase the availability of 
credit will be necessary, they are not sufficient. More targeted investment 
friendly macroeconomic policies could be envisaged. For example:
• Improve the savings rate: The government could envision new and 
innovative instruments to encourage domestic savings, e.g. by issuing 
inflation-indexed as well as GDP-linked bonds. Inflation-indexed 
bonds are likely to encourage households to save more while the 
GDP-linked bonds will allow the country to pay a return that var-
ies with the GDP growth performance. A number of countries – 
Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
– issued different versions of GDP-linked bonds during the past 
three decades, which helped to reduce their borrowing costs and 
increase access to domestic and international capital. Issuance of 
GDP-linked bonds can be particularly helpful to ensure that the 
much needed social sector spending on health, education and social 
protection does not suffer during an economic crisis.
• Priority sector lending: Monetary authorities could adopt asset-based 
reserve requirements to encourage bank-lending to priority sectors 
of the economy. Such instruments can allow banks to adjust their 
cash reserve ratios based on the sectors that they need to lend to. For 
instance, the Reserve Bank of India, has introduced Priority Sector 
Lending (PSL) programmes to target sectors that are likely to create 
more formal jobs. 
7  
•	 Productivity-enhancing strategy: Kenya could stimulate labour and total 
factor productivity via tax incentives for firms that make necessary invest-
ments in skills and productivity enhancement. The government could 
also consider creating a ‘Productivity Fund’ that will provide grants and 
loans to firms to invest in training of their workers. In addition, efforts 
to reduce excessive sectoral concentration and promote sectors that are 
incrementally more productive could also be part of an overall produc-
tivity-enhancing strategy. These policies would need to ensure coherence 
and coordination between fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies on 
one hand and employment and education policies on the other hand. In 
this regard, it is critical to recognise that improvements in labour produc-
tivity do not necessarily reduce labour demand. In fact, the experiences of 
the East Asian economies show that employment and growth in labour 
productivity need not be a zero-sum game.
•	 Diversifying the export-base: A greater diversification of export products 
would allow Kenya to maintain foreign exchange earnings constant, 
reduce its vulnerability to the volatility of commodity prices and lessen the 
harmful effects of sudden falls in agricultural production due to climate 
conditions. Moreover, a greater diversification of production and exports 
would have the potential of improving the quality of jobs, especially in 
sectors that have a higher value added. In order to achieve this, priority sec-
tor lending (as explained above) could be a solution. However, a forward-
looking industrial policy will be also necessary to ensure that educational 
institutions are imparting the knowledge, training and skills necessary to 
promote those export sectors with potential.
A stable macroeconomic framework and improved growth performance, 
while necessary are insufficient. Special efforts are needed to address the 
labour market challenges facing Kenya, notably as regards the trend increase 
in informality, as well as rising joblessness and sense of discontent among 
youth.
Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations
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… second, to encourage the formalization of informal-sector enterprises 
and improve the working conditions of workers in informal-sector employment...
Efforts to reverse the rise in informal-sector employment and promote the 
formalization of firms will go a long way to improving the employment 
content of growth and complement efforts to stimulate productivity and 
investment. Stimulating formal job creation will also help to improve over-
all working conditions and reduce economic instability. To achieve this, 
measures along the following lines could be envisaged: 
•		Promoting private sector development and the formalization of informal-
sector enterprises and jobs: One of the main obstacles to more formal 
job creation is the existence of entry barriers into the formal economy. 
This includes the presence of unfriendly legal and regulatory frame-
work for business operations, unfavourable taxation regime and cum-
bersome business registration. Although considerable progress has 
been made in recent years in this area, continued efforts to reduce the 
administrative and tax burdens of businesses (especially micro and small 
firms) to encourage entrepreneurs to formalize their firms are needed. 
Additionally, the lack of sound property rights is another common bar-
rier to formalization. Examples from other countries in these areas might 
prove insightful:
• Brazil has facilitated formalization by extending credit to microen-
terprises, small enterprises, cooperatives and production initiatives in 
the informal sector. Brazil has also reduced from 41 to 7 the number 
of steps involved in the process of formalization and has reduced tax 
burdens for micro-businesses with up to one employee.  
• Peru has taken significant steps to address the lack of property 
rights by setting up the Praedial Registration System, which granted 
property titles to more than 1.2 million families and helped about 
380,000 firms enter the formal economy.
9  
• Countries such as Liberia and Uruguay have reduced significantly 
start-up times by introducing the so-called one-stop-shops that bring 
together in one easily-accessible location all the information and 
forms that are needed to start a business. Efforts in this direction can 
also help facilitate youth entrepreneurship (see below). 
• China has promoted the development of rural productive non-
farming activities in order to reinforce the linkages between the 
agricultural sector and the broader economy, creating opportunities 
for formal employment. In fact, the dynamic rural non-farming sec-
tor in China has been a major contributor to the country’s growth, 
increasing rural household income and contributing to rural devel-
opment.
•	 Developing social protection floors as a tool to improve working conditions 
of informal-sector workers: Many of the informal-sector workers in Kenya 
lack access to basic social protection, leaving them vulnerable to occupa-
tional health and safety risks but also unprotected in case of unemploy-
ment, accident, sickness or old-age. Good social provisions can strengthen 
individual health and well-being of informal-sector workers, as well as to 
improve their capacity to organize themselves and make demands for bet-
ter conditions of work. Some examples include the UMASIDA scheme in 
Tanzania – a community-based insurance model aimed to minimize the 
problem of accessibility to health care services by the informal economy 
workers. Additionally, there is the Self Employed Women’s Association 
(SEWA) that was created to address the welfare of Indian women who 
work informally by taking initiatives to ensure health, income security 
and empowerment. More broadly speaking, policy makers should bear in 
mind that expenditure outlays on such social provision measures should 
be viewed as a long-term investments rather than a risk management or 
crisis-response tool.
Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations
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… and third, to develop a national employment strategy with 
a particular focus on encouraging job creation among youth.
A coherent national employment strategy where labour market policies 
are fully integrated in strategic development and growth plans may yield 
important benefits. Many countries have adopted national employment 
strategies, including a multi-year Action Plan for Jobs implemented in 
Ireland that puts employment-friendly policies at the heart of the recov-
ery efforts. Policymakers in Kenya could learn from the strengths and 
weaknesses of these initiatives for the development of their own strategy. 
Not only will this help to improve the content and design of programmes 
for youth, but it will also help to ensure a more inclusive process that 
views youth as central to providing solutions, as opposed to being a source 
of problems. Several areas of initiatives could be part of such a strategy, 
including:   
 
•	 Re-orient the suite of existing programmes to better align them with youth 
employment challenges: While the efforts to date to address youth-employ-
ment challenges have been a welcome initiative, they remain too general 
in their approach. This is, they target young people in general but fail to 
identify those in greatest need and to address the main challenges of youth 
in Kenya, notably; (i) lack of job opportunities available to them; and, 
(ii) their low employability for the few jobs that are available. Policies and 
programmes that target a specific challenge – e.g. having the right set of 
skills – are more effective and efficient than simply targeting an age group. 
To improve the relevance of the existing programmes for youth, the fol-
lowing issues need to be addressed:
• Improve skills matching and school-to-work transitions, including ele-
ments of soft-skills development: There is a common view among the 
different stakeholders in Kenya that one of the reasons for the high 
proportion of the youth out of employment is the prevalence of a 
mismatch between the skills youth have and those needed by the 
labour market. The Report underlines the importance of education 
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and training policies, but especially when adapted to the needs of the 
labour market. For instance, the Republic of Korea and Singapore 
not only addressed the issue of the quality of education (includ-
ing secondary and tertiary education) but also improved vocational 
skills, which they rightly believed were essential factors in improving 
productivity and competitiveness. Both countries introduced train-
ing levies to encourage enterprises to participate in workers training. 
Moreover, the combination of education and training could be com-
plemented with policies that help the youth acquire work experience 
to ensure their long-term integration into the labour market. The 
programmes Joven in Chile and Juventud y Empleo in Dominican 
Republic aimed to provide youth not only with technical skills, but 
also with necessary soft skills for the labour market.
• Ensure equity in programme participation, especially for women and youth 
in rural areas: To ensure equity in programme participation and to 
combat discrimination, the Programme for the Promotion of Children 
and Youth (PCY) was implemented in Uganda between 2003 and 
2006. The PCY was a Ugandan–German comprehensive approach 
to promote the interests of disadvantaged youth living in rural areas, 
suffering from either unemployment or underemployment.
• Supporting the most vulnerable: Traditional employment policies may 
be ill-suited to ‘activate’ youth who are discouraged and have been 
out of the labour market for long periods of time. For instance, in 
Egypt, in an effort to promote the reintegration of youth into the 
labour market and society more broadly, a UNESCO-funded pro-
gramme provides youth with literacy training, vocational education, 
life-skills, as well as computer and foreign language skills.
•	 Improve the employment content of growth: In an effort to achieve a more 
equitable distribution of the gains from growth, some countries have 
undertaken measures that provide incentives to enterprises to hire young 
workers, while others have promoted entrepreneurship among youth. 
Examples of initiatives are detailed below: 
Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations
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• Targeted subsidies and other measures to encourage the hiring of youth: 
Governments can support youth labour demand by providing incen-
tives to enterprises to hire young workers, through subsidized wages 
or tax breaks. The First Employment Programme established in Brazil, 
Colombia, Paraguay and recently Mexico and the Youth Wage Subsidy 
Programme in Turkey, are examples of this type of programmes that 
provide subsidies to companies to encourage the recruitment of 
young people. For these programmes to be effective, it is impor-
tant to make sure they are targeted enough to a particularly affected 
population, for example, by offering the training grant subsidy to 
firms that hire youth that have yet to complete secondary school or 
to offer subsidized wages to youth who are long-term unemployed. 
This is what the First Employment Programme has done targeting 
youth who have no labour market experience. 
• Promoting entrepreneurship among youth: Another type of measure 
that can also help increase employment levels among youth is pro-
moting entrepreneurship among the youth. Successful entrepreneur-
ship programmes incorporate not only start-up assistance but also 
knowledge of how to maintain and develop business activities. For 
example, the Northern Uganda’s Youth Opportunities Programme offers 
young people aged 16 to 35 cash grants to cover training programmes 
and the tools and materials needed to run a business.
• Promote cohesion between adults and youth. It is important to remem-
ber that youth and adults are not substitutes in the labour market, 
and the promotion (or discouragement) of one is not to the detri-
ment (or benefit) of the other. All too often, it is wrongly assumed 
that early retirement will open up positions for youth – which 
has had the unfortunate effect of creating an adverse relationship 
between the two groups. Both young and adult workers are central 
to a productive and efficient labour market. Furthermore, through 
contact with more experienced workers via mentoring, young work-
ers can better instil good practices at the workplace and help to dispel 
misconceptions regarding the attitudes of youth. The recent initia-
13  
tive of the Kenya government to launch an internship programme is 
welcome but will need to be monitored carefully to ensure that the 
above policy parameters and principles are integrated and taken into 
consideration.
•	 A coherent and tripartite strategy to leverage the above complementarities 
will be needed: Engaging in social dialogue with relevant stakeholders 
when pursuing policy initiatives for youths is also imperative to ensure 
that measures are tackling the needs of the labour market. Indeed, social 
dialogue with relevant stakeholders can help to bridge information asym-
metries between the government, employers and youth, target specific 
needs of workers and employers and promote strategic partnerships 
aimed at achieving longer-term sustainable outcomes. Some areas and 
examples that Kenya could draw on in the future are detailed below:
• Building partnerships with the private sector and with international 
organizations: Fostering collaboration with these structures is essen-
tial, not only to facilitate the integration of partners’ needs into 
national employment policies but also to allow private partners to 
integrate into the budgeting and planning aspects of employment 
strategies. South Africa, for example, instituted a statutory levy in 
April 2000 to be invested in training and development as part of the 
Government’s skills strategy. In addition, partnerships with interna-
tional organizations could also play a crucial role. The ILO’s Youth 
Employment Programme (YEP) follows an integrated approach that 
combines macroeconomic policies and targeted measures, address-
ing labour demand and supply, as well as the quantity and quality of 
employment.
• Promote youth engagement in the process: Youth are themselves, cru-
cial stakeholders for the discussion, creation and implementation of 
youth employment policies and programmes. They are the future 
national labour force and as such represent an immense opportunity 
and a potential for the country’s future development prospects. One 
example of a country that has made efforts to involve the youth 
Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations
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or youth organizations in its youth employment policies and pro-
grammes is Sri Lanka. The National Action Plan for Youth Employment 
in Sri Lanka involved youth throughout the country in the design 
and running of the consultative process. As a result of these consul-
tations, concrete inputs were met, such as the recommendation of 
fifteen amendments that were taken into account in the final draft 
of the National Action Plan. 
• Improved monitoring and evaluation of programmes: The ability of 
policy makers to improve the effectiveness of existing (and new) 
programmes depends very much on a proper evaluation framework. 
Generally, however, little is known about the effectiveness of the 
existing suite of efforts. First, there is a need to gather and monitor 
pre- and post-programme information and results. To the extent pos-
sible, a vast range of information should be gathered: cost, employ-
ment status, earnings, demographic information, education level, 
etc. Second, it is critical to continue to monitor participants over 
longer periods. Given that in many cases returns to programmes, 
in particular training for youth, accrue over time, monitoring par-
ticipants and outcomes beyond programme exit, e.g. for 3-5 years, 
should be part of any monitoring and evaluation strategy. Finally, 
the government needs to establish at the outset, clear and measur-
able objectives with respect to expected outcomes in the short- and 
long-term.
The task is not a simple one but it is possible provided that employment 
goals are better integrated into current strategic growth and development plans.
The inaugural five-year Medium-Term Plan (MTP) of Vision 2030  
was completed in 2012 and the next leg of the process is intended to take 
place from 2013 to 2017. This would provide an excellent opportunity  
to mainstream labour market policies into development planning. More fun-
damentaly, the new Government could take steps to ensure a more equitable 
growth process.
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The new Government will, however, have to work closely with social  
partners – that is representations from the Central Organization of Trade 
Unions (COTU) and Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE). Indeed, effec-
tive social dialogue can ensure the best possible design of reforms and increase 
the likelihood of equitable and sustainable policies being implemented. In 
this respect, the ILO through its technical and research capacity and as a 
facilitator of tripartite dialogue has an important role to play along with the 
Government and social partners to ensure growth with equity.
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 CHApTER 1 
 ECONOMIC AND lABOUR MARKET pERfORMANCE
 
 INTRODUCTION
During the past three decades, Kenya’s economic stability has been affected 
not only by a series of droughts and the volatility of commodity prices, but 
also by ethnic conflict and political instability. Since 1980, there have been 
only two periods (1986–1988 and 2003–2007) during which economic 
growth exceeded 5 per cent and was sustained for at least 3 years. The most 
recent period of growth was abruptly ended by a wave of ethnic violence 
following a disputed presidential election coupled with the global economic 
crisis. Against the backdrop of an unstable growth pattern, progress in labour 
market and social developments has been slow. Employment rates in Kenya 
are low compared to its African counterparts due to the weak labour mar-
ket participation of women and youth, combined with the fact that many 
of the job gains during the recent expansionary period took place in the 
informal sector and were therefore of insufficient quality to raise workers 
out of poverty.
The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on recent economic and labour 
market developments in order to assess the labour market and social chal-
lenges to achieving a more inclusive and employment-rich growth trajectory. 
In particular, section A reviews the economic developments leading up to 
the crisis, including a discussion of the drivers of this performance. Section 
B assesses in more detail the labour market impacts stemming from the high 
volatility of GDP. This section also highlights the heterogeneous evolution 
of labour market trends among different groups in society and discusses the 
situation facing certain groups of vulnerable workers, including youth and 
those workers in precarious forms of employment. Section C takes a closer 
look at how Kenyan households are constrained by persistent income and 
non-income inequalities, including the issue of poverty. The final section of 
this chapter discusses a number of policy considerations and introduces the 
remainder of the report.
Chapter 1 Economic and labour market performance
KENYA : MAKING QUAlITY EMplOYMENT THE DRIvER Of DEvElOpMENT
 18
A MACROECONOMIC DEvElOpMENTS BEfORE 
 AND DURING THE CRISIS
The fast pace of economic growth in Kenya that began in 2003 
was interrupted by a political and economic crisis in 2008...
In 2003, Kenya’s economic performance accelerated after a decade of poor 
economic growth. During this 5-year period of sustained growth, real GDP 
growth increased on an annual basis from 0.3 per cent in 2002 to almost 
7 per cent in 2007 – on a par with growth in sub-Saharan Africa and 
slightly above the global growth rate of 5.4 per cent (figure 1.1, panel A). 
Importantly, economic growth during this period took place in spite of a 
resurgence of drought that negatively affected the agricultural sector. The 
expansionary phase was a result of the emergence and resurgence of other 
sectors, notably tourism. Manufacturing, transport and communications 
also showed signs of renewed growth in response to a number of incentive 
structures introduced by the Government (AfDB and OECD, 2006).
  
In 2008, however, economic recovery ended abruptly as both investment 
and exports collapsed. First, the post-election violence that broke out at 
the beginning of 2008 affected almost every sector of the economy during 
the first quarter. Second, the country was heavily impacted by the global 
increase in commodity prices at the end of 2008. Food and oil prices soared 
during the course of the year and were passed directly on to consumers 
through a significant increase in the costs of electricity and transportation, 
which also resulted in higher manufacturing costs. This problem was exac-
erbated by the drought that had been affecting production in the Horn of 
Africa since 2007 (see Chapter 2). 
As a result, at the beginning of 2008, quarterly GDP fell to 1 per cent in the 
first quarter (figure 1.1, panel B and AfDB and OECD, 2009). Moreover, 
in comparison to neighbouring countries, such as Tanzania, quarterly GDP 
growth in Kenya remained suppressed throughout the year and was con-
sistently low throughout 2008. And, while there was a brief respite at the 
beginning of 2009, growth slowed again to hover just above zero by the 
end of the year. However, by the end of 2010 the economy had achieved 
figure 1.1  Real GDp growth
*Figures for 2012 are estimated values.
Source: IMF, 2012; AfDB et al., 2012; Kenya Bureau of National Statistics.
 panel A. Annual real GDp growth, 2002–2012 (percentages)
 panel B. Quarterly real GDp growth rate, Q1 2007–Q3 2012 
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*Figures for 2012 are estimated values.
Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.
figure 1.2  Real GDp growth by component, 2007–2012 (percentages)
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an impressive growth rate of 7.3 per cent – comparable to that of emerging 
economies during the same period.
… but the economy recovered in 2010 due to strong growth 
in exports and increases in infrastructure spending by the Government.
After a period of instability and adjustment occasioned by the various crises, 
a strong recovery took hold in 2010. The increase in growth can be attrib-
uted mainly to a full recovery of exports and significant gains in investment  
(figure 1.2). Indeed, good rainfall during 2010, coupled with higher prices for 
some Kenyan export products, in particular coffee,1 resulted in an impressive 
recovery in the growth rate of exports – from -7.0 to 6.1 per cent between 
2009 and 2010. In addition, gross fixed investment grew by 7.4 per cent in 
2010, close to 7 percentage points above the growth in 2009. The Economic 
Stimulus Programme (ESP) put in place by the Government in 2009/2010 
played an important part in boosting infrastructure and creating credit for 
1 Average annual prices for coffee sales more than doubled in 1 year; from 195.75 Kenyan Shillings (KSh) 
to 396.78 KSh per kilogram between 2009 and 2010 (AfDB et al., 2011).
Electricity and water 
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figure 1.3 Real GDp growth by economic activity, between Q4 2010 and Q4 2011 
 (percentage change)  
Source: Kenya Bureau of National Statistics.
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small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (AfDB et al., 2011), which in 
turn boosted investment and economic growth. Real GDP growth in the 
third quarter of 2012 fell moderately to 4.7 per cent, however, it is expected 
– in the absence of economic and social turbulence – to grow at 5.1 and 5.6 
per cent in 2012 and 2013, respectively (World Bank, 2012).
Wholesale and retail trade, along with the transport 
and communications sectors, were the main drivers of the recovery …
Tourism, wholesale and retail trade and communications were the fast-
est growing sectors in 2011 in terms of economic performance. Indeed, 
between the fourth quarters of 2010 and 2011, GDP in hotels and restau-
rants grew 8.2 per cent. Similarly, GDP in wholesale and retail trade, which 
accounts for over 14 per cent of total GDP, grew by 6.7 per cent and GDP 
in transport and communications by 6.2 per cent (figure 1.3). Due to their 
relative importance in the overall economy, these latter sectors – wholesale 
figure 1.4 Evolution of real GDp per capita 2002–2012 
 (compound annual changes, percentages)
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and retail trade and transport and communications – were also the biggest 
drivers of economic growth during the period 2003–2011, contributing 20 
and 10 per cent to total GDP growth respectively.
… but GDP per capita growth rates remain low in comparison to those 
attained in other sub-Saharan African and emerging and developing countries.
In spite of the improvements in certain sectors, GDP per capita in Kenya 
continues to be well below the levels observed in sub-Saharan Africa and 
in other neighbouring countries, such as Tanzania or Uganda (figure 1.4). 
Even during the growth period of 2002–2007, annual growth in GDP per 
capita in Kenya averaged just 4.7 per cent, compared to over 7 per cent 
in Tanzania and more than 6 per cent in Uganda and sub-Saharan Africa. 
Since 2008, despite a strong recovery, the gap between Kenya and other 
emerging and developing countries has persisted, with the pace of per capita 
GDP growth slowing to an average of 3 per cent per annum. As a result, in 
terms of the levels in 2012, GDP per capita in Kenya stood at US$1,807 
23  
compared to US$1,217 in 2000 in contrast to Tanzania, which had just 
above half the per capita GDP of Kenya (US$771) in 2000 but, in 2012, 
has all but closed the gap, with per capita GDP rising to US$1,472. 
Moving forward, a number of unresolved vulnerabilities 
will need to be addressed.
Underlying the relatively weak growth performance are a number of persist-
ent vulnerabilities. First, the unpredictable nature of inflation has in many 
instances eroded households’ purchasing power and increased their risks of 
falling into poverty. For Kenya, this is especially worrying since the incidence 
of low earnings and high poverty rates are two major social barriers to progress. 
Inflation in Kenya increased to 18.9 per cent at the end of 2011 – driven 
mainly by food and transport inflation – from 4.5 per cent at the end of 2010. 
Second, Kenya’s economy suffers from its high dependence on agriculture and 
overall declines in productivity. 
Addressing the second issue will be crucial if the country is to attain high-
er and more sustainable rates of economic growth that allow for sufficient 
employment creation. Agriculture represents approximately one-quarter of 
GDP, making Kenya susceptible to nature and commodity price volatility. 
During the cycle of severe droughts that has affected the Horn of Africa since 
2007, Kenya’s food deficit had to be met through highly priced food imports, 
in particular maize.2 Although exports benefit from higher price levels, Kenya’s 
top exports can no longer cover the costs of oil and highly priced food imports 
and, as a result, the current account deficit hit close to 10 per cent of GDP in 
2011. Achieving macroeconomic stability in these areas and improving invest-
ment and productivity are important elements in achieving more sustained 
economic growth, which will in turn increase employment opportunities. 
These and other related macroeconomic issues are discussed in Chapter 2.
2 Global maize prices increased from an average of US$167 per tonne in 2010 to US$299 in 2011. Moreover, 
Kenyans themselves paid up to US$530 per tonne of maize, due to additional policy distortions that disrupted 
the domestic food market. 
figure 1.5  Real GDp and employment growth, selected countries 
 (compound growth rate between 2003 and 2012,* percentages)
*Figures for 2012 are estimated values.
Source: IMF, 2012; ILO, 2012c.
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B lABOUR MARKET pERfORMANCE
Employment has grown in Kenya at a pace similar to that of other African 
and emerging and developing countries outside the region …
The evolution of real GDP and employment during the past decade has varied 
considerably across countries in Africa (figure 1.5). Since economic growth 
picked up in Kenya in 2003, employment has grown at an average of 3 per cent 
per annum – a rate which is comparable to the average annual employment 
growth for sub-Saharan Africa and above the employment growth achieved in 
developing and emerging countries of other regions, such as Bangladesh (2.2 
per cent), Brazil (2.2 per cent), Indonesia (2 per cent) and Tunisia (2.1 per 
cent) as well as neighbouring countries (with the exception of Ethiopia with 
3.5 per cent): Tanzania (2.9 per cent) and Uganda (2.9 per cent). 
 
25  
… but employment rates remain lower in Kenya 
than in the rest of Africa, especially for youth and women …
Since 2003, employment growth has outpaced the growth in working-age pop-
ulation, and has therefore been sufficient to absorb the new entrants into the 
labour market. Indeed, the employment rate (measured as the employment-
to-population ratio) has increased – albeit marginally – from 59.7 per cent in 
2003 to 60.6 in 2012. However, this increase represents only an insignificant 
reversal of the decline experienced in the employment rate since the beginning 
of the 1990s. In fact, the employment rate fell by over 7 percentage points 
from 67 per cent between 1991 and 2003. As a result, the employment rate in 
Kenya remains low in comparison to the average level in sub-Saharan Africa: 
in 2012 it stood at 60.6 per cent in Kenya compared to 65.1 per cent for sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole. The gap between Kenya and sub-Saharan Africa 
in terms of gender is similar, with the employment rate among men being 
5 percentage points lower in Kenya than in sub-Saharan Africa and among 
women almost 4 percentage points lower (figure 1.6, panel A). 
The gap in employment rates is almost entirely explained by the gap among 
youth cohorts. In fact, the employment rate for people aged 15 to 24 is close 
to 14.5 percentage points lower in Kenya, with the difference being even more 
pronounced among female cohorts of the same age – at over 15 percentage 
points.3 Moreover, the total employment rate for women is among the lowest in 
sub-Saharan Africa (figure 1.6, panel B) and has fallen below the level attained 
in 2000. Only four other countries in the region – Angola, Mozambique, 
Uganda and Zambia – have seen a decline in the employment rate of women 
and, of those four, three initially had much higher levels than that of Kenya.
… which is partly explained by comparatively low levels 
of participation in the labour market.
However, the relatively low employment-to-population ratio among women 
and youth is driven primarily by weak labour force participation rather than 
higher unemployment rates. In fact, in 2012 female labour force partici-
pation, at 61.7 per cent, was over 10 percentage points below the male 
3 The Government of Kenya defines youth as the population between the ages of 15 and 30 years. To 
comply with this definition, the analysis in this report will take into account, whenever possible, the inter-
national definition of youth (15–24) and an enlarged sample of youth (15–34). Given that the most com-
monly employed categorization of the population is by decade, starting with 15 years of age, the specific 
Kenyan national definition of youth is not applicable.
figure 1.6  Employment rates by age and sex  
 (percentages)
Source: ILO, 2012c for panel A and World Bank Development Indicators for panel B.
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4 Youth in this graph is defined as the population aged 15 to 24 since it is not possible to calculate employ-
ment rates by the wider category of youth.
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participation rate. Moreover, during the past decade, participation rates 
among women have declined by nearly 1.5 percentage points. Similarly, in 
2012, labour market participation among youth was 39.5 per cent, which 
is 5 percentage points lower than in 2000.5 The problem is particularly 
acute among young women, who appear to be one of the most vulnerable 
groups (see Chapter 3).
In comparison to results for the region, the female and youth participation 
rates in Kenya are 2.9 and 14 percentage points respectively below the aver-
age observed for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Even in terms of the overall 
population, labour market participation is comparatively low: 66.8 per cent 
in 2012 in comparison to neighbouring countries, such as Tanzania and 
Uganda, where participation rates are approximately 89 and 78 per cent 
respectively, and lower than the averages for low-income countries (75.1 
per cent) and for sub-Saharan Africa (70.4 per cent).6
Employment creation during the past decade 
has been mainly concentrated in urban informal-sector enterprises …
As in other developing countries, informal-sector employment in Kenya 
– which includes employment in urban informal-sector enterprises7 – con-
stitutes an important element of the labour market and has been the biggest 
contributor to employment creation during the past decade.8 In 2011, non-
agricultural informal-sector employment accounted for 64 per cent of total 
employment in Kenya. Moreover, the share of informal-sector employment 
rose by more than 25 percentage points between 2000 and 2011, and the 
number of people in informal employment increased by approximately 5.1 
million during that decade (see Chapter 3). 
5 Participation rates among individuals aged 15 to 34 stood at 57.6 per cent in 2011, a decline of nearly 2 
percentage points since 2000.
6 The fact that participation rates in Kenya are lower than those in sub-Saharan Africa – which has a higher 
GDP per capita – is somewhat surprising given that analyses of the overall labour force participation rates 
of countries at different stages of development find a U-shaped relationship between these two variables. 
That is to say, in less-developed countries, economic growth is associated with a decline in participation 
rates (ILO, 2012c).
7 Defined by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics as small-scale activities (with fewer than ten employ-
ees) that are semi-organized, unregulated and use simple technologies.
8 The 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians defined informal employment as encompassing 
both employment in the informal sector and informal workers in the formal sector (whether employees or 
contributing family workers) as well as persons working in households, such as domestic employees and 
those who produce goods for their own end use (see ILO, 2002). In Kenya, however, only data on employ-
ment in informal-sector enterprises are gathered and therefore available figures are underestimations.
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Unfortunately, in Kenya the publically available data on categorization of 
jobs by employment status do not include own-account workers in the agri-
culture sector and employees engaged in small-scale agricultural activities. 
However, by combining existing national statistics and estimates on total 
employment produced by the ILO (2012c), it is possible to extrapolate the 
missing category. It can therefore be estimated that, in 2011, close to 21 per 
cent of total employment was comprised of agricultural self-employed and 
employees engaged in small-scale agricultural activities.9 This constitutes an 
important reversal from the figure of almost 45 per cent at the beginning of 
the decade. Thus, it appears that at least part of the decrease in employment 
in agricultural activities has been absorbed by the increase in employment 
in urban informal-sector enterprises. 
In terms of sectoral distribution, employment in the sector of wholesale 
and retail trade, restaurants and hotels has been the main driver of employ-
ment growth in the urban informal sector. Indeed, in 2011, 96 per cent of 
employment in this sector corresponded to employees working in informal- 
sector enterprises. Moreover, with an annual average growth rate of 6.6 per 
cent between 2003 and 2011, the sector accounted for almost two-thirds of 
total employment growth in informal-sector enterprises. The second main 
contributor to the growth in informal-sector employment is the manufac-
turing sector: in 2011, 87 per cent of employees in that sector were working 
in informal-sector enterprises and accounted for more than 16 per cent of 
the informal-sector employment created between 2003 and 2011. 
The creation of salaried jobs in formal-sector enterprises has been driven by 
growth in transport and communications and wholesale and retail trade …
As highlighted in section A, growth since 2003 has been mainly driven by 
the progress of the transport and communications and wholesale and retail 
trade sectors. Not surprisingly, employment growth in these sectors was the 
highest of all the sectors. In fact, during the period 2003–2011, employ-
ment in the transport and communications sector increased at an average 
annual rate of 7.7 per cent, followed by the sector of wholesale and retail 
9 Small-scale agricultural activities are not categorized in Kenya as part of the informal sector but, since 96 
per cent of the agriculture sector consists of agricultural self-employed and workers engaged in small-scale 
agricultural activities, it seems pertinent to include them here.
Source: Kenya Economic Surveys. 
figure 1.7 Share of employment by economic activity in total salaried employment 
 in 2003 and 2011 and in the change between 2003–2011 (percentages)
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trade, restaurants and hotels (4.9 per cent). Meanwhile, employment in the 
services sector grew by 2 per cent per year, in the agriculture sector by 1.1 
per cent and in the manufacturing sector by 1.8 per cent. 
Yet, in terms of overall composition, the community, social and personal 
services sector10 – taking into account its relative size – was the main driver 
of salaried job creation accounting for close to one-third of the jobs creat-
ed between 2003 and 2011 (figure 1.7). Moreover, 56 per cent of the total 
number of female salaried jobs are concentrated in this sector. The wholesale 
and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, and transport and communications 
sectors were also important sources of job creation during the period, account-
ing for close to 19 and 18 per cent of total employment growth, respectively. 
Importantly, the concentration of female salaried jobs in the services sector is 
higher than that of men. Conversely, both the manufacturing and financial 
and real estate sectors experienced a fall in their share of employment but 
together still account for close to 30 per cent of salaried employment.11
10 This sector includes: professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service 
activities; public administration and defence; compulsory social security; education; human health and 
social work activities; arts, entertainment and recreation and other service activities.
11 Some have argued that Kenya’s manufacturing industry has lagged due to the lack of investment, given 
the perception of the environment for investors as risky and also the rather high costs (relative to productiv-
ity) of doing business in Kenya (Bigsten et al., 2010).
Note: Figures contained within the bars represent the contribution of each segment to total employment in 
that year and are in percentages. For the definition of casual workers, see footnote 12.
Source: Kenya Economic Surveys.
figure 1.8 Waged formal-sector employment by type, 2000–2011 (in thousands)
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… but an increasing number of the jobs created 
in the formal sector are casual in nature.
Between 2003 and 2011, employment in formal sector enterprises in Kenya 
grew by just over 23 per cent (compared to over 120 per cent in informal- 
sector enterprises). However, the vast majority of formal jobs in this period 
were casual in nature: regular employment grew by 7 per cent over this 
period compared to 87 per cent growth in casual employment.12 As a result, 
the proportion of casual employment in total formal-sector employment 
increased from 20 per cent in 2003 to over 30 per cent in 2011 (figure 
1.8).13
12 Casual workers are individuals whose terms of engagement provide for payment at the end of each day 
and who are not engaged for a period longer than 24 hours at a time (Republic of Kenya, 2007). This 
category of workers enjoys the same rights as other employees to a large extent, but may be excluded from 
certain crucial benefits, such as leave entitlement, medical cover or provision of accommodation. 
13 Some studies indicate that this increase in the incidence of casual employment is due to a preference on 
the part of employers for these types of contracts. Indeed, most employers in Kenya have tended to increase 
the use of casual contracts to reduce labour costs, achieve more flexibility in management and exert greater 
levels of control over labour. The trend is mainly observed within textile and garment manufacturing, 
especially in the export processing zones, and the plantation sector. The situation is fuelled by weak enforce-
ment of labour legislation (Omolo, 2012).
Private
Public
Semi-public
Salaried employees 
 
Own-account workers
Table 1.1 Median real monthly incomes (wages or business revenues) 
 by category of employment, 2006 (in KSh)
Source: Pollin, 2009.
FormalInformal Formal to informal wage rate
6,160
15,375
12,800
6,000
2,880
2,600
2.1
5.3
4.4
2.3
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C SOCIAl CONSIDERATIONS
Kenyan workers’ livelihoods are 
constrained by a variety of persistent income disparities …
Overall, income inequalities are relatively high in Kenya: in 2005, the Gini 
coefficient stood at 47.7 – the sixth highest among the 24 African countries 
with available information. This overall level of income disparities is rooted 
in a number of different, although interconnected, forms of wage inequali-
ties. For example, data from the 2005–2006 Kenya Integrated Household 
Budget Survey (KIHBS) show that the median monthly income of formal 
workers is higher than that of informal-sector workers by a factor of at 
least 2 (private sector), rising to 4.4 and 5.3 among semi-public and public 
workers, respectively (see table 1.1). Even own-account workers in the for-
mal sector earned a median salary (6,000 KSh per month) which was 2.3 
times that of their informal counterparts (2,600 KSh per month). Given 
the trend increase in informal-sector employment discussed above, it is not 
surprising that overall wage developments have been adversely affected by 
this specific type of employment creation.
There are also important disparities within the formal sector. Indeed, in 
2010 monthly public sector wages were, on average, more than 25 per cent 
higher than those in the private sector. Moreover, in only 3 out of 10 sectors 
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are the wages of private sector workers higher, with the disparity reaching 
a peak among manufacturing workers where public sector workers earn, 
on average, twice the salary of their private sector counterparts per month 
(figure 1.9).14 Yet, Kenyan employees in formal sector enterprises continue 
to earn less than their counterparts in other countries in the region. In 
2009, for example, Kenyans earned, on average, US$835.6 per month, while 
the average wage in all African countries with available information was 
US$1,167.9 per month.15 In addition, in Kenya, between 2006 and 2011, 
average real earnings decreased by 27.8 per cent, putting additional pressure 
on household incomes and increasing the risk of a rise in poverty levels.
There are also important wage disparities across economic sectors, with 
financial and real estate activities paying the highest wages, both in the 
public and private sectors, followed closely by transport and communica-
tions activities and public-sector activities related to trade, restaurants and 
hotels. Indeed, compared to the lowest earning activities (i.e. agriculture 
and foresting, and mining and quarrying) workers engaged in the financial 
and real estate sector earn, on average, around four to five times more per 
month. Importantly, one of the lowest paid sectors is the community, social 
and personal services sector, which accounted for one-third of jobs created 
in the past decade and represents more than 40 per cent of total salaried 
employment.
… and by high levels of poverty … 
Poverty still affects a significant percentage of the population in Kenya. 
According to the International Human Development Indicators of the 
UNDP (2011), 47.8 per cent of the population lives in poverty in Kenya 
– as measured by the percentage of the population having a weighted dep-
rivation score of at least 33 per cent.16 In comparison, 27.2 per cent of 
the population lives in poverty in Bhutan, 34.5 per cent in São Tomé and 
14 Large disparities also exist between urban and rural areas in all sectors of economy activity. When all 
employment categories are taken into account, urban workers earn about twice as much as rural workers in 
the same job category (Pollin, 2009).
15 Information on gross average nominal monthly wages comes from the ILO Global Wages Database and 
is available for the following African countries: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Egypt, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.
16 Calculated based on data on household deprivations in education, health and living standards (UNDP, 
2011). 
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Príncipe, 49.4 per cent in Pakistan and 41.4 per cent in Swaziland; all of 
these countries have around the same level of development as Kenya (as 
measured by the Human Development Index). Moreover, 19.7 per cent of 
the population still lives in extreme poverty, which is below the interna-
tional poverty line of 1.25 dollars per day (in PPP terms). Yet, this is still 
below international poverty levels in most of Kenya’s African counterparts 
(with the exception of Cameroon and South Africa) and other developing 
countries at similar levels of development, such as Bangladesh (49.6 per 
cent), Cambodia (28.3 per cent) and Pakistan (22.6 per cent).
Importantly, although poverty is often associated with joblessness, the earn-
ings of a significant proportion of workers do not allow them to rise above a 
given poverty line. According to ILO estimates (ILO, 2012a), in 2011, 67.1 
per cent of workers in sub-Saharan Africa were classified as “working poor” 
(i.e. those who are working but live still in poverty),17 which is more than 
35 percentage points higher than the global figure. In Kenya, in 2006 (the 
latest year for which information on working poor exists) the proportion of 
working poor in total employment was 33.6 per cent. This is 38 percentage 
points lower than in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole but still higher than in 
a number of African countries, such as Gabon (14.2 per cent), Egypt (21.5 
per cent) or South Africa (23.2 per cent), and much higher than in other 
countries at similar levels of development in other regions, such as Paraguay 
(11 per cent) and the Republic of Moldova (11 per cent).18
Low levels of income, either because workers cannot work enough hours 
or because wages are low, are one of the major factors determining the 
persistence of working poverty (ILO, 2003). In Kenya, in 2010, all work-
ers engaged by formal sector enterprises earned a salary that was, on aver-
age, above both the national and international poverty lines. Yet, when 
salaries are adjusted for the fact that the average worker in Kenya sup-
ports themselves and 1.9 other people,19 the earnings for workers in  
 
17 According to the ILO, “working poor” is defined as the proportion of employed persons in a household 
whose members are living below the international poverty line, in this case US$2 per day (in PPP terms).
18 Data refer to the year 2005 (Egypt and Gabon), 2006 (South Africa), and 2008 (Paraguay and the 
Republic of Moldova).
19 Average number of individuals supported by each wage earner based on Kenya Household Survey.
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figure 1.9 Real monthly wages per person supported by wage earner21 by economic sector  
 and poverty lines, 2010 (based on PPP current international dollars)
Private sector
Public sector
Note: Private- and public-sector information by economic activity refers to the formal sector. 
*National poverty line (overall poverty line): Cost of purchasing a minimally adequate level of food and a 
minimal level of consumable goods other than food in the urban sector. Adjusted for inflation and converted 
to PPP international dollars, the Kenyan overall poverty line is equivalent to $139 per month. 
**International poverty line: An international monetary threshold under which an individual is considered to 
be living in poverty. The World Bank defines the population below the poverty line as that proportion of the 
population living on less than US$2.00 per day at 2005 international prices. 
 
Source: Kenya Economic Survey.
Poverty line 1*
Poverty line 2**
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agriculture and forestry and in the public mining and quarrying sector fall 
below the national poverty line (figure 1.9). Informal-sector workers20 – 
who account for 85 per cent of total employment – also earn, on average, 
less per month than the established international and national poverty lines 
when the number of individuals supported by the wage earner is taken into 
consideration.
 
20 Including informal agricultural workers.  
21 The average number of people supported by one wage earner equalled 2.9 in 2010. See also footnote 19.
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Male
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Female
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Male
Female
Literacy rate (% of population 
aged 15 and above)
Gross primary 
school enrolment (%)
Gross secondary 
school enrolment (%)
Gross tertiary 
school enrolment (%)
Table 1.2 Education indicators by sex, 2000–2009/10 (percentages)
Note: Gross enrolment ratio is the total enrolment in each level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a 
percentage of the population of official age corresponding to that level.
Literacy rates for sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa correspond to 2008.
Source: World Bank Statistics, Kenya Economic Survey and United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). 
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… and by a number of inequalities that are not income related. 
Inequalities in access to health and education can exacerbate poverty and 
lead to greater marginalization within society, reinforcing a vicious circle 
than dampens development prospects (ILO, 2012b). In Kenya, there has 
been significant progress in a number of areas, notably for initial and basic 
education, but tertiary enrolment remains low (table 1.2). Indeed, in terms 
of literacy rates and access to primary education, both men and women 
have seen dramatic improvements over the past decade. In 2009, only 13 
per cent of the Kenyan population aged 15 years and above were illiterate. 
This figure is 13 percentage points lower than in 2000 and 24 percentage 
points lower than in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. This improvement in 
literacy rates is largely due to the population’s increased access to educa-
tion. In fact, the gross primary school enrolment ratio has increased by 8 
percentage points from 95.2 per cent in 2000 to 113.3 per cent in 2009. 
Likewise, the gross secondary school enrolment ratio, at 60.2 per cent in 
2009, has increased by more than 20 percentage points relative to the rate 
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at 2000. In comparison, 99.6 per cent and 39.6 per cent of the popula-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa had access to primary and secondary education, 
respectively, in 2010. 
However, improvements have been slow – in fact, almost non-existent – 
with regard to tertiary education where the enrolment rates are far below 
international standards. Indeed, in 2009 only 4 per cent of the Kenyan 
population were enrolled in tertiary education – an increase of only 1.3 
percentage points since 2000. This is almost 3 percentage points lower 
than in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and more than 25 points below the 
average for North Africa. Moreover, inequalities in access to education are 
particularly acute between men and women – while 63.2 per cent of men 
had access to secondary education in 2009, only 57 per cent of women 
could benefit from this opportunity. As a result, the literacy rate is 7 per-
centage points lower among women than among men. 
Inequality with respect to food access and affordability in Kenya is also 
somewhat alarming. So-called food poverty (i.e. the inability to afford or 
have reasonable access to food which provides a healthy diet) can impact 
health and human capital development. In Kenya, the percentage of the 
population who continuously have an insufficient food intake to meet die-
tary energy requirements (i.e. the prevalence of undernourished individu-
als) is 33 per cent. This is more than 10 percentage points higher than the 
share observed in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (22 per cent). The severe 
effect of rising food prices over recent years has only aggravated this situ-
ation in Kenya. Indeed, since 2007, consumer food prices have increased 
continuously in Kenya at a significantly higher rate than that observed in 
the world as a whole (box 1.1).
 
Box 1.1  Evolution of food prices and their impact on inequality and poverty
 
Between January 2007 and June 2012, the consumer food price index in Kenya increased 
by more than 100 percentage points, compared to a 26 percentage point global average 
(figure 1.10). Changes in food prices can have detrimental effects in terms of poverty 
and inequality through consumption and income channels. It is true that the rise in 
food prices could potentially lead to an increase in the incomes of those whose earnings 
arise from the agricultural sector (such as self-employed farmers, salaried workers in 
the agricultural sector and rural landowners). However, an increase in food prices also 
raises the cost for households of acquiring a fixed basket of consumables, hence reduc-
ing consumers’ welfare and aggravating poverty and income inequalities (Deaton, 1989; 
Ravallion, 1990; De Hoyos and Medvedev, 2008). 
The global rise in commodity prices at the end of 2008 was passed directly on to con-
sumers through a significant increase in the costs of electricity and transportation. This 
also resulted in higher manufacturing costs, adding to inflationary pressures, which still 
constitute an important challenge for the country. In addition, the World of Work Report 
2011 found that the positive agricultural income effect of the rise in food prices has 
been limited. On the contrary, there is significant evidence of the negative poverty effect 
associated with higher food prices. Indeed, in around 50 per cent of the countries with 
available information, the share of food expenditure in household incomes among the 
poorest population quintile is over 60 per cent, reaching 78 per cent in Africa. Moreover, 
the report finds that a further 30 per cent rise in food prices may increase poverty rates 
by 3 percentage points in countries with chronic food shortages. This rise in food prices 
would mean that low-paid workers would need more than a week’s additional work per 
month in other to maintain their living standards (ILO, 2011). 
Source: Laborsta and FAO. 
figure 1.10  Trends in consumer food price indices, Kenya and the world, 
 January 2007 to June 2012
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D CONClUDING REMARKS
Kenya has fared relatively well during the crisis and its output in the fourth 
quarter of 2010 rebounded to more than 7 per cent. This comes on the 
heels of a fairly robust growth period between 2003 and 2007. The chal-
lenges, however, are twofold. First, the most recent expansionary period was 
rather short and, taking a longer view, it is apparent that growth spells have 
been uneven and over the past several decades growth has lagged in com-
parison to other least developed countries. Of particular concern are the 
high and volatile inflationary pressures, arising in part due to international 
food and fuel prices. Moreover, dependence on agriculture – with conse-
quent susceptibility to nature and recent droughts – coupled with declining 
productivity elsewhere, has negatively impacted the overall macroeconomic 
environment. With this in mind, Chapter 2 of this report studies the drivers 
of macroeconomic instability in Kenya in greater detail to shed light on the 
constraints to accelerating and sustaining economic growth.
Second, the growth that has taken place has not sufficiently translated 
into labour market and social improvements. Employment rates in Kenya 
remain lower than in other sub-Saharan Africa countries, due to the lower 
participation rate of women and youth in the labour market. Chapter 3 will 
therefore examine the labour market challenges confronting young women 
and men and suggest measures designed to improve the employment and 
income situation of this important group. Moreover, employment creation 
during the past decade has been concentrated mainly in informal-sector 
enterprises, a fact that has fuelled a number of significant disparities in 
earnings, increasing the risk of families falling into poverty. Against this 
background, Chapter 4 will analyse the issue of informal-sector workers 
and the policies required to promote quality job creation.
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Finally, in light of the new government in place as of March 2013, the final 
chapter (Chapter 5) will discuss the policy planks necessary to enhance 
overall employment and social content of growth measures. In particu-
lar, the new government will have to work closely with both workers and 
employers to increase the likelihood that the policies implemented are both 
equitable and sustainable.
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 CHApTER 2 
 MACROECONOMIC pERfORMANCE: 
 DEClINING AND vOlATIlE GDp GROWTH
22
 INTRODUCTION
As seen in the previous chapter, achieving macroeconomic stability and 
tackling its deep-rooted vulnerabilities and structural impediments are key 
to addressing employment and social inequity in Kenya. In general, the low 
rates of economic growth over the years have been insufficient to absorb the 
new labour market entrants. As a result, employment rates have been declin-
ing during the decade and inactivity rates have increased. Furthermore, the 
unpredictable nature of inflation has in many instances eroded households’ 
purchasing power and increased their risk of falling into poverty. In addi-
tion, Kenya’s economy is threatened by its high dependence on agriculture 
and overall declines in productivity. Addressing the latter will be vital if the 
country is to attain higher and more sustainable rates of economic growth, 
which in turn will allow for sufficient employment creation.
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this chapter is to study, in greater 
detail, the drivers of macroeconomic instability in Kenya in order to identify 
appropriate policies to accelerate and sustain employment-centric economic 
growth. In particular, section A reviews the macroeconomic developments 
during the past three decades, comparing the evolution of the Kenyan 
economic growth to that of least developed countries (LDCs). Section 
B documents the decline in competitiveness and productivity, including 
an analysis of the causes and consequences. The final section discusses a 
number of policy considerations necessary to achieving equitable, inclusive 
and sustainable growth in Kenya.
 
 
22 This chapter is authored by Dr Hamid Rashid, Senior Adviser for Macroeconomic Policy in the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) in New York. The views and opin-
ions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations 
Secretariat or the International Labour Organization (ILO). The designations and terminology employed 
may not conform to United Nations practice and do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever 
on the part of the ILO. For questions or comments, please write to rashid12@un.org. 
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A MACROECONOMIC DEvElOpMENTS 
 DURING THE lAST THREE DECADES
The gap between Kenya and LDCs has widened in recent years due to the country’s 
lacklustre economic performance… 
It was only natural that Kenya was not among the LDCs when the United 
Nations first prepared the list of these countries in 1971. Kenya’s per capita 
income in 1971 – one of the key criteria for inclusion in the LDC group – 
was 29 per cent higher than the threshold income set for LDCs. Forty years 
later, the Kenyan per capita income is now 11 per cent below the threshold 
for graduation from the LDC group. As a non-LDC developing economy, 
Kenya grew at an average of 3.4 per cent per year during the period 1981–
2011, while LDCs as a group grew by an average of 4.0 per cent per year 
during the same period. The Kenyan GDP growth was particularly slow 
during the decade of structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s, aver-
aging only 1.9 per cent, compared to a 3.4 per cent growth rate in LDCs. 
The growth gap between Kenya and LDCs further widened during the 
period from 2001 to 2010 as GDP in LDCs grew by 6.3 per cent per year 
while Kenya’s GDP grew by 4.1 per cent annually (figure 2.1).
Kenya’s per capita growth rate has averaged about 0.32 per cent a year dur-
ing the past 30 years, with GDP growth barely keeping pace with the growth 
rate of the population, suggesting that there has been little improvement in 
the living standards of the average Kenyan since the early 1980s. During the 
same period, the per capita income of LDCs grew by 1.5 per cent a year. A 
number of factors explain the low growth performance of Kenya during the 
past 30 years. A combination of falling domestic savings, lack of productive 
investments, inadequate structural transformation, declining labour force 
participation rate, insufficient numbers of new jobs and stagnant produc-
tivity growth depressed the growth of the Kenyan economy.
figure 2.1  GDp growth rates of Kenya and lDCs, 1981–2011 (percentages)
Source: World Bank, 2012.
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… and structural transformation of the economy 
has been slow relative to its counterparts. 
The size of the industrial sector – including manufacturing and non-man-
ufacturing activities – in the total economy has remained unchanged dur-
ing the past 20 years, at 18 per cent of GDP. In comparison, in Tanzania 
and Uganda the relative importance of the industrial sector in GDP has 
increased by 7.8 and 14.4 percentage points respectively during the same 
period, to reach 25.5 per cent of GDP in each country in 2010. Likewise, 
on average, LDCs have seen the relative size of the industrial sector increase 
by 7.6 percentage points, to 28.3 per cent in 2010. The relative growth in 
the industrial sector in these countries, however, is often driven by non-
manufacturing activities (i.e. construction). Indeed, during the past two 
decades, the share of manufacturing activities in GDP in Tanzania increased 
by a mere 0.3 percentage points. Likewise, in the LDCs, the manufacturing 
sector accounted for close to 12 per cent of GDP in 2010 and increased 
figure 2.2   GDp by economic activity, 1990 and 2010
Note: “Non-manufacturing” includes mining, quarrying, electricity, water and construction.
Source: Kenya Economic Surveys.
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slightly – by around 1 percentage point – between 1990 and 2010. Uganda 
is the exception to this trend, as the increase in the share of the overall 
industrial sector in Uganda was mainly driven by the growth of manufac-
turing activities, which increased by 2.6 percentage points between 1990 
and 2010.
Agriculture remains the main sector of the Kenyan economy. By 2010, it 
accounted for 25 per cent of GDP, despite a slight decrease of 3 percentage 
points during the previous 20 years (figure 2.2). Only the transport and 
communications sector experienced sustained growth during the past two 
decades. Indeed, thanks to an impressive growth rate of 8.3 per cent per 
year, the transport and communications sector has gone from representing 
the seventh largest sector in 1990 (with a 7 per cent share of GDP), to 
becoming the second largest component of GDP (at 14 per cent) in 2010. 
Likewise, the trade, restaurants and hotels sector, which today is another 
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important component of GDP, has increased its share by 2 percentage 
points over the past two decades – from 11 per cent in 1990 to 13 per 
cent in 2010. This increase in the relative importance of the transport and 
communication sector occurred at the expense of both financial, real estate 
and business services and government services, both of which experienced 
a decrease in their share of GDP. These two sectors – which in 2010 each 
accounted for 11 per cent of GDP – have seen their shares reduced by 5 
and 2 percentage points, respectively.
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B DEClINES IN COMpETITIvENESS AND pRODUCTIvITY: 
 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES  
Macroeconomic policy reforms and liberalization 
made the export sector vulnerable… 
As Kenya liberalized its trade regime during the 1990s, the share of goods 
and services imports in GDP increased from about 30 per cent in 1990 to 
approximately 45 per cent in 2011, while the share of exports remained 
steady at around 26 per cent, contributing to rising trade and current 
account deficits. The rise in imports can be partly explained by surges in 
food imports. The share of food imports, as a percentage of total merchan-
dise imports, increased from 7.7 per cent in 1980 to 12 per cent in 2010. 
However, the share of fuel imports actually dropped from 33.9 per cent to 
22.1 per cent during the same period. Growing dependence on imports, 
facilitated by a liberalized trade regime, adversely affected the growth in 
import-competing sectors (e.g. light manufacturing) of the economy and 
employment in those sectors. Weighted average applied tariffs on imports 
fell from 20.6 per cent in 1994 to 6.1 per cent in 2006. The applied weight-
ed tariff on manufacturing imports registered an even sharper decline – 
from 32 per cent to about 12 per cent during the same period. Low tariff 
structures prompted a steady rise in imports of consumer goods. Imports of 
passenger vehicles, for example, grew by an average of 28.8 per cent a year 
during 2002–200723 while imports of television sets grew by an average of 
44.0 per cent per year during the same period, far outpacing the import 
growth rates of capital goods and machinery. 
The current account balance has been increasingly volatile during this peri-
od, showing considerable swings in the demand for Kenyan exports, which 
are largely concentrated in primary products such as tea, coffee and cut 
flowers. In 2011, these three products alone accounted for nearly one-third 
of the total value of Kenya’s exports. Kenya’s coffee exports experienced a 
major decline during the past decade, due to a plunge in international pric-
es and increases in the global market shares of Brazil and Viet Nam. Falling 
coffee prices and other compounding factors, including a falling nominal 
23 International Trade Centre Database: http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Product_SelCountry_
TS.aspx [accessed 8 Feb. 2013].
figure 2.3  Kenya: Terms of trade index (2000 = 100) and current account balance, 1980–2010 
 (percentages of GDP)
Source: Author’s estimates based on the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank, 
2012.
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exchange rate, were largely responsible for the fall in its terms of trade index 
(2000 = 100) from 114 in 1997 to 84 in 2007 (figure 2.3). The fall in the 
terms of trade index partly explains the very slow growth in Kenya’s per 
capita income. Although the global demand for, and price of, tea remained 
relatively stable, Kenya also experienced a decline in tea exports due to 
increases in market share by countries such as China, Malawi, South Africa 
and Viet Nam.
Despite the fact that Kenyan coffee exports remained robust during the 
recent economic crisis, its total exports of goods and services fell by more 
than 9 per cent in 2009. While global exports also fell by 10 per cent, 
exports from neighbouring Tanzania and Uganda grew by 15.5 per cent 
and 16.1 per cent respectively in 2009 (figure 2.4, panel A). Exports from 
low-income countries, in general, declined in the aftermath of the global 
crisis but Kenyan exports were particularly hard hit by the crisis, which 
exposed the vulnerability of the Kenyan economy. 
figure 2.4  Export developments by country and product, 2009
 (percentages)
Source: Author’s estimates based on the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank 
and the International Trade Centre database.
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Tourism revenue – another important source of foreign exchange, employ-
ment and economic growth – declined by 19.6 per cent in 2009. A narrow 
export base that is sensitive to global demand shocks, droughts and crop 
failures, political instability and uncertainty, external economic shocks, 
including the oil and food price shocks and the recent financial crisis, 
largely explain the high degree of volatility in Kenya’s current account bal-
ance and GDP growth. 
figure 2.5  Share of Household and Government final Expenditures 
 in GDp, 2011 (percentage of GDP)
Source: Author’s estimates based on the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank.
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… and consumption-led growth depressed domestic savings 
and investment rates …
Kenya’s economic growth during the past three decades was largely driven 
by household consumption, which outpaced GDP growth and depressed 
domestic savings and investment rates. The share of household final con-
sumption expenditure increased from 62 per cent of GDP in 1981 to about 
81 per cent in 2011 (figure 2.5). In neighbouring Tanzania and Uganda, the 
shares of household final consumption expenditure were 65 per cent and 
75 per cent, respectively. The LDCs average for household final consump-
tion expenditure was 75 per cent. Lack of employment opportunities and 
persistently low levels of household income largely explain why the house-
hold share of national expenditure is so high in Kenya. Correspondingly, 
the share of government final expenditure declined from 18.6 per cent in 
1990 to 13.3 per cent in 2011. In Tanzania, government final consump-
tion expenditure accounted for 18.2 per cent in 2011. Primary government 
deficit fell from -2.8 per cent of GDP in 1991 to +2.0 per cent of GDP 
in 2001. Structural adjustment and economic reform programmes imple-
mented during the 1990s eliminated fiscal deficits and contained inflation 
but did not deliver growth or generate employment during the 1990s, 
which represent a lost decade for Kenya. 
figure 2.6  Gross domestic savings, 1990–2010   
 (percentages of GDP)
Source: Author’s estimates based on the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank.
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Kenya experienced one of the sharpest declines in gross domestic savings 
rate in the developing world. While the majority of the emerging, devel-
oping and least developed economies managed steadily to increase their 
savings rates and reduce their reliance on more unpredictable sources of 
external finance, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign bor-
rowings, Kenya’s domestic savings rate fell from 18.6 per cent in 1990 to 
8.9 per cent in 2010 (figure 2.6). Both Tanzania and Uganda substantially 
increased their savings rate during this period. Tanzania’s domestic savings 
rate was 1.3 per cent in 1990 and rose to 17.2 per cent in 2010. The gross 
domestic savings rates of the LDCs increased, on average, from 7.8 per cent 
to 12.8 per cent during the same period, acting as key drivers of domestic 
investment, growth and employment.
During the 1990s, growing consumption and falling savings rates imped-
ed vital growth in fixed capital formation and investment in productive 
capacities, which, in turn, inhibited growth and employment potential 
for Kenya. Although external debt stock fell from its highest level of 132 
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per cent of gross national income (GNI) in 1993 to about 48 per cent of 
GNI in 2000 and inflation dropped from 46 per cent to 10 per cent during 
the same period, there was no improvement in the domestic savings rate. 
Despite achieving macroeconomic stability with a low government deficit 
and relatively low inflation (growth rate stalled at around 1.9 per cent a 
year), unemployment remained steady at around 10 per cent during the 
1990s. Kenya’s lost decade was essentially a period of low  inflation, no 
growth and no employment.
… with high and volatile inflation adding pressure 
to the already depressed domestic savings.
Consumer price inflation averaged over 10.3 per cent during the period 
from 2001 to 2010, falling from the previous decade average inflation of 
15.6 per cent, which peaked at 46 per cent in 1993. Relatively high-level 
inflation and nominal wage rigidity among middle-income households 
that depend on salaries meant that both the purchasing power of house-
holds and their savings eroded during the past two decades. During this 
time, households increased their borrowing from the banking sector, which 
crowded out credit to manufacturing and other productive sectors of the 
economy. According to data available from the Central Bank of Kenya,24  
the share of household loans, as a percentage of total private sector credit, 
increased from 5 per cent in 1998 to 19.7 per cent in 2011 (figure 2.7). 
During the same period, the share of credit to the manufacturing sectors of 
the economy fell from 20.5 per cent to 12.5 per cent. The declining share 
of manufacturing sector credit also explains the weak economic growth and 
weaker employment generation in Kenya.
24 Central Bank of Kenya Statistical Bulletin (2011), Table 1.7: Distribution of credit facilities from the 
banking system.
figure 2.7  Sectoral distribution of private credit from the banking sector, 1998–2011    
 (percentages of GDP)
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Central Bank of Kenya.
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The relationship between inflation and growth is both complex and 
ambiguous. Cross-country evidence on the relationship shows all four 
possible combinations – low inflation and high growth, low inflation and 
low growth, high inflation and high growth and high inflation and low 
growth. In the case of Kenya, the data suggest a strong correlation of high 
inflation and low growth although the direction of causality is unclear. The 
observed correlation is as high as -0.42 (figure 2.8). Even when the four 
outlier inflation rates during 1991 to 1994 are excluded, the correlation is 
still significant and negative (-0.14). Persistently high inflationary expecta-
tion is manifested in the nominal lending rate, which averaged 15.7 per 
cent between 2000 and 2010. With such a high interest rate, it is difficult 
for businesses, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to 
borrow and make economically feasible investments that generate employ-
ment and growth.
figure 2.8  Inflation and GDp growth in Kenya, 1980–2011   
 (percentages)
Source: Author’s estimates based on the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank.
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The economic reforms did little to stimulate employment generation…
As economic growth plummeted from 6.2 per cent in 1988 to -0.8 per cent 
in 1991, Kenya began the first generation of structural reforms. In 1991, 
Kenya liberalized its interest rates, long before other low-income countries 
or LDCs did so. Credit ceilings and credit targets were eased in 1992 while 
barriers to entry to the banking sector were eliminated – for both domes-
tic and foreign banks – in 1996, along with privatization of a number of 
state-owned banks. The restrictions on banks borrowing internationally 
and engaging in securities market activities were also relaxed during this 
period, making the Kenyan financial sector one of the most liberalized in 
the developing world.25 The financial sector liberalization was reinforced by 
commensurate liberalization in capital account transactions. In 1996, Kenya 
was one of the very few low-income countries to eliminate the multiple 
exchange rates, which were proving detrimental to the interests of its export 
sector. In the same year Kenya withdrew all restrictions on current account 
transactions and abolished the requirement to surrender export proceeds 
(Chinn and Ito, 2008).
25 Please see the financial reform database developed by Abiad, et al. (2010). 
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Complementing these reforms, Kenya has since pursued a tight macr-
oeconomic policy, which brought down inflation, albeit briefly, from 46 
per cent in 1993 to 5.7 per cent in 1999. However, as the first wave of 
reforms during the 1990s did not deliver growth but instead plunged 
Kenya into a period of macroeconomic instability, the Government of 
Kenya began a second generation of reforms in 2000, outlined in its 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which focused on governance 
and public sector reforms, further liberalization of imports and priva-
tization of state-owned banks and utilities. An International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) assessment (IMF, 2000) of the Kenyan reform package high-
lighted the following:
The three year policy-matrix correctly recognizes that the shift to 
the higher growth path will require not only the envisaged reduc-
tion in domestic real interest rates but also the implementation 
of the supply-side measures that address existing constraints on 
economic activity. These include measures that address pervasive 
governance problems, correct regulatory distortions in various 
markets, especially in agriculture, redirect public resources toward 
the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and improve the efficiency and 
governance of state-owned banks and utilities through privatiza-
tion. While the measures to improve governance (and their timeta-
ble) are well articulated in the interim PRSP, the remaining supply 
side measures will need to be developed and prioritized more fully, 
and implemented more decisively if the growth targets envisaged 
for the medium term are to be attained.
Under the first phase of the privatization programme, which was initiated 
in 1992, the Government privatized a large number of SMEs. During the 
second wave of reforms, the Government privatized the Kenya Commercial 
Bank (KCB) and the National Bank of Kenya (NBK) during 2000-2003. 
TELKOM – the telecommunication utility – was among a number of 
companies privatized in 2006. Energy utilities – notably Kengen and KPLC 
– were partly privatized and contracts awarded to foreign management in 
mid-2000.
figure 2.9  pace of financial market liberalization*, 
 Kenya and low-income countries, 1995–2007 (percentages)
* Based on a liberalization index built considering a number of dimensions of financial regulation and financial-
sector policies.
Source: Constructed from Abiad et al. (2010).
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As part of the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) credit arrange-
ments with the IMF and Economic and Public Sector Reform credit arrange-
ments with the World Bank – both approved in 2000 – the Government 
of Kenya adopted a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) that 
helped to eliminate government deficits by increasing VAT and implement-
ing a major retrenchment in the civil service. VAT was raised from 15 per 
cent to 18 per cent in 2000, with the aim of offsetting the loss of revenue aris-
ing from cuts in import duties. Under the 2000–2001 fiscal programme, the 
Government replaced existing suspended duties with constant tariffs and, at 
the same time, reduced the number of resultant tariff bands, excluding sugar, 
from 13 to nine. The Government of Kenya made a commitment to improve 
governance and reduce public sector inefficiencies by cutting 32,348 civil 
service jobs, which accounted for 15.5 per cent of public sector employment. 
There was a further commitment to remove 25,783 civil servants from the 
payroll by September 2000 and another 8,800 employees during 2001–2002 
through natural attrition. Under the same retrenchment programme, about 
7,000 employees of the public universities, the Kenya Revenue Authority, an 
agricultural research institute and the Catering and Training Levy Trust were 
also removed from their jobs (Republic of Kenya, 2000).
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… and when growth returned, 
there was little improvement in the labour market.
As illustrated in Chapter 1, between 1991 and 2003, the employment 
rate in Kenya fell by over 7 percentage points from 67 per cent to 59 per 
cent. Even during the most recent period of strong and persistent growth, 
starting in 2003, total employment grew by an average of 3 per cent, a rate 
that has barely kept pace with the growth in the working-age population, 
and the unemployment rate has remained high and sticky. In particular, 
against the backdrop of a favourable global economy, the GDP growth rate 
accelerated from 0.54 per cent in 2002 to 2.9 per cent in 2003 and 5.1 per 
cent in 2004 and yet the unemployment rate only fell from 9.6 per cent to 
9.5 per cent.26 The growth momentum of the period 2003 to 2007 came to 
a halt in 2008 after the country was hit by the post-election violence that 
broke out on 27 December 2007, coupled with drought and the effects 
of the global financial crisis. GDP growth plummeted from 7 per cent in 
2007 to 1.5 per cent in 2008 but, surprisingly, the unemployment rate 
– according to official statistics – fell from 9.5 per cent to 9.3 per cent. 
During the 2008–2009 economic crisis, the labour force participation rate 
remained resilient, suggesting the possibility that the sectoral composition 
of employment changed, which helped to prevent a rise in unemployment 
rate. The observed correlation between GDP growth and employment rate 
is -0.08, underscoring the fact that growth in Kenya does not necessarily 
translate into job creation. 
After recovering in 2010, the Kenyan economy faced a number of chal-
lenges in 2011, including the severe drought in the Horn of Africa and 
high international commodity prices that affected both the urban and 
the rural poor. The external price shocks, strong domestic demand and a 
rapid expansion of bank credit to the private sector – which grew by over 
30 per cent in 2011 – increased the inflationary pressure, widened the 
current account deficit and depreciated the KSh. The nominal value of 
the KSh fell by more than 12 per cent between 2010 and 2011. However, 
once again the economic recovery did not translate into job growth as the 
unemployment rate remained stalled at 9.4 per cent. 
26 The unemployment rate is estimated from the data available in the World Development Indicators data-
base of the World Bank.
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Between 1991 and 2010, employment in Kenya grew at an average rate of 
2.8 per cent a year, while GDP grew by an average of 3.1 per cent, suggest-
ing an implied employment elasticity of growth of 0.9.27 While implied 
employment elasticity provides some idea of the employment response to 
growth, it cannot account for the quality of jobs created in the economy – it 
cannot distinguish between formal and informal-sector jobs or between part-
time and full-time employment. In the case of Kenya, the relatively high 
employment elasticity of growth can be largely explained by the increases in 
informal employment, as discussed in Chapter 4.
 
A growing savings–investment gap and falling investment 
are behind the lacklustre economic performance…
Kenya has one of the highest levels of savings–investment gaps among the 
developing countries. The gap increased from almost 0 in 1980 to 14.3 per 
cent in 2008 (figure 2.10, panel A). As a consequence of the falling domes-
tic savings rate, gross fixed capital formation did not keep pace with the 
rates in other developing countries and LDCs. Gross fixed capital forma-
tion has remained stagnant at around 20 per cent of GDP during the past 
decade: too low to trigger a structural transformation of the economy and 
increase employment. It is also likely that most of the fixed capital forma-
tion took place in private construction – mainly housing – which has had 
little or no long-term impact on employment generation and productivity 
growth. Large-scale investments in productive capital, production processes 
and technology upgrades are the key determinants of employment genera-
tion and economic growth. 
27 This analysis of the employment elasticity of economic growth during the past 20 years is also carried out 
in Chapter 3 with similar results. In that chapter, a number of scenarios are presented showing the annual 
rate of economic growth that would be required to absorb the growing working-age population. 
figure 2.10 Investment trends in Kenya and selected countries, 1981–2010   
  
Source: Author’s estimates based on the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank.
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… which was only partly offset by an increase in remittances…
Kenya has had few offsetting long-term inflows to make up for the falling 
domestic savings rate. FDI has been particularly low, largely because of 
weak business and institutional frameworks and the relatively unstable and 
figure 2.11 financial inflows into Kenya and other comparable countries, 2010 
 (percentages of GDP)
Source: Author’s estimates based on the World Development Indicators (WDI) database and the Bank of 
International Settlement’s (2012).
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uncertain political environment. Both Tanzania and Uganda have been far 
more successful in attracting FDI in recent years, although this has largely 
been confined to their mineral sectors. Even if foreign investments in min-
eral sectors are excluded, FDI in both neighbouring countries far exceeded 
that in Kenya and the gap continues to widen (figure 2.11). During the past 
20 years, FDI in Kenya averaged 0.6 per cent of GDP, compared to 2.4 per 
cent in Tanzania and 3 per cent in Uganda. Kenya also experienced a declin-
ing flow in public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt, which can 
be a major source of investment in the economy. In 1990, external debt 
disbursement was 6.8 per cent of GDP but has fallen sharply to about 1.6 
per cent since 2010, which suggests that it is increasingly difficult for Kenya 
to borrow on a long-term basis from external sources – a prerequisite for 
long-term investments. Similarly, Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
flows are also trending downwards, which adversely impacted investment 
in the social sector, particularly in the health and education infrastructures 
of the economy – one of the key determinants of labour productivity and 
long-term economic growth. The share of ODA in GDP fell from 13.7 per 
cent of GDP in 1990 to 5.1 per cent in 2010.
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Remittance flows from Kenyans living and working overseas, however, have 
risen considerably in recent years. In 1990, remittances accounted for only 
1.6 per cent of GDP but steadily increased to 5.5 per cent by 2010. Unlike 
FDI, ODA or PPG debt flows, inflows of remittances remained robust and 
resilient during the current financial crisis. Remittances, which reached 
US$1.7 billion in 2010, are now Kenya’s single largest source of foreign 
exchange and a key social safety net. While remittances represent a depend-
able source of external financial flows, they primarily go into household 
consumption. It is likely that only a small fraction of remittances, if any at 
all, goes to productive investments that can create employment and con-
tribute to long-term growth.
In recent years, Kenya witnessed a significant increase in private commer-
cial borrowing from abroad. Claims of foreign banks and financial insti-
tutions vis-à-vis Kenya increased by nearly 300 per cent between 2001 
and 2011. As a percentage of GDP, private commercial borrowing is now 
the largest source of external flows into the Kenyan economy, reaching 
as high as 12.5 per cent of GDP in 2010. Private commercial borrowings 
are mostly short term and highly pro-cyclical. For example, immediately 
before the current financial crisis, between December 2007 and March 
2008, private commercial borrowing increased from US$2.3 billion to 
US$4.3 billion – an increase of 86 per cent in a mere three months (Bank 
of International Settlement, 2012). These short-term inflows are largely 
“hot money” that enters the Kenyan economy to exploit arbitrage oppor-
tunities offered by large interest rate differentials between KSh loans and 
US dollar or euro denominated debt. While these inflows help Kenya to 
meet its current account obligations, they do not translate into long-term 
investments, jobs and economic growth. Moreover, these inflows keep the 
KSh relatively overvalued despite depreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate, which adversely affects Kenya’s export competitiveness. In spite of 
the inflows of short-term capital, interest rates in Kenya remain very high, 
constraining access to credit for productive investment and employment 
generation. In fact, excessive dependence on short-term borrowing from 
abroad can make credit to the private sector more volatile and costly. 
The real interest rate averaged over 8 per cent during 1981–2010 – one 
figure 2.12 Real and lending interest rates in Kenya, 1981–2011 (percentages)  
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of the highest real interest rates in the world (figure 2.12). The high real 
interest rate kept the real exchange rate overvalued and uncompetitive, 
discouraging foreign investment, and also kept the lending rate very high, 
thus discouraging borrowing for productive investments. A lending rate 
for investment of 15 per cent or more makes it difficult for businesses to 
borrow for productive investment. Given that Kenya has a well-developed 
financial sector compared to LDCs, its lending rate could be significantly 
lower in order to promote productive investment.
… which led to weak productivity growth in Kenya.
In 1980, labour productivity in Kenya – measured in terms of GDP per 
person employed – was double the labour productivity in Tanzania and 
Uganda (figure 2.13, panel A). In the absence of data on GDP per hour 
worked and relevant firm-level data, GDP per person employed provides 
a reasonable estimate of labour productivity. Thirty years later, Uganda’s 
GDP per person employed is 10 per cent higher than that of Kenya. During 
this period, labour productivity in Uganda increased by 3.6 per cent annu-
ally while Kenya’s annual productivity declined by 0.24 per cent. In 1990,  
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when comparable data became available for LDCs, average labour produc-
tivity in Kenya was 37 per cent higher than the average productivity levels 
in LDCs. In 2010, Kenya’s labour productivity was 11 per cent lower than 
average labour productivity in LDCs.
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Consistent with overall labour productivity estimates, agricultural value 
added per worker also showed a decline during the period 1980 to 2010. In 
1980, agricultural value added per worker was about US$400 in constant 
2000 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar terms. By 2010, it had fallen 
to US$350 (in constant 2000 PPP dollars), marking a 12 per cent decline 
(figure 2.13, panel B). 
During the same period, LDCs, on average, managed to improve their agri-
cultural productivity by about 30 per cent. A number of complementary 
factors – an increase in arable land and crop intensity, improved irrigation, 
investment in and mechanization of agriculture, favourable price support 
for agricultural inputs, access to credit, tariff and non-tariff protection 
against cheap agricultural imports, commercial farming and improved mar-
ket access – helped many LDCs to improve their agricultural productivity 
and increase the real income of the rural population. Additionally, higher 
levels of income boosted aggregate demand for goods and services, which 
paved the way for structural transformation of their economies. Many of 
the enabling factors that boosted agricultural productivity in a number of 
LDCs were missing in Kenya.
At the macroeconomic level, the fall in labour productivity in both abso-
lute and relative terms can be largely explained by inadequate investment 
and fixed capital formation in Kenya. The stalled productivity growth also 
explains why Kenya’s growth rate lagged behind the growth rates of neigh-
bouring Tanzania or Uganda or that of other least developed economies. 
A preliminary analysis of the sources of GDP growth between 2001 and 
2010 suggests that nearly 92.2 per cent of the growth came from increases 
in employment, which increased from 6.0 million in 2001 to 7.9 million in 
2010 and only 7.8 per cent of growth came from improvements in labour 
productivity. In other comparable countries, improvement in labour pro-
ductivity, including total factor productivity, accounted for as much 30 per 
cent of GDP growth.
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C pOlICY OpTIONS GOING fORWARD
For Kenya, increasing the labour force participation rate and boosting 
employment generation must be the primary macroeconomic policy priori-
ties. The past two decades of policy reforms managed to contain inflation 
and improve macroeconomic stability and growth, but have done little 
to increase employment. The overall unemployment rate – though mod-
est by the standards of unemployment rates in Spain or Greece – masks 
the real problems of informal employment, underemployment, vulnerable 
employment and the working poor. Although the recently concluded IMF 
Article IV consultation commended Kenya for steering a robust recovery 
and achieving macroeconomic stability, the report makes no mention of 
unemployment, informal-sector employment or low labour force participa-
tion rates (IMF, 2012a). The Article IV report focuses on the imperatives 
of reining in inflation, observing:
Kenya’s economy has continued to expand, but high inflation 
and exchange rate pressures are threatening the growth outlook. 
Economic activity has remained strong, with GDP growth above 5 
per cent in 2010/11 and little sign of a slowdown so far. The drought 
in the Horn of Africa, higher international prices and strong domes-
tic demand have boosted inflation – 18.9 per cent in October – 
and swelled the external current account deficit. Because monetary 
authorities hesitated to respond to these developments, inflationary 
expectations heightened, leading to a rapid depreciation of the KSh 
that if not addressed could destabilize macroeconomic conditions 
and bring growth to a halt. The authorities have already started to 
adjust their policies to stem inflationary expectations and stabilize 
the exchange rate to preserve the basis for continued growth.
1 EMplOYMENT-ORIENTED MONETARY pOlICY
While a high rate of economic growth is necessary for generating savings, 
investment and employment, it is clearly not sufficient to overcome the 
structural constraints of the Kenyan economy, which include the daunt-
ing challenges of raising the domestic savings rate, reducing reliance on 
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short-term borrowing and increasing the labour force participation rate 
and productivity to make economic growth broad based, inclusive and 
sustainable. A singular policy focus on inflation may rejuvenate growth 
but it is unlikely that such a policy orientation will create employment or 
make economic growth more inclusive and equitable. As the experience 
during the 1990s suggests, Kenya managed to reduce inflation significantly 
and growth resumed without necessarily expanding employment, particu-
larly formal sector employment. The macroeconomic policy framework 
needs to avoid an excessively narrow and singular focus on inflation and 
instead implement specific interventions to boost savings, investments and 
gross fixed capital formation. Krugman (2012) has argued that a moderate 
but stable and predictable level of inflation – possibly at the high single 
digit level – can incentivize private investments by making money-holding 
costly. In Kenya, inflation is associated with a higher share of household 
consumption in GDP. To achieve a moderate level of inflation to stimulate 
investment, the Kenyan economy must also create a more enabling environ-
ment for investments. While macroeconomic policies to reduce the cost of 
borrowing and increase the availability of credit will be necessary, they will 
be insufficient to stimulate productive investments. Investment-friendly 
macroeconomic policies – while keeping interest rates low – must be com-
plemented by appropriate sectoral policies that will increase demand for 
productive investments. Sectoral policies may include adequate protection 
and support – including support for higher value addition and market 
access – for specific productive sectors of the economy that are likely to 
demand more labour with higher levels of productivity.
2 ENCOURAGE DOMESTIC SAvINGS
The Government of Kenya needs to adopt appropriate policies to promote 
domestic savings. It will be critical for the Government to reduce the con-
sumption bias of the economy. Household final consumption rates would 
need to stabilize to increase the gross domestic savings rate. A stable and 
predictable inflation rate can help households to smooth their expenditures 
over time and increase savings. Appropriate tax incentives and matching 
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government contributions for additional contributions to public and pri-
vate pension funds can help to increase the domestic savings rate. This will 
require pension fund operations to be more professional, transparent and 
accountable. As is the case with Singapore and many emerging economies, 
pension funds, when managed properly, can be an important source of 
domestic investments to generate employment and growth. 
Innovative savings instruments can be introduced to reduce household con-
sumption and encourage domestic savings. The Government of Kenya may 
issue inflation-indexed bonds to encourage savings among salaried people 
and pensioners who are adversely affected by inflation. Such a step can help 
to reduce inflationary fears and commensurate risk and liquidity premium. 
If the return on private savings is inflation adjusted, then there will be no 
rush to spend today, propelled by fear that the same amount will buy less 
tomorrow due to the effects of inflation. This will, in turn, reduce the cur-
rent inflationary pressures and expectations about future inflation.
The Government may also issue GDP-linked bonds – public debt instru-
ments that allow a country to pay a return that varies with the GDP growth 
performance. These bonds typically pay more when the performance of 
the country is better than expected and less in the case of poor perform-
ance. GDP-linked bonds contain an inherent countercyclical feature, 
allowing a government to adjust its debt service according to its revenue 
earning, which can rise or fall depending on the growth performance of 
the economy. A number of countries – Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela – have issued different versions of GDP-
indexed bonds during the past three decades, which helped to reduce their 
borrowing costs and increase access to domestic and international capital. 
GDP-linked bonds can also reduce the probability of default as they allow 
the Government to reduce its debt service during an economic crisis. GDP-
linked bonds have the capacity to act as automatic stabilizers, reducing 
the temptation to spend too much during periods of high growth. In this 
sense, this type of bond may be especially useful for developing countries 
where the presence of weaker institutions makes it easier for governments 
to implement more pro-cyclical economic policies. They can also allow 
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governments to implement more stable and predictable tax policies, since 
they remove the need to increase taxes during times of poor economic per-
formance. Furthermore, these types of bonds can benefit especially the poor 
since governments are not required to cut social benefits during an eco-
nomic crisis. Though these bonds allow governments to raise resources and 
make public sector investments, they can also be an important source of 
private investment, either through public–private partnerships or through 
government refinancing of private projects through a development bank. 
The success of these bonds in boosting savings and investments will, how-
ever, largely depend on the credibility of macroeconomic policy manage-
ment, which has improved in Kenya in recent years. 
The Government of Kenya may also pursue a set of monetary and financial 
sector policies to direct credit to the productive sectors of the economy. 
Moving away from liability-based reserve requirements and capital adequa-
cy ratios, monetary authorities may adopt asset-based reserve requirements 
to encourage bank lending to priority sectors of the economy. Asset-based 
reserve requirements can allow banks to adjust their cash reserve ratios 
based on the sectors to which they lend. For example, reserve require-
ments may be lower for loans to SMEs, which can create employment, but 
higher for personal loans or for the import of vehicles. There can also be 
differential reserve requirements for unbanked or underserved areas of the 
country where unemployment is high and labour force participation is low. 
More explicitly, and following the example of the Reserve Bank of India, 
monetary policy may introduce priority sector lending (PSL) programmes 
to target sectors that are likely to create more formal jobs in the short and 
medium term. Commercial banks may be mandated to meet specific PSL 
targets and penalties may be imposed, including loss of excess reserves or 
overnight borrowing facilities, should a bank fail to meet the PSL target. 
Following the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in the United States, 
the Government of Kenya may also require banks to extend credit to under-
privileged communities for productive investments. Selective interest rate 
caps can also be introduced to reduce the cost of lending to productive sec-
tors of the economy. Although these are blunt instruments, they may help 
to reduce the borrowing costs of sectors of the economy that face financing 
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constraints and are excluded from the credit market. Specialized develop-
ment banks can be established to support productive investments. 
   
3 EffECTIvE fINANCIAl REGUlATIONS AND TAX pOlICY
Appropriate and selective capital account regulations can be effective in 
preventing excessive private commercial borrowing, especially if the bor-
rowings are for short-term consumption finance and speculative invest-
ments. A fractional financial transaction tax and higher reserve requirement 
on short-term inflows into the banking system can help to prevent the 
inflow and outflow of hot money, which often has an adverse impact on 
employment and economic growth as it can lead to overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate and loss of export competitiveness. Alongside these measures, 
the Government may adopt appropriate policies to attract new FDI and 
also to encourage reinvestment of profits earned by existing FDI. Given 
that the figure for repatriation of profits is almost as high as net inflows of 
FDI, the Government of Kenya may introduce specific tax incentives for 
reinvestment of profits by foreign firms. Policies must also be introduced 
to ensure that remittances – although private flows – are not fully used up 
in consumption and that they are invested in the economy to increase the 
labour force participation rate and create employment.
The linkages between tax policy and formal employment in Kenya need 
to be re-examined. Taxes on labour – including personal income taxes and 
social security contributions by both employer and employee – can reduce 
labour demand by driving up labour costs and reduce labour supply by low-
ering after-tax wages. Although the effects are indirect, final consumption 
taxes – such as VAT or excise duties – can also influence the labour demand 
and supply by reducing real wages. It is also argued that corporate taxes can 
affect employment by reducing investment and production. Higher corpo-
rate taxes may also adversely affect the labour supply as firms can pass on 
the effect of these taxes to employees in the form of lower wages. Given that 
the total tax rate – as a percentage of commercial profit – is high at almost 
50 per cent in Kenya, the Government may consider tax breaks and tax 
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credits for both existing firms and new entrants to generate employment. 
Effective use can be made of fiscal incentives for investments in productive 
capital and penalties for investments in non-productive capital, such as real 
estate investments and financial assets held for speculative gain.
4 INCREASE COMpETITIvENESS 
 vIS-à-vIS pRODUCTIvITY-ENHANCING pOlICIES
A strong focus on stimulating labour and total factor productivity is vital 
to ensure that Kenyan labour is globally competitive. Improving labour 
productivity is essential to attract FDI and increase the overall employment 
rate. It is important for the Government to recognize that improvement in 
labour productivity does not necessarily reduce labour demand. In fact, the 
experiences of the East Asian economies show that employment and growth 
in labour productivity need not be a zero-sum game. Tax incentives can be 
offered to firms that will make essential investments in skills and productiv-
ity enhancement. The Government may consider creating a Productivity 
Fund to make grants and loans to firms for worker training with the aim 
of raising productivity levels. 
To improve labour and total factor productivity, the Government may also 
implement a broad-based industrial policy to reduce excessive sectoral con-
centration and promote sectors that are incrementally more capital intensive 
and productive, without necessarily reducing labour demand. The indus-
trial policy would have to ensure coherence and coordination between fiscal 
and monetary and exchange rate policies on the one hand, and employment 
and education policies on the other hand to reduce the mismatch between 
labour supply and labour demand. A coordinated and forward-looking 
industrial policy will help to ensure that educational institutions are impart-
ing the knowledge, training and skills demanded by the employers and that 
the employers have the right fiscal and monetary incentives to invest and 
create jobs that can utilize those skills. A well-coordinated macroeconomic 
policy framework, within the ambit of a broader industrial policy, will be 
a sine qua non for Kenya to stimulate employment and promote inclusive, 
equitable and sustainable growth.
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CHApTER 3 
YOUTH EMplOYMENT: REAlITIES, CHAllENGES 
AND THE ROlE Of lABOUR MARKET pOlICIES  
 INTRODUCTION
These are complex and challenging times for young people in the global 
economy. Kenya, where young women and men represent more than 37 per 
cent of the working-age population, is no exception. Youth are confronted 
by considerable challenges in finding meaningful employment and are often 
discouraged from seeking work. In addition, the few jobs available to them 
are mainly low-paid, of low quality and located in the informal sector.
Not only are youth in Kenya increasingly discouraged by the labour market 
situation in their country and future economic prospects, they are also dis-
satisfied with their living conditions and their role in society more broadly. 
Importantly, discouragement and dissatisfaction, especially among youth, 
have the potential to increase the risk of social unrest – as evidenced by the 
violence that erupted in Kenya during the post-election crisis of early 2008.
Youth employment, however, should be viewed as an opportunity rather 
than as a problematic challenge. Young people represent a valuable resource 
to the economy, businesses and society in general. With this in mind, this 
chapter will seek to shed light on the current labour market and social context 
of youth in Kenya (section A). The chapter then assesses the perceptions of 
young women and men regarding their situation and analyses the different 
reasons underlying the dissatisfaction with their prospects and their role in 
society (section B). The different measures and special programmes that have 
been implemented to support youth employment, with a focus on whether 
these measures have gone in the right direction, are examined in section 
C. This section examines the different macroeconomic and individual ele-
ments affecting youth employment with a view to discussing the elements 
that are at the heart of the youth labour market challenges. In addition the 
key policy issues for improving the situation of youth are discussed in this 
section, including a review of a number of successful country examples that 
could be leveraged in the context of Kenya.
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A TRENDS AND COMpOSITION Of YOUTH EMplOYMENT
 
Youth in Kenya account for a larger proportion 
of the population than in other African countries … 
A significant portion of the population of sub-Saharan Africa and, in particu-
lar, of Kenya is below the age of 25. In 2011, there were more than 8.5 million 
people between the ages of 15 and 24 in Kenya, comprising 37.4 per cent of 
the working-age population and rising to over two-thirds when the population 
under the age of 34 is included (figure 3.1).28 This is close to 2 percentage 
points higher than the share of youth observed in Africa as a whole (35.5 per 
cent) and around 11 percentage points higher than the global figure (26.5 per 
cent). In comparison, Kenya has a rather expansive population pyramid, with 
a high proportion of younger people and a low proportion of older people. 
In addition, Kenya’s population continues to grow rapidly; according to 
UN World Population Prospects (UNDESA, 2011a), by 2050 the youth 
population in Kenya will reach 17.9 million, which is more than double 
the figure of 2011 and will represent 18.4 per cent of the estimated overall 
population and 30 per cent of the estimated working-age population.29  
This means that between 2011 and 2050, the working-age population will 
increase, on average, by more than 950,000 people per year. This fact high-
lights the urgent need to create employment opportunities, especially for 
new labour market entrants.
 
… however, the youth employment rate is lower in Kenya 
than in other countries in the region ...
In Kenya, youth are considerably under-represented among the employed 
population. In fact, persons aged 15 to 24 accounted for less than 19 per 
cent of total employment in 2012,30 whereas they made up over 35 per  
28 The Government of Kenya defines youth as the population between the ages of 15 and 30. To comply 
with this definition, the analysis in this report will take into account, whenever possible, the international 
definition of youth (15 to 24) and an enlarged sample of young persons (15 to 34). Given that the most 
commonly employed categorization of the population is by decade, starting at 15 years of age, the specific 
Kenyan national definition of youth is not applicable. Also, when referring to persons aged 15 to 34, the 
text will refer to young persons as opposed to youth, which is traditionally the age group 15 to 24.
29 When considering the wider definition (persons aged 15 to 34), by 2050 Kenya is estimated to have 
33.1 million young people. This is 34 per cent of the total population and 55 per cent of the working-age 
population. 
30 Latest available information. Due to the unavailability of information by age group, it is not possible to 
include figures on employment and employment-to-population for the group of people aged 15 to 34.
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cent of the working-age population. The youth employment rate in the 
country, i.e. the employment-to-population ratio, is less than half the adult 
employment rate (figure 3.2) and is one of the lowest youth employment 
rates in the region. In fact, the gap between youth and adult employment 
rates reached 43 percentage points in 2012, placing Kenya among those 
countries with the highest disparities between youth and adults in the  
figure 3.2  Employment-to-population ratio by age group, 2012   
 (percentages)
Source: IILS calculations based on KILM (ILO, 2012b).
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region – the gap being close to twice that observed in sub-Saharan Africa 
as a whole. And, at 32.8 per cent in 2012, the employment rate among 
youth in Kenya was 14.5 percentage points below the average observed for 
sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Kenya is also one of the few countries in 
the region to have witnessed a decline (close to 4 percentage points) in the 
past decade.31
 
… due principally to sluggish job growth among youth in recent years, 
leading in many instances to an exit from the labour market ...
The persistently low employment rates among youth in Kenya are driven 
primarily by a slowdown in job creation, as opposed to growth in the 
working-age population. For instance, employment growth among people 
aged 15 to 24 fell from 1.7 per cent in 2006 to 0.3 per cent per in 2012, 
31 Between 2000 and 2005, the youth employment rate fell by close to 4 percentage points and stabilized at 
around 32 per cent thereafter.
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whereas the slowdown in the growth of the youth working-age population 
was less prominent – from 1.6 per cent to 1 per cent. In comparison, in 
2012 job creation among adults (3.9 per cent) continued to slightly exceed 
working-age population growth (3.8 per cent).
As a result, some youth have become discouraged and are leaving the labour 
market entirely. Indeed, in 2012 the inactivity rate for people aged 15 to 24 
in Kenya reached 60.5 per cent – an increase of 5 percentage points from 
2000 (figure 3.3) – the seventh largest increase in sub-Saharan Africa.32 
The problem was especially acute among women under the age of 25, who 
appear to be in a vulnerable employment situation (box 3.1). Moreover, 
Kenya’s youth inactivity rate in 2012 was 42 percentage points above that 
of people aged 25 or more (18.5 per cent) – which, as seen in Chapter 1, 
is high by international standards – and 14.1 percentage points above the 
youth inactivity rate in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (46.4 per cent). 
One possible explanation for the comparable low employment-to-popu-
lation ratios and low participation rates among youth is the increase in 
high school enrolment. Indeed, Kenya’s primary and secondary school 
enrolment rates have been increasing and are now higher than those for 
sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (14 and 21 percentage points higher, respec-
tively). However, this would only help to explain the situation of the group 
aged 15 to 19 since, for youth above this age, tertiary enrolment (as dis-
cussed in Chapter 1) remains relatively low (even below the average in 
sub-Saharan Africa). As a result, the inactivity rate among young people 
aged 15 to 34 remains elevated in Kenya at 42.2 per cent in 2012, over 7 
percentage points higher than in sub-Saharan Africa.
32 The inactivity rate for young people aged 15 to 34 reached 42.2 per cent in 2012, which is 1.6 percent-
age points above the figure in 2000 (40.6 per cent). Although this figure is significantly lower than that for 
youth, aged 15 to 24, it is still 24.2 percentage points above the adult (people aged 35 or more) inactivity 
rate.
figure 3.3  Inactivity (out of the labour force) rate by age group, 2012    
 (percentages)
Source: IILS calculations based on KILM (ILO, 2012b).
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Box 3.1 Gender disparities in the access to jobs
 
In 2012, the proportion of young women aged 15 to 24 in employment in Kenya (29.5 
per cent) was lower than that of young men (36 per cent) (figure 3.4). In addition, in 
2012, the female youth participation rate in Kenya was 35.5 per cent compared to 43.5 
per cent among men. These figures are, respectively, 15.5 and 16 percentage points 
lower than in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Gender disparities in access to jobs are not 
a new phenomenon but have worsened during the past decade. Weaker employment 
opportunities not only place young women as the most vulnerable group in Kenya, but 
are a major economic factor in the feminization of poverty in Africa (Haji, 2007).
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figure 3.4 Youth employment-to-population ratio and youth labour force participation 
 rate by sex, Kenya and sub-Saharan Africa, 2012 (percentages)
Kenya Sub-Saharan AfricaSub-Saharan AfricaKenya
Source: IILS calculations based on KILM (ILO, 2012b).
Male
Female
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Box 3.1 Gender disparities in the access to jobs
 
A number of cultural and political factors (such as discriminatory policies, structural 
barriers33 and cultural prejudices) explain the additional difficulties that young women 
face on entering and remaining in the job market (Okojie, 2003). Moreover, differences 
in literacy and access to education between female and male children play a key role in 
explaining gender gaps among youth in both employment and labour force participation 
rates (World Bank, 2009; ECA, 2011). In fact, in 2009, the literacy rate among women 
was 7 percentage points lower than among men. Moreover, only 57 per cent of women 
had access to secondary education compared to 63.2 per cent of men. Likewise, only 3.3 
per cent of women are in tertiary education compared to 4.7 per cent of men.
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33 Such as customary laws and norms that prevent women from obtaining land, credit, education, informa-
tion and health care.
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B YOUNG pEOplE IN KENYA: pERCEpTIONS Of DISSATISfACTION 
 WITH THEIR pROSpECTS AND THEIR ROlE IN SOCIETY
Young women and men are pessimistic about their economic 
and labour market prospects... 
In light of the challenges confronting young people, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that their perception of the country’s economic and labour market 
prospects has deteriorated dramatically. According to the Gallup survey 
database,34 in 2011, only 15.8 per cent of the population aged 15 to 34 
believed that economic conditions were improving. This is 30 percentage 
points below the figure found in 2007, when over 46 per cent of the youth 
stated that they felt positive about the economic prospects. This is inter-
esting, given that these figures correspond to a relatively strong period of 
growth. Moreover, Kenya’s perception of future economic prospects is the 
most pessimistic of the developing countries analysed (figure 3.5) and the 
third most pessimistic of the 37 sub-Saharan African countries with avail-
able information. In comparison, in 2011, 38.5 per cent of young people 
in sub-Saharan Africa reported that they were confident that economic 
conditions were improving – although this too constitutes a deterioration 
of young people’s perceptions compared to 2007 (by almost 7 percentage 
points). Importantly, adults in Kenya are as pessimistic as youth in relation 
to economic prospects – in 2011 only 17 per cent of people aged 35 to 
49 and 12 per cent of those aged 50 and over believed that the economic 
conditions of the area in which they lived were improving.
Furthermore, in 2011, only 25 per cent of young women and men believed 
that it was a good time to find a job in the local labour market – a fall of 
almost 7 percentage points since 2007. In 2011, perceptions of the health of 
local labour markets were higher in sub-Saharan Africa (39.5 per cent) and 
other African countries, such as South Africa (33.9 per cent) and Tanzania 
(44.6 per cent), and other developing countries such as Bangladesh (40.9 
34 Section B is based on the analysis of Gallup World Poll Data, which gathers survey data for 160 countries 
as of 2011 and is representative of 98 per cent of the world’s adult population. The area coverage of the 
surveys is national (including rural areas) and the samples are representative of the entire non-institutional 
civilian population aged 15 or older. In 2011, 37 sub-Saharan African countries were covered, including 
Kenya. The survey sample size in Kenya is comprised of 1,000 respondents and is probability-based and 
nationally representative of the resident population aged 15 and above.
figure 3.5 Young people’s levels of satisfaction concerning 
 their prospects and confidence in their national institutions, 2011* 
 (percentage of people aged 15 to 34 that trust their country’s institutions and the prospects 
 of the economy and the labour market)  
* Data relative to the question “Do you think it is a good time to find a job in the local labour market?” cor-
respond to 2010. 
Note: Figures for sub-Saharan Africa have been calculated based on a sample of 37 countries for which avail-
able information exists. 
Source: IILS calculations based on Gallup World Poll, 2012.
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per cent). The unavailability of jobs is not the only labour market chal-
lenge perceived by young people; they are also dissatisfied with the lack of 
Government effort to increase the availability of quality jobs. Indeed, in 
2010 (the latest year with available information), 86.4 per cent of young 
people reported that they were dissatisfied with efforts made to increase 
the number of quality jobs – a figure which is 11 percentage points higher 
than in 2007. Dissatisfaction with the lack of availability of quality jobs is 
again higher in Kenya than in sub-Saharan Africa (75.5 per cent) and the 
other countries analysed. 
figure 3.6 How young people perceive their quality of life, selected countries, 2011* 
 (percentage of people aged 15–34 that are satisfied with various aspects of their life)
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* Data relative to the question of “Satisfaction with efforts made to deal with poverty” correspond to 2010. 
Note: Figures for sub-Saharan Africa have been calculated based on a sample of 37 countries for which avail-
able information exists. The variable Satisfaction with the efforts made to deal with poverty is based on a 
reduced sample of 24 countries. 
Source: IILS calculations based on Gallup World Poll, 2012.
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... and are less satisfied with their quality of life 
than young people in other countries ...
Relative to other countries, young Kenyans are less satisfied with their qual-
ity of life. Kenya ranks lower than the average of sub-Saharan Africa and 
most other developing countries analysed, with the exception of Uganda, 
in terms of the satisfaction of youth with their standard of living (figure 
3.6). In 2011, only 38 per cent of young people aged 15 to 34 were satis-
fied with their standard of living – although this represents a 6 percentage 
point increase from 2007. Satisfaction among adults is even lower, at only 
28 per cent. Young people in Kenya are most dissatisfied about efforts to 
counter poverty and the degree to which society focuses on the welfare of its 
young people. Only 16.3 per cent of young people said they were satisfied  
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35 These figures result from the analysis of the question “Is the city or area where you live a good place or not 
a good place to live for entrepreneurs forming new businesses?”, Gallup World Poll (2012).
with current efforts to deal with the issue of poverty in 2010. Importantly, 
adults share this concern and have a similar percentage of dissatisfaction. 
The discontent among young people has increased since 2007 by close 
to 14 percentage points and, as a result, Kenya ranks sixth among the 24 
sub-Saharan African countries with available information on dissatisfaction 
among young people regarding efforts made to aid the most disadvantaged. 
On a positive note, the majority of young women and men were satisfied 
with the educational system (61.6 per cent) and, to a lesser extent, the 
quality of health care (54.4 per cent) in 2011.
… leading to a sense of alienation, less confidence in national democratic 
institutions and relatively high rates of young out-migrants.
Confidence among young Kenyans in the Government and its democratic 
institutions has deteriorated considerably in recent years. For example, 
between 2007 and 2011, young people’s confidence in national Government 
fell by 18 percentage points, in the judicial system by 20.4 percentage 
points and in the honesty of elections by 28.9 percentage points. As a result, 
in 2011, confidence in national institutions in Kenya was the lowest among 
the countries analysed (figure 3.5) and among the eight lowest of all African 
countries with available information.
Kenyans also feel dissatisfied with policies and institutions responsible for 
facilitating a suitable business environment. According to the Gallup data-
base, 24.5 per cent of young Kenyans reported that the area in which they 
lived was not a good place for entrepreneurs to start up new businesses in 
2010.35 This percentage is similar to that observed in sub-Saharan Africa as 
a whole (24.7 per cent) but considerably higher than in other countries in 
the region, such as Ghana (9.2 per cent) and Liberia (13 per cent). 
In the face of the increasing discontent and the poor employment pros-
pects, out-migration of young people has remained an important issue 
in Kenya. As a share of the total stock of migrants, in 2010 the stock of 
young migrants accounted for 22.4 per cent when considering people aged 
15 to 24 and 42.3 per cent when taking into account migrants aged 15 to 
figure 3.7 Median age of international migrants, selected countries, 2010  
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34 – the seventh highest in Africa. As a result, the median age of Kenyan 
migrants in 2010 was 23.8 years. This is 6 years younger than migrants 
from sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (29.8 years), 15 years younger than the 
world median (38.8 years) and more than 18 years younger than European 
migrants (figure 3.7).
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C NATIONAl pOlICIES AND pRIORITIES fOR THE YOUTH: 
 THE WAY fORWARD
 
The Government has expended considerable effort 
to support youth ...
In response to these challenges, the Kenyan Government has introduced a 
range of programmes in recent years in an effort to provide youth with better 
education and training opportunities (table 3.1 and Appendix A). Most nota-
bly, in 2008, the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MOYAS) launched the 
Youth Employment Marshall Plan, with a view to addressing the long-term 
challenges of youth employment. In 2010, the Kenya Youth Empowerment 
Programme was established, which absorbed many of the activities of the 
Marshall Plan, but included a larger spectrum of activities (e.g. training and 
policy development). Recently, new initiatives have been put in place, includ-
ing the Yes Youth Can programme, created by the youth themselves, and the 
Youth Employment for Sustainable Development Project, a joint initiative 
developed by the ILO, the Government of Kenya (through the MOYAS) and 
the Government of Japan.
… but in order to improve labour market outcomes for youth, first, 
programmes could be better aligned to the specific challenges facing them ...
Youth in Kenya continue to be confronted by a number of labour market 
and social challenges which have had a dampening effect on their outlook 
and confidence, despite considerable efforts on the part of policy-makers 
to address the situation. Part of the problem may be that efforts made by 
the Government have failed – both in terms of design and magnitude 
of resources allocated – to adequately address the challenges confront-
ing youth. For instance, an analysis of the Kenyan budget for the period 
2012/13, set at KSh 1,459 billion, shows that 24 per cent of the total 
budget was allocated to social services, of which only 3.1 per cent – or 11.1 
billion – is targeted specifically at youth programmes and activities (figure 
3.8). In other words, less than 1 per cent of the total budget is allocated to 
the activities of MOYAS, of which only 10 per cent is dedicated to the two 
key youth employment-oriented programmes.
Economic  
Recovery Strategy 
(ERS) for Wealth and 
Employment Creation
(Strategic Plan 
2003–2007)
Ministry of Youth 
Affairs and Sports 
(MOYAS)
(New institution)
Kenya National Youth 
Policy
Youth Employment 
Marshall Plan 
(substituted in 2010 
by the Kenya Youth 
Empowerment Pro-
gramme)
Kenya Youth 
Empowerment 
Programme
The strategy’s overall objective was to improve 
growth and development. In terms of youth, the 
plan aimed to: 
• ensure universal primary education through the 
Free Primary Education programme 
• support students in the transition from primary 
to secondary education through the Free Day 
Secondary Education programme.
To coordinate, represent and address youth 
concerns in Kenya.
Responsible for the National Youth Policy and the 
main Government programmes directed towards 
youth. 
Legislative framework put in place to enhance 
youth participation in national development.
It includes a strategy for employment creation.
It was accompanied by the creation of a National 
Youth Council to facilitate, coordinate, manage 
and promote youth issues and youth-led initiatives.
 
Launched by the MOYAS to address the long-term 
challenge of youth unemployment through three 
main initiatives:
• KaziKwaVijana to generate short-term employ-
ment opportunities (now part of the Kenya Youth 
Empowerment Programme). Initiatives include 
the Tree for Jobs programme that aims to provide 
employment while addressing environmental 
problems.
• Youth Enterprise Development Fund to enhance 
youth participation through the provision of credit 
to youth entrepreneurs (still active and managed by 
the MOYAS).
• Technical Vocational Education and Training 
(TVET) component to provide youth with quality 
training in technical, vocational, industrial and 
entrepreneurial skills at Youth Polytechnic facilities 
(still active and managed by the MOYAS).
To provide disadvantaged unemployed youth with 
opportunities to obtain training, apprenticeships 
and short-term jobs to improve their future 
employability. 
2003– 
2007
2005
2007
2008
2010
Net primary school enrolment rate increased from 
84.8 per cent in 2000 to 95.7 per cent in 2011.
The transition rate from primary to secondary 
education rose from 42 to 72 per cent between 
2003 and 2011.
However, there was a fall in the primary teacher/
student ratio, from 1:40 in 2003 to 1:57 in 2011.
Successfully coordinated youth concerns.
Main criticisms: non-inclusion of demographic 
issues as a policy priority and the lack of colla-
boration with other institutions (UNICEF and 
IEA-Kenya, 2012).
The cost of the full implementation amounted to 
KSh 91 million for the period 2007–2011, which 
was mainly allocated to education and training, but 
also to employment creation.
The initiative was welcomed but experts suggest 
that a greater effort is needed to address the lack 
of coordination between government agencies 
(UNICEF and IEA-Kenya, 2012).
The KaziKwaVijana initiative enabled a large 
number of young Kenyans to have their first job 
experience. However, it did not include a training 
and capacity building component.
The Youth Enterprise Development Fund had 
disbursed over KSh 2.9 million by 2010 to finance 
86,000 youth-led enterprises. Challenges include 
insufficient support or funding, inaccessibility 
to certain groups and strict requirements for 
participation.
Under the TVET component, 2,000 additional 
instructors were recruited and 3,500 young people 
were trained in entrepreneurial activities at Youth 
Polytechnic facilities. The challenges include 
lack of resources for training, low level of wages 
paid to staff and lack of collaboration with other 
institutions as well as a negative attitude towards 
graduates of such non-traditional facilities.
In June 2011, the programme had approved 406 
public works and had provided life skills training 
for 1,057 interns, of which 916 were subsequently 
selected for work placements.
Due to irregularities in management, the funds 
were cut by the World Bank and reallocated to 
other activities of the Kenyan portfolio of the 
World Bank. 
Table 3.1 Government programmes, institutions and policy frameworks 
 directed at youth in Kenya
EvaluationObjective/description of the programmeName of intervention Year
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Kenya Vision 2030 
(Strategic Plan 
2008–2030)
Youth Employment 
for Sustainable 
Development (YESD) 
Project 
The long-term development blueprint for the pe-
riod 2008–2030 which aims to improve the quality 
of life of Kenyan citizens. In terms of youth, this 
programme highlights the need for young people 
to be prosperous and globally competitive, so plans 
for youth are proposed in several areas.
Joint initiative developed by the ILO, the Govern-
ment of Kenya (through the MOYAS) and the 
Government of Japan. The project seeks to create 
employment for at least 2,500 youths by running 
road rehabilitation and maintenance projects and 
to educate the youth about infrastructure building.
Local implementation is carried out by the Youth 
Polytechnics under the direction of the MOYAS.
2008– 
2030
2012
Table 3.1 Government programmes, institutions and policy frameworks 
 directed at youth in Kenya
EvaluationObjective/description of the programmeName of intervention Year
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While lack of resources is a key consideration, there appears to be a mis-
match between the problems that this group faces – as described in sec-
tions A and B – and the specific programmes that have been implemented. 
Evidence has shown that well-targeted policies increase efficiency and that 
the effects of such policies on employment can be significant relative to 
their budgetary costs (Jackman et al., 1990). In fact, a microeconomet-
ric assessment of the latest Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 
(KIHBS) revealed that the key individual characteristics that influence 
youth’s probability of finding employment related principally to: (i) edu-
cation and training, notably tertiary education and vocational training; (ii) 
gender of the individual; (iii) family responsibilities; and (iv) geographical 
location (see box 3.2 and Appendix B).36
36 See Escudero and López (forthcoming) for a more detailed analysis of the interpretations of these results.
figure 3.8   Kenyan Government expenditures, 2012/13 budget
Note: FPE refers to Free Primary Education programme and FDSE to Free Day Secondary Education pro-
gramme.
Source: Kenyan Ministry of Finances. 
Safety nets, 
special programmes 
and others
Research
Health
Teachers salaries
FDSE
FPE
18%19%
24%
9%11%
24%
13%
6%
81%
41.6%
7.7%
23.8%
23.8%
Social services
Education
Youth affairs 
and  sports 
3.1%
Physical infrastructure
Consolidated 
fund services
National 
Security
Economic 
affairs
Public administration, 
governance and justice
Civil contingency 
fund (0%)
Kenya youth 
empowerment 
programme  
4.4% Youth enterprise 
development fund 
4.9%
87  
A microeconometric analysis of the latest KIHBS was carried out to shed light on the 
individual characteristics that influence youth’s probability of finding employment and 
the factors that explain the gap between adults and youth (Appendix B). Overall, the 
model pinpoints the age of individuals as the principal factor determining their status in 
employment, even after controlling for variables such as school attendance, educational 
attainment and vocational training. Indeed, people aged 15 to 24 have a 22.4 per cent 
greater chance of being inactive than adults (people aged 35 or more). This difference 
holds, although it is dramatically reduced, when the wider youth group (25 to 34) is con-
sidered – for this wider group the probability of being inactive is still 2.9 per cent higher 
than for adults. The model also shows that being in the 15- to 24-year-old group (in com-
parison to the adult group) increases the probability of being unemployed by 8.1 per cent, 
but the same does not hold (probability being only 0.1 per cent higher) when the wider 
group aged 24 to 35 is considered. More importantly, the likelihood of being employed 
and self-employed is lower for young people – the probability of being employed and 
self-employed is 12 per cent and 11.2 per cent lower, respectively, for youth aged 15 to 
24 and 1.8 and 2.4 per cent lower, respectively, for young people aged 25 to 34. 
The most important factors that explain the differences between the employment status 
of youth and adults, include:
Sex of the individual: The results suggest that some gender discrimination37 might be 
limiting the access of young people to the labour market. Indeed, young females have 
a 21.1 per cent greater chance of being inactive than young males when they are aged 
15 to 24, rising to 25.7 per cent when aged 25 to 34, while this difference is 15.4 per 
cent in the case of adults (people aged 35 or more). Similarly, the sex of young people 
also plays an important role in explaining the gap in finding employment. Indeed, in 
the case of young persons aged 25 to 34, being a woman reduces the likelihood of being 
employed by 26 per cent compared to 17.1 per cent for the adult population as a whole.38 
The gender effect is radically lower when explaining the gap in self-employment. In fact, 
being a man only increases the probability of being self-employed by almost 2 per cent 
among youth (15 to 24), and slightly decreases the odds of being self-employed for young 
people up to the age of 34.
Family responsibilities: Surprisingly, the presence of children in the household does not 
play a role in explaining the level of inactivity of young people (in either age group), but it 
does increase the probability of being inactive among adults. However, in terms of access 
to employment, family responsibilities are an important driver for the older youth group. 
Indeed, while having children barely has any impact on the younger youth group (15 
to 24), it reduces the likelihood of being employed by 8.6 per cent in the case of young 
people aged 25 to 34 (compared to 1.2 per cent for adults).
 
Geographical location: While geographical location plays a crucial role in explaining the 
gap in accessing labour markets between rural and urban youth, it is a factor explaining 
Box 3.2 factors affecting labour market outcomes of youth: A micro-assessment 
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37“Gender discrimination” is captured by the differences in employment status between men and women 
that are not explained by educational attainment, family responsibilities and the effect of having access to 
a network. However, it is important to bear in mind the fact that, discrimination aside, the residual effect 
could also be linked to factors such as health conditions, for which the model did not control due to lack of 
information. 
38 The impact of this factor is lower in the younger age group (15 to 24). Being a woman has the same impact 
on employability as in the case of adults.
the differences between youth and adults. Living in urban areas increases the probability 
of being inactive by 8 and 4.5 per cent among youth aged 15 to 24 and young people 
aged 25 to 34, respectively, compared to 8.2 per cent in the case of adults. More impor-
tantly, the model shows that youth (15 to 24) living in urban areas have a 7.8 per cent 
lower chance of being employed than those living in rural areas, which is not surprising 
given the difference in youth unemployment rates between the two areas – 38.4 and 19 
per cent, respectively. This effect holds, although it is radically reduced, for the young 
people aged 25 to 34 that live in urban areas – who have a 2.2 per cent lower chance 
of being employed than their rural counterparts. Likewise, living in urban areas has a 
lesser effect on the odds of being self-employed. Indeed, it decreases the probability of 
being self-employed among youth, but by a mere 0.6 and 3.4 per cent for youth and 
young people, respectively. Meanwhile, for adults the probability of being self-employed 
is greatly reduced (by close to 10 per cent) when they live in urban areas.
Education and training – notably tertiary education and vocational training: Human capital 
endowment plays an important role in explaining the gap between youth and adults in 
accessing the labour market. Yet, it is tertiary education and vocational training that play 
a crucial role in explaining these differences. Indeed, primary and secondary education 
reduce the probability of being inactive by about 18 and 19 per cent, respectively, in the 
two youth groups (compared to 16 and 19 per cent in the case of adults). Tertiary educa-
tion, on the other hand, reduces the probability of being inactive by 31 per cent among 
youth aged 15 to 24 compared to 17 per cent in the case of adults; and vocational training 
by 8.5 per cent and has no impact on adult inactivity.39 Likewise, education variables 
strongly influence the probability of youth being employed (while they barely have any 
impact on the adult group). Indeed, tertiary education and vocational training increase 
the likelihood of having a job by 24 and 7.7 per cent, respectively, in the case of youth 
aged 15 to 24 and by 36.4 and 9.4 per cent, respectively, in the case of young people 
aged 25 to 34. The difference in the effect of university education and vocational training 
between youth and adults could be attributed to the fact that, after adults have acquired 
professional experience and soft skills, their level of educational attainment becomes less 
important and therefore explains a lower part of the probability of being employed.
The availability of a network in the household: Finally, having a network (a member of the 
household already in employment who can facilitate entry into the labour market) in the 
household greatly increases the probability of youth being employed. Indeed, the presence 
of another employed or self-employed individual raises the likelihood of being employed 
by 10.1 and 11.5 per cent, respectively, among youth aged 15 to 24 and by 14.5 and 
13.5 per cent, respectively, in the case of young people aged 25 to 34. Interestingly, this 
insider–outsider concept of job recruitment (Wittenberg and Pearce, 1996) only affects 
young Kenyans and not their adult counterparts. The opposite is true when analysing 
the probability of being self-employed. The availability of a network increases the odds of 
being self-employed by 2 and 7 per cent among youth aged 15 to 24 and young people 
aged 25 to 34, respectively (compared to 11 per cent in the case of adults).
Source: IILS calculations based on KIHBS.
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39 However, these two factors had a much lesser impact on the probability of young people aged 25 to 34 of 
being inactive. Indeed, tertiary education reduces the probability of being inactive by 15.6 per cent for this 
age group and vocational training by 5 per cent.
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Whereas many of the policies implemented are aimed at young people in 
general, without identifying those in greatest need. Moving forward, greater 
emphasis could be placed on targeting the disadvantages that youth face, 
rather than focusing on youth per se: 
•	 Improve the technical skills match: The combination of an education that 
is adapted to the needs of the country with technical training that could 
be used directly on the job can dramatically improve the employability 
of youth. For instance, the Republic of Korea and Singapore not only 
addressed the issue of the quality of education (including secondary and 
tertiary education) but also improved vocational skills, which they rightly 
believed were essential factors in improving productivity and competitive-
ness. Both countries introduced training levies to encourage enterprises 
to participate in workers training. The objective of both countries was 
to harness the potential of enterprises to function as learning organiza-
tions in order to develop worker skills (Asian Development Bank, 2004). 
Although, over the past decade, the key driver of growth in Kenya has 
continued to be domestic demand, the export sector remains a potential 
source of growth for the country – Kenya has moved towards higher 
value added products and there is also potential to develop new products 
(World Bank, 2011b). Thus, emphasizing the quality of education and 
improving vocational skills could be essential factors in consolidating this 
export-led growth process.
•	 Facilitate school-to-work transitions: A significant problem in Kenya 
remains the difficulty that youth face in moving from school to work. In 
recent years, several Latin American countries implemented job training 
programmes designed especially for disadvantaged youth. The pioneer-
ing initiative in this field was the programme Chile Joven, created in 
1991 and still active today. The programme moved from an in-classroom 
initiative towards a more comprehensive training model that included 
supplementary services, such as counselling and mentoring, monitoring, 
job search and placement assistance, and soft- and life-skills training. It 
is estimated that over 50 per cent of participants in this programme have 
achieved employment as a direct result of this intervention – although 
most of these success stories (young males, with complete secondary 
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education and previous job experience) had advantages over the aver-
age non-participant. Moreover, about 10,000 companies (most of them 
small) have been involved and the vast majority were favourably dis-
posed to repeating the experience (Sepúlveda, 2009). Other countries in 
the region faced with similar challenges replicated the model, on many 
occasions with the support of the Inter-American Development Bank 
and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The success of such 
programmes lies in the inclusion of a labour demand perspective.
•	 Include elements of soft-skills development: While measures aimed at 
enhancing the employability of youth should focus on providing young 
people with technical skills applicable in the workplace, efforts must also 
be made to encourage soft skills. In 2001, the Dominican Republic cre-
ated the Juventud y Empleo Programme aimed at providing youth with 
both technical and soft skills for the labour market. The programme inte-
grates education in life skills to help young people to be more effective 
workers, through training provided mainly by private local training insti-
tutions – the so-called System Operations Centres (Centros Operativos 
del Sistema). The topics taught include self-esteem, teamwork, commu-
nication skills, work organization and service skills, job-search skills and 
knowledge related to risky behaviours (reproductive health, drug use, 
violence, etc.). Data from the Dominican Republic Ministry of Labour 
indicate that, between 2003 and 2010, 55,003 young people benefited 
from this programme, of which 90 per cent were from the poorest areas 
in the country. Furthermore, 65 per cent of people that completed the 
training were employed or self-employed within 6 months of completing 
the programme and earned, on average, 10 per cent more than those who 
did not participate.
•	 Ensure equity in programme participation, especially for women and youth in 
rural areas: A number of programmes, including KaziKwaVijana and the 
Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF), have been criticized for 
the lack of access to a majority of the individuals’ target group. Experts 
believe that there is a need for enhanced equity, accessibility, capacity 
building and participation of youth in these programmes (UNICEF 
and IEA-Kenya, 2012). This is particularly the case for young women 
and youth in rural or remote areas – key determinants of employment 
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outcomes. To ensure equity in programme participation and to combat 
discrimination, the Programme for the Promotion of Children and Youth 
(PCY) was implemented in Uganda between 2003 and 2006. The PCY 
was a Ugandan–German comprehensive approach to promote the inter-
ests of disadvantaged youth living in rural areas, suffering from either 
unemployment or underemployment. The programme facilitated the 
development of the National Action Plan on Youth Employment, in 
which PCY played an important part (GTZ, 2006).
•	 Supporting the most vulnerable: A high percentage of young peo-
ple in Kenya remain outside the labour force. Measures such as the 
KaziKwaVijana Programme have attempted to address this problem but 
traditional employment policies aimed at “activating” individuals may 
be ill-suited to assisting youths specifically since, in contrast to their 
older counterparts, youths usually have only limited work experience. 
Some countries have responded to this new challenge by introducing 
specific policy measures to support and reintegrate unemployed and inac-
tive youth into the labour market. One such example is a non-formal 
education project for youth in Egypt. This UNESCO-funded project, 
implemented under the auspices of three non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), seeks to target those individuals that have fallen out of 
the formal educational system and provide them not only with literacy 
skills, but also with vocational training, life skills, computer and foreign 
language skills. Given the specific characteristics of the targeted youth 
group, the project is based on an alternative approach, using a non-formal 
model of education revolving around learning and working conditions 
rooted in local economies and local knowledge. The project leads to 
lifelong learning and earning skills and eventually creates networks of 
learning communities, acting as a vehicle for the provision of practical 
skills in the hope of improving productivity and successfully tackling the 
problem of youth unemployment.
… and, second, complemented by demand-side initiatives.
Scenario 1: annual GDP growth of 3.1% 
(average 1991–2011) 
Scenario 2: annual GDP growth of 4.2% 
(average 2000–2011) 
Scenario 3: annual GDP growth of 5% 
(growth rate of 2011 and 
necessary rate of growth to absorb 
growing working-age-population) 
Scenario 4: proggressive increase 
in the annual GDP growth rate until 
attaining 10% 
(Vision 2030’s prospect) 
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
figure 3.9  Simulations: Number of jobs that would be required by 2015 to absorb 
 the estimated working-age population* given different growth scenarios and 
 the existing employment elasticity, calculations for total and youth (millions of jobs) 
* Existing and projected (2012–15) data on working-age population comes from UNDESA, 2011a.
Source: IILS calculations based on KILM (ILO, 2012b), UNDESA, 2011a and IMF, 2012. 
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Although the size of the youth cohort has significant implications for the 
status of youth in the labour market, aggregate demand has a greater influ-
ence in the case of Kenya (see Appendix C).40 Moreover, the employment 
elasticity of economic growth during the past 20 years has been around 0.9 
in Kenya, whereas the youth employment elasticity was only about 0.4 dur-
ing the same period. It is, therefore, not surprising that several growth sce-
narios reveal that only an average annual growth rate that rises progressively 
to reach 10 per cent in 2015 – the objective of Vision 2030 Strategic Plan – 
would close both the youth and total job shortage gap (figure 3.9). Growth 
scenarios of 3.1 and 4.2 per cent per annum would yield job deficits for 
both youth and adults totalling 1.1 million and 500,000, respectively. An 
average growth rate of 5 per cent per annum would close the overall gap but 
a youth job shortage of approximately 240,000 would persist.
40 With a view to assessing the relative importance of these factors, an econometric analysis has been carried 
out to estimate the impact of aggregate demand and cohort size on the rates of unemployed and inactive youth 
during the past 20 years. See Appendix C for the exact specification of the different equations and Escudero 
and López (forthcoming) for a detailed analysis of the theoretical framework from which the equations were 
derived and the interpretations of the results.
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Fostering economic growth and ensuring economic sustainability are thus 
important factors, yet in isolation they will not be sufficient to address 
youth challenges. Additional efforts tailored to improving the employ-
ment content of growth and encouraging the demand for youth labour 
are needed. Indeed, in an effort to achieve a more equitable distribution 
of the gains from growth, some countries have undertaken measures that 
provide incentives to enterprises to hire youth workers, while others have 
promoted entrepreneurship among youth. Examples of initiatives are 
detailed below: 
•	 Targeted subsidies and other measures to encourage the hiring of youth: A 
number of initiatives exist to encourage job creation among youth, includ-
ing subsidized wages or tax breaks. For instance, the First Employment 
Programme, established in Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay and, recently, 
Mexico, seeks to create permanent, well-paid jobs in the formal econo-
my through subsidies for the recruitment of young people. In Mexico, 
the Government returns to the company all social security contributions 
made for each young person employed, starting from the tenth month 
after the person was hired.41 The amount of the subsidy depends on the 
salary of the new employee. An additional advantage of this programme 
is that it provides incentives to enable workers and their families to 
receive social security benefits, such as access to health services, pensions 
and maternity allowances. According to the Mexican Institute of Social 
Security, by August 2012, some 26,178 companies had been enrolled 
in the programme, registering 94,200 workers. A similar programme 
existed in Turkey between July 2008 and June 2009, which introduced 
reductions of 100 per cent of employers’ social security contributions in 
the first year, with a 20 percentage point decline per year in the subsidy 
over the following 4 years. Betcherman et al. (2010) found that, during 
the year that it was active, this programme led to significant increases in 
net registered jobs, estimated to be between 5 and 15 per cent. 
•	 Promoting entrepreneurship among youth: Promoting entrepreneurship can 
help to foster employment opportunities for young people, while also 
reducing precarious and informal forms of employment among them. 
In addition, entrepreneurship has the potential to unlock the innovative 
41 More specifically, after the tenth month of work, the social security contributions paid by the company 
during the first month are reimbursed; after completion of the eleventh month of work, the social security 
contributions paid by the company during the second month are reimbursed, and so on.
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capacities of youth through the promotion of new and entrepreneurial 
types of work that achieve a better fit with such a diverse group of indi-
viduals. However, to establish and run successful businesses, young peo-
ple require assistance with training, access to credit and office facilities, as 
well as support and advice. For instance, Uganda’s Youth Opportunities 
Programme was introduced in 2006 to raise incomes and employment 
among vulnerable young people aged 16 to 35 in the country’s north-
ern region.42 To qualify, young adults had to organize themselves into 
groups of 10 to 30 people in order to receive the training and then 
submit a proposal (either in groups or individually) for a grant to cover 
training programmes and the tools and materials they required to run 
a business. An evaluation carried out between mid-2010 and mid-2011 
(approximately 12 to 18 months after most groups had finalized their 
training programmes) showed that young adults who applied for the 
programme were more likely to be undertaking some kind of skilled 
activity (68 per cent) than those who did not qualify for the grant (34 per 
cent). Moreover, on average, grant recipients had 50 per cent higher net 
incomes than those who did not receive the grant and had also amassed 
more savings (World Bank, 2011a).
•	 Promote cohesion between adults and youth: It is important to remember 
that youth and adults are not mutual substitutes in the labour market, 
and the promotion (or discouragement) of one is not to the detriment (or 
benefit) of the other. All too often, it is wrongly assumed that early retire-
ment will open up positions for youth – which has had the unfortunate 
effect of creating an adversarial relationship between the two groups. Both 
young and adult workers are central to a productive and efficient labour 
market. Moreover, mentoring can be a powerful resource for nourishing 
the entrepreneurial spirit of young people. One example of this kind of 
mentorship programme is the Shell LiveWIRE initiative in Nigeria. Shell 
LiveWIRE is a social investment programme created in 2003 that aims 
to empower young Nigerians in enterprise development and manage-
ment. The project provides skills training as well as grants and mentoring 
assistance to enable beneficiaries to set up micro-enterprises. By 2008, 
over 2,000 young people had received training, while 260 had gone on to 
start their own business (ILO, 2007). Of course, mentoring of this kind 
42 More than one-quarter had not completed primary education, more than two-fifths did not have an income 
or employment and more than half reported having weekly revenues of around US$4, which is below the 
international poverty line of US$1.25 per day.
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can be envisioned elsewhere and greater contact and interaction between 
younger and more experienced workers can help to instil good workplace 
practices.
Finally, success will be possible only if a coherent and tripartite strategy 
to leverage the above complementarities is undertaken.
An integrated employment policy plan is needed to create opportunities 
for young people while at the same time reducing poverty and allowing 
youth to be part of the economic and social development of the coun-
try. Engaging in social dialogue with relevant stakeholders when pursuing 
policy initiatives for youth is also imperative to ensure that the comple-
mentarities between demand- and supply-side initiatives are leveraged. 
Indeed, social dialogue with relevant stakeholders can help to bridge infor-
mation asymmetries between the Government, employers and youth and 
promote strategic partnerships aimed at achieving longer term sustainable 
outcomes. Some areas and examples that Kenya could draw on in the future 
are detailed below: 
•	 Building public–private partnerships. Employers’ organizations and the 
private sector in general are key partners of institutions in charge of 
employment. Fostering collaboration is essential, not only to facilitate 
the integration of partners’ needs into national employment policies but 
also to allow private partners to integrate into the budgeting and plan-
ning aspects of employment strategies. Moreover, these kinds of pub-
lic–private partnerships play a crucial role in the planning of training 
policies. Indeed, thanks to communication and dialogue with the private 
sector, public training providers are able to improve the relevance and 
quality of training, match the skills needed by employers with existing 
skills of workers, etc. With this in mind, some countries have created a 
system of sector bodies.43 South Africa, for example, instituted a statu-
tory levy in April 2000 to be invested in training and development as 
part of the Government’s skills strategy. The levy was set at 1 per cent 
of the wage bill and collected monthly through taxation by the South 
Africa Revenue Service. The money has been used to establish a nation-
43 The term “sector body” refers to an organization whose mandate is to promote skills development in a 
specific economic sector, and to ensure that training in that sector meets the needs of employers as well as any 
Government objectives (City & Guilds Centre for Skills Development, 2008).
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al network of Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) and 
encourage employers to develop workplace skills plans and to invest in 
skills (Raddon and Sung, 2006). Currently, there are 23 SETAs and their 
funding depends on the size of the sector and the levy paid.
•	 Partnerships with international organizations: The ILO’s Youth Employment 
Programme (YEP) follows an integrated approach that combines macr-
oeconomic policies and targeted measures, addressing labour demand and 
supply, as well as the quantity and quality of employment. The ILO YEP 
provides assistance to countries in developing consistent and coordinated 
policies and programmes on youth employment. The specific functions of 
the ILO YEP include the establishment of strategic partnerships on youth 
employment through the promotion of cross-country and global peer 
networks, inter-agency cooperation across the United Nations and other 
international agencies, and collaboration between the private and public 
sectors at the international, regional and national levels. The YEP’s work 
informs and shapes the ILO’s contribution to the Youth Employment 
Network (YEN) – a global partnership forged by the ILO, the United 
Nations and the World Bank to find new, durable policy and programme 
solutions to the youth employment challenge. The YEN provides a global 
platform for prioritizing youth employment on development agendas 
and exchanging information on policies and programmes to improve 
employment opportunities for youth. The Network includes develop-
ment agencies, governments, the private sector, youth groups and other 
NGOs. The Kenyan Government and the ILO YEN have been working 
together to create youth programmes. In 2010, for example, the ILO 
YEN launched the Youth-to-Youth Fund in Kenya. The Youth-to-Youth 
Fund is a competitive grant scheme targeting youth-led organizations, 
providing them with both funding and capacity building. The first call 
for proposals was launched in July 2010 and resulted in 156 applications, 
out of which ten organizations were selected to receive the Fund grant 
package to implement their entrepreneurship development projects. 
•	 Promote youth engagement in the process: Youths themselves are crucial 
stakeholders in the discussion, creation and implementation of youth 
employment policies and programmes. Youths have a different perspec-
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tive on the realities of the youth labour market and, therefore, have sig-
nificant insights to offer to policy-makers. In Kenya, an effort was made 
to accommodate these contributions via the Yes Youth Can programme, 
but with limited success (see Appendix A). To build on Kenya’s own 
experience, a number of international examples exist from which fur-
ther lessons could be drawn. For example, the National Action Plan for 
Youth Employment in Sri Lanka involved youth throughout the country 
by including the Sri Lanka Youth Parliament (SLYP) in the design and 
running of the consultative process. The SLYP comprised 225 delegates 
between the ages of 16 and 25 from all districts and ethnic and religious 
backgrounds. The SLYP was responsible for creating a platform for young 
leaders in Sri Lanka to voice their concerns and documenting discussions 
and, in this specific case, to obtain feedback from young people across 
the country on the National Action Plan. As a result of these consulta-
tions, concrete inputs were achieved, such as the recommendation of 
15 amendments that were taken into account in the final draft of the 
National Action Plan (UNDESA, 2011b and ILO, 2008).
•	 Improved coordination: There is a need to promote better coordination 
among the various youth-centred programmes and policies, both pub-
lic and private, in order to avoid duplication of efforts and to reach 
more youth. This is one of the main criticisms of the MOYAS, which is 
believed to lack a strategy on how to collaborate successfully with other 
institutions on the implementation of youth-related programmes and 
projects housed in other ministries (UNICEF and IEA-Kenya, 2012).
•	 Introduce effective programme evaluation: The ability of policy-makers to 
improve the effectiveness of existing (and new) programmes is highly 
dependent on an accurate evaluation framework. Generally, however, lit-
tle is known about the effectiveness of the existing package of measures. 
First, there is a need to gather and monitor pre- and post-programme 
information and results. As far as possible, a vast range of information 
should be gathered: cost, employment status, earnings, demographic 
information, education level, etc. Second, it is critical to continue to 
monitor participants over longer periods. Given that, in many cases, the 
benefits of programmes, in particular training for youth, accrue over 
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time, monitoring participants and outcomes beyond programme exit (for 
between 3 and 5 years) should be part of any monitoring and evaluation 
strategy. Finally, the Government needs to establish at the outset, clear 
and measurable objectives with respect to expected outcomes for both 
the short and long term. 
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 AppENDIX A 
 REvIEW Of EXISTING pROGRAMMES fOR YOUTH
Economic recovery strategy for wealth and employment creation
In 2003, Kenya developed the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth 
and Employment Creation (ERS). This Strategy set forth the country’s 
vision for human development for the period 2003 to 2007 through the 
action of different ministries and government departments working in 
unison. It aimed to stimulate economic growth, reduce poverty and pro-
mote human development, as well as setting targets consistent with the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Republic of Kenya, 2003). To 
address these objectives, the programme focused on ensuring universal 
primary education, improving access to basic health care, expanding 
productive capacity in agriculture – through the development of the 
country’s arid and semi-arid lands – and upgrading the living conditions 
of the urban poor. 
One of the most popular measures included in the ERS – due to its large 
impact – was the Free Primary Education programme (FPE) put forth in 
January 2003. The programme was created specifically to achieve 100 per 
cent net primary school enrolment by 2005, and was relatively successful. 
Indeed, following the implementation of FPE in Kenya, enrolment in gov-
ernment primary schools increased dramatically – the net primary school 
enrolment rate increased by more than 10 percentage points over the past 
decade, from 84.8 per cent in 2000 to 95.7 per cent in 2011. In addition 
to the FPE programme, the Kenyan Government introduced the Free Day 
Secondary Education (FDSE) programme in 2008 to support students in 
the transition from primary to secondary education. As a result, the transi-
tion rate from primary to secondary education rose in Kenya from 42 to 
72 per cent between 2003 and 2011.
Although the FPE and FDS programmes opened up opportunities for 
children and youth who had never previously enrolled in school or had 
101  
dropped out because their families could not afford the costs, the sig-
nificant challenges that emerged from the elimination of school fees were 
not always adequately addressed. For example, the sharp increase in the 
number of children at school, combined with inadequate basic facilities, 
such as classrooms, books and equipment, produced overcrowding and 
reduced the quality of education by adversely affecting teacher–pupil ratios 
– the primary teacher–student ratio fell from 1:40 in 2003 to 1:57 in 
2011. Moreover, with primary education becoming universal, school-to-
work transition became a crucial, but unaddressed, challenge.
Programmes directly under the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports 
(MOYAS)
MOYAS was established in December 200544 to address youth concerns 
in Kenya. The core functions of this ministry include: (i) formulating, 
implementing, coordinating, reviewing and monitoring youth development 
policies; (ii) facilitating youth participation in the development processes; 
(iii) coordinating and monitoring youth-led initiatives; (iv) advocating and 
promoting youth-led initiatives; (v) developing youth resource centres; 
and (vi) facilitating leadership, entrepreneurship and life skills training. 
The ministry’s functions are executed through five departments: General 
Administration and Planning, Youth Development, National Youth Service, 
Youth Training, and Sports.
The ministry is responsible for the National Youth Policy, as well as 
the National Youth Council – created to manage the youth-led initia-
tives included in the National Youth Policy. The ministry also oversees  
Youth Development Programmes (such as the Youth Employment 
Marshall Plan and the Kenya Youth Empowerment Programme), the 
Youth Enterprise Development Fund and the Technical, Industrial, 
Vocational, Education and Training component of the different devel-
opment programmes (in particular, Youth Polytechnics).45 In addition, 
the ministry is also responsible for the National Youth Service and Youth 
Resource Centres.
44 Initially, MOYAS was established purely as a ministry for youth affairs. In May 2008, the Department of 
Sports, which was then included in the Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services, was transferred 
to the Ministry of State for Youth Affairs, creating the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. 
45 Youth Polytechnics are alternative Kenyan colleges (tertiary education institutions), which provide both 
academic education and accredited vocational training courses.
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46 The fund provides both short- and long-term loans to these intermediaries at a 1 per cent interest rate. The 
intermediaries in turn lend to the youth at an 8 per cent interest rate. The 7 per cent difference is used to cover 
administrative costs and to mitigate losses that might arise from lending to a clientele perceived as risky.
In 2010, a programme created in 2008 – the Youth Employment 
Marshall Plan – was replaced by the Kenya Youth Empowerment 
Programme (KYEP). Of the three components of the Marshall Plan 
– KaziKwaVijana, Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) and 
Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) – the KYEP 
absorbed only the first. The other two were transferred to the MOYAS 
and remain active today.
•	 Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF): The fund was created to 
enhance youth participation in socio-economic development through 
the provision of credit to young entrepreneurs. YEDF was launched 
as a revolving fund – based on public–private partnerships. Loans are 
offered with annual interest rates ranging from 5 to 8 per cent, with 
a repayment period ranging from 6 months to 6 years. The loan sizes 
range from KSh 50,000 (US$530) to KSh 2 million (US$21,276).  
The fund disburses loans through: (i) the Constituency Youth Enterprise 
Scheme (C-YES); (ii) the Enhanced Youth Enterprise Scheme; and (iii) 
private financial intermediaries working as partners with the Fund  
to ensure continued financing.46 As at June 2012, YEDF had disbursed 
KSh 6.5 billion (US$77,380) to over 171,000 youth enterprises. 
•	 Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET): This TVET 
component (partly funded by the African Development Bank) aims 
to empower youth through the provision of accessible, appropriate 
and high-quality training in technical, vocational and entrepreneurial 
skills. The TVET can claim a number of achievements: (i) KSh 890 
million were spent in the financial year 2010–11 to subsidize tuition 
for trainees registered in public Youth Polytechnics and to recruit 2,000 
additional instructors; (ii) the curriculum for Youth Polytechnics was 
reviewed to ensure that it matched labour market needs; (iii) there was 
a clear improvement of the physical facilities and an increase in the 
provision of equipment and tools to Youth Polytechnics; (iv) 3,500 
young people were trained in entrepreneurial activities in 150 different 
districts countrywide.
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Kenya National Youth Policy 
The Kenya National Youth Policy (KNYP) was adopted by Parliament in 
2007 as a legislative framework to enhance youth participation in national 
development. This was carried out through the selection of a number of 
priority target groups, such as youth with disability, street youth, youth 
infected with HIV/AIDS, female youth, unemployed youth and out-of-
school youth (Republic of Kenya, 2007). Moreover, strategic areas for 
action (education and training, employment creation, empowerment 
and participation, health, the environment, art and culture, ICT and the 
media and, finally, sports and recreation) are defined through this policy. 
At present, the employment creation strategy includes the following objec-
tives: (i) identifying those public and private youth programmes which 
are efficiently addressing the youth employment crisis; (ii) facilitating the 
establishment of high-level resource centres where youth can access infor-
mation, training and technical support on income-generating activities; 
(iii) promoting programmes from the private sector, Community Service 
Organizations and the Government to provide youth with necessary skills 
and financial assistance (through microfinance credit facilities) and allocat-
ing funds specifically for young entrepreneurs; and (iv) encouraging com-
panies to offer mentorship, apprenticeship and internship programmes to 
young people in order to provide them with labour experience.
The establishment of the KNYP was accompanied by the creation of 
a National Youth Council, launched within the Ministry of Youth and 
Sports. The Council was created to facilitate, coordinate, manage and pro-
mote youth issues and youth-led initiatives. The full implementation of this 
policy required KSh 91 million for the period 2007–2011 (KSh 18 million 
per year). The largest share of the total budget was allocated to education 
and training, with 61.4 per cent of the total policy budget, while employ-
ment creation accounted for 21.9 per cent. Empowerment and participa-
tion accounted for 11 per cent; health for 4.4 per cent and the rest of the 
strategic areas taken together (namely, environment, art and culture, ICT 
and the media, and sports and recreation) for 1.3 per cent.
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Kenya Youth Empowerment Programme
In 2010, the Government of Kenya joined forces with the World Bank 
to create the Kenya Youth Empowerment Programme (KYEP). The 
KYEP is a World Bank funded project, which supports efforts made by 
the Government of Kenya to increase access to youth-targeted temporary 
employment programmes and to improve youth employability (World 
Bank, 2010). The KYEP aims to provide disadvantaged unemployed youth 
with opportunities to obtain training, apprenticeships and short-term jobs 
with a view to increasing their employability in the medium and long 
term. The KYEP replaced the Youth Employment Marshall Plan that was 
created in 2008. Of the three components of the Marshall Plan (see above) 
the KYEP absorbed only the first (KaziKwaVijana). The other two of its 
original components, the YEDF and the TVET are still active and managed 
by the MOYAS.
The KYEP has three main components:
•	 Labour-intensive works and social services: This component enhances 
and improves the performance of the KaziKwaVijana (KKV) by pro-
viding technical assistance and additional funds to the programme. The 
KKV programme was launched in 2009 under the Youth Employment 
Marshall Plan with the objective of generating between 200,000 and 
300,000 short-term employment opportunities for unskilled youth 
through labour-intensive public works projects. The young people 
employed in the KKV programmes are engaged in manual-based small 
projects in their own communities. Moreover, under the KKV pro-
gramme, the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports developed the Trees-
for-Jobs Initiative which aimed to address the deforestation of the 
country by planting 90 million seedlings per year to increase Kenya’s 
forest coverage to a total of 4 per cent by 2012. This initiative has 
created many employment opportunities for unemployed youth, with 
over 19,000 youths hired in its first 2 years and has enabled a large 
number of young Kenyans from both urban and rural areas to gain 
their first job experience. However, the programme did not include a 
training and capacity-building component to facilitate the transition 
from short-term to longer term employment for participants.
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•	 Private sector internships and training: This element is carried out by the 
Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), a business membership institution 
created in 2003. KEPSA’s main role is to interface with the Government on 
behalf of the private sector on cross-cutting issues such as youth employ-
ment. KEPSA serves as a platform that aims to benefit 11,000 youths over 
the next 4 years through internship placement in the private sector. The 
project plans to provide approximately 900 internships in Nairobi, 400 in 
Mombasa, and 135 in Kisumu per cycle, with eight cycles in total. Youth 
aged 15 to 29 who have been out of school for at least a year, are not cur-
rently working and who have a minimum of 8 years of schooling are eligi-
ble to participate. Formal sector internships will be limited to those over 18 
years of age, since this is the minimum working age in Kenya, while youths 
between the ages of 15 and 18 are eligible for work in the informal sector. 
The share of interns with some level of tertiary education is capped at 40 
per cent. KEPSA pays the participants a monthly stipend of KSh 6,000 and 
focuses on placements within industries that are considered to be the main 
growth sectors according to Kenya Vision 2030 (namely energy, finance, 
tourism, manufacturing and micro- and small enterprises).
•	 Capacity building and policy development: The main objective is to enhance 
the capacity of the MOYAS to implement the National Youth Policy and 
increase the institutional capacity for youth policy planning. To achieve 
this, a training programme was implemented for MOYAS staff and other 
government workers, while a number of social audits were put in place to 
improve transparency and accountability in the implementation of the 
other two components of the project. 
In June 2011, the World Bank carried out a financial management review of 
the KYEP. The review illustrated, in terms of objectives met, that the KYEP 
had approved 406 public works and had provided life skills training for a total 
of 1,057 interns, of which 916 were subsequently selected for work place-
ments. However, it also identified a number of irregularities in the financial 
management of the labour-intensive works and social services component. 
As a result, the overall programme was restructured and the labour-intensive 
works and social services component was removed. The funds were reallocated 
to other activities of the World Bank Kenya portfolio (Wiseman, 2011).
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Kenya Vision 2030 
Kenya Vision 2030 is the new development plan covering the period 2008–
2030. It replaced the ERS and aims to improve the quality of life of all 
Kenyan citizens (from an economic, social and political perspective). The 
initiative seeks to achieve its goal through economic, social and political 
projects and is divided into 5-year medium-term plans with the first one fin-
ishing in 2012. The next leg of the process is expected to take place between 
2013 and 2017. Youth objectives within the overall plan are addressed 
through the implementation of public programmes: (i) to improve practi-
cal skills training and identify specific barriers to youth employment; (ii) 
to implement policy reforms that help to widen opportunities for youth 
employment; (iii) to rehabilitate or build one youth empowerment centre 
in each constituency; (iv) to increase allocations to the Youth Enterprise 
Development Fund (YEDF) and ensure the efficient and productive use of 
funds allocated to youth groups (Republic of Kenya, 2011). 
Youth Employment for Sustainable Development (YESD) Project 
In 2012, the International Labour Organization, the Government of Kenya 
and the Government of Japan jointly launched the YESD Project as an 
initiative to create job opportunities for youth through the rehabilitation 
and maintenance of roads (ILO, 2012). The project aims to target at least 
2,500 youths in the first 9 months and is funded by Japan with a budget of 
KSh 136 million. The implementation of the project is carried out by the 
Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports via the platform of Youth Polytechnics. 
The partnership has identified four main areas of interest: (i) development 
of youth-owned small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – the project 
intends to provide incentives for business creation, by agreeing to contract 
their businesses to pave and maintain certain roads; (ii) mainstreaming cob-
blestone47 and “Do-nou”48 technologies to strengthen training capacity; (iii) 
development of green jobs by employing youths in the clean technology 
sector and investing in research relating to environmental sustainability; 
and (iv) strengthening programme monitoring and evaluation. 
47 Refers to cobblestone paving technology, which is a new technology in Kenya that has vast potential in 
improving urban and rural infrastructure.
48 The Japanese term “Do-nou” refers to sealed sacks that are filled with soil, sand or gravel. These sacks can 
then be used to fill pot holes in roads, raise embarkments to prevent floods, reinforce structures, etc.
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Yes Youth Can
Yes Youth Can is a nationwide project that aims to empower youths through 
direct engagement in civic and social efforts in over 15,000 communities 
(USAID, 2011). Organized and led by youths themselves, the programme 
gained financial support from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in 2011. Specific initiatives seek to: (i) support 
quick-impact projects to promote youth voices on national issues, particu-
larly the reform process, through independent grass-roots organizations and 
activities; (ii) build new skills in youth leadership and entrepreneurship; 
(iii) establish a youth-led fund that promotes economic opportunities in 
their own communities and fosters an environment conducive to youth 
enterprises, and; (iv) expand youth networks to encourage collaboration 
and leverage resources. To achieve these goals, USAID has commissioned 
the local organization Inunya Kenya Trust49 to facilitate the funding and 
implementation of programme activities. Despite its ambitious goal, heavy 
criticism and public accusations of corruption have surfaced amid the lack 
of transparency in the practices of the Trust’s management. As a result, 
significant benefits have yet to be realized. Intense discontent with the 
programme has led to violence, including an assault on the fund controller 
during an organizational event.
49 Inunya Kenya Trust is a grass-roots advocacy group dedicated to inspiring youths to improve their own 
lives by promoting Heshima (dignity and respect for others), Diversity (inclusiveness and equality) and Self-
Belief. It connects local businesses and youths with external support agents to help execute the strategic goals 
of both parties. Ironically, widespread suspicion of Inunya CEO John Githongo’s involvement in donation 
embezzlement has marred the reputation of the group.
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AppENDIX B
 ANAlYSIS Of THE DETERMINANTS Of EMplOYMENT STATUS 
 Of YOUTH
Section C of this chapter, discussed the implications of the different deter-
minants of youth’s status in employment. This discussion is the result of 
a microeconometric analysis carried out to shed light on the individual 
characteristics that influence youth’s probability of finding employment 
and the factors that explain the gap in employment status between adults 
and youth. The aim of this appendix is to describe how the model was 
constructed and present the detailed results of the exercise.
In order to shed light on the individual causes of youth unemployment 
in Kenya, this analysis investigates the microeconomic determinants of 
the employment status of young individuals. The aim of the exercise is 
to explore the main variables that influence the probability of youth of 
being unemployed, employed, self-employed or in inactivity. Establishing 
the individual characteristics that could increase the probability of young 
Kenyans finding a job is a decisive step towards identifying potential poli-
cies to address youth labour market challenges.
The analysis draws on a microeconometric model based on the Kenya 
Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 2005/06 conducted by 
the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Data collection for the KIHBS 
2005/06 was undertaken during a period of 12 months starting on 16 May 
2005. The survey was conducted in 1,343 randomly selected clusters across 
all districts in Kenya, comprising 861 rural and 482 urban clusters. The 
database contains information for 13,430 households and 66,709 house-
hold members (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2007). For the purpose 
of this report, the analysis focuses on individuals aged 15 or more for which 
information on employment status is available. Thus, the selected sample 
consists of 36,047 individuals, of which 13,996 (38.8 per cent) are youths 
aged 15 to 24; 8,272 (22.9 per cent) are young people aged 25 to 34 and 
13,780 (38.2 per cent) are adults aged 35 or more.
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The model estimated
To analyse the determinants of youth status in employment, a multino-
mial probit model has been estimated, with a four-level dependent variable 
adopting the values of: 1, if the individual declares that they have been in 
inactivity during the reference period; 2, if the individual declares that they 
have been unemployed; 3, if the individual was an employee; and 4, if they 
were self-employed. The probit model makes it possible to estimate how 
the characteristics of individuals influence the probability of belonging to 
any of these four categories.
The equation estimated can be described as follows:
Yi* = Xiβ’ +Ｅi
where, Yi* is the unobserved latent variable, Xi is a vector of the individu-
als’ characteristics, β is the vector of coefficients to be estimated andＥi is 
a random error. Following this equation, if the status in employment is 
indexed by k(k=1,2,3,4), the probability that an individual i with a vector 
of characteristics Xi is assigned to employment status j is:
P ( yi = j ) =        
 exp ( Xij βj )
 
where βk is a vector of coefficients corresponding to the kth mployment 
status.
Although, the estimated coefficients of βalready indicate whether an 
explanatory variable has a positive or negative impact on the dependent 
variable, it is much easier to interpret the model using the marginal effects. 
The marginal effect of each of the independent variables on each of the 
categories can be computed as follows (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009):
∑k exp ( Xik βjk )
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( ∂Pij )
 = Pij (βjk  – ∑Pim  βmk ), j = 1, …, m – 1
The estimation of the model included the following explanatory variables 
organized by categories: 
•	 Personal	characteristics	of	individuals	included	information	on	the	sex	
of the individual, age (divided into three groups as explained above) and 
location (rural or urban). A more detailed description of the variables 
included in the estimation is presented in table B3.1.
•	 Variables	linked	to	the	individuals’	family	background	are	introduced	
to control for the fact that family responsibilities can influence the deci-
sion to enter the labour force. This category included, as independent 
variables, marital status, the presence of the spouse or partner in the 
household and the presence of children under 15 years of age. 
•	 Variables	related	to	human	capital	endowment	are	also	included,	as	fol-
lows: four dummies for the level of education attained (no education, 
primary schooling, secondary schooling and university degree); a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not the individual has completed vocation-
al training; a dummy variable indicating if the individual is still attending 
school; and a variable to show whether the individual can read or write 
in another language. 
•	 Finally,	three	dummy	variables	linked	to	employment	status	of	the	other	
members in the household are introduced: (i) the presence in the house-
hold of unemployed family members other than the individual, since 
additional economic responsibilities can influence the individual’s deci-
sion to enter the labour force; (ii) presence of waged employees, since 
they could act as informants about labour opportunities; (ii) the pres-
ence of self-employed members of the household, since this can increase 
the probability of self-employment when setting up a family business 
(Mlatsheni and Rospabé, 2002).
(∂Xik )
J – 1
m = 1
Dependent:
Employment status
Independent:
Sex
Age
Location
Marital status
Living with a partner
Children
No education
Primary education
Secondary education
University education
Vocational training
School attending
Language
Other unemployed in the household
Other employee in the household
Other self-employed in the household
= 1 if inactive; = 2 if unemployed; = 3 if waged employee; = 4 if self-employed
= dummy variable: male, female
= dummy variable: 15–24, 25–34, 35 or more
= dummy variable: urban, rural
= 1 if married
= 1 if the spouse/partner currently lives in the household
= 1 if there are children aged 15 or under in the household
= 1 if the individual has not completed any level of schooling
= 1 if the highest educational attainment of the individual is primary school
= 1 if the highest educational attainment of the individual is secondary school
= 1 if the highest educational attainment of the individual is university
= 1 if the individual has completed vocational training
= 1 if the individual is currently attending school
= 1 if the individual can read or write in another language
= 1 if members of the household are unemployed
= 1 if members of the household are employees
= 1 if members of the household are self-employed
Table B3.1 Definitions of variables used in the regression analysis
 
Variable Definition
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The results
In order to estimate the impact of the individuals’ age on their employ-
ment status, the variable age is included as an independent variable in the 
regression for the whole sample. However, with the aim of capturing the 
difference between youths and adults in terms of individual characteristics, 
the model is estimated separately for youths aged 15 to 24, young people 
aged 25 to 34 and for adults aged 35 or more. The results of the estimation 
of the probit model for the complete sample are summarized in table B3.2 
and the outcomes of the regression by age group in table B3.3 and table 
B3.4. The estimation is statistically significant, with an acceptable goodness 
of fit, and most coefficients are highly significant. Moreover, the signs of 
the variables and the values of the marginal effects follow expected patterns. 
For a more detailed explanation of the microeconomic interpretations of 
these results, please refer to the body of section C.50
50 See also Escudero and López (2013, forthcoming).
Sex (ref. woman)
Age (ref. adult)
Location (ref. rural)
Married
Living with a partner
Children
Educational attainment 
(ref. no education)
Vocational training
School attendance
Foreign language
Other unemployed in the household
Other employees in the household
Other self-employed in the household
Man 
Youth 15–24
Young person 25–34
 
Urban 
 
Primary education
Secondary education
University education
Table B3.2 Regression results for the whole sample
 
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. 
Significance levels: 
* significant at 5 per cent; 
** significant at 1 per cent.
Self-employedEmployedUnemployedInactive  
0.006
(1.5)
-0.112
(19.5)**
-0.024
(6.3)**
-0.041
(10.7)**
0.021
(2.9)**
0.021
(3.1)**
-0.074
(11.6)**
0.025
(3.2)**
-0.010
(1.3)
-0.104
(15.0)**
-0.024
(4.8)**
-0.196
(54.1)**
0.019
(3.2)**
-0.092
(12.5)**
-0.134
(27.1)**
0.055
(10.4)**
0.250
(38.9)**
-0.121
(13.3)**
-0.018
(2.2)*
-0.054
(7.9)**
0.063
(4.9)**
-0.135
(11.3)**
0.013
(1.1)
0.250
(16.8)**
0.298
(19.2)**
0.439
(25.7)**
0.118
(12.3)**
-0.407
(78.9)**
0.082
(6.5)**
-0.157
(10.6)**
0.153
(19.7)**
-0.042
(5.5)**
0.024
(13.3)**
0.081
(4.1)**
0.001
(5.7)**
0.007
(4.5)**
-0.021
(5.7)**
-0.001
(0.4)
 
0.003
(1.9)*
0.004
(1.4)
0.009
(2.3)*
0.003
(0.5)
-0.000
(0.0)
-0.031
(24.7)**
0.005
(2.2)*
0.101
(10.4)**
-0.003
(2.2)*
0.001
(0.8)
-0.280
(39.9)**
0.224
(23.4)**
0.029
(3.2)**
0.088
(11.4)**
-0.063
(4.2)**
0.116
(8.1)**
0.064
(5.1)**
-0.279
(17.7)**
-0.297
(20.6)**
-0.338
(23.2)**
-0.094
(8.5)**
0.634
(121.0)**
-0.106
(7.8)**
0.148
(8.5)**
-0.016
(1.9)*
-0.014
(1.7)*
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Sex (ref. woman)
Location (ref. rural)
Married
Living with a partner
Children
Educational attainment 
(ref. no education)
Vocational training
School attendance
Foreign language
Other unemployed in the household
Other employees in the household
Other self-employed in the household
Man 
Urban 
 
Primary 
education
Secondary 
education
University 
education
Table B3.3 Regression results for youth (15–24) and young persons (25-34)
 
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. 
Significance levels: 
* significant at 5 per cent; 
** significant at 1 per cent.
Se
lf-
em
pl
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ed
Se
lf-
em
pl
oy
ed
Em
pl
oy
ed
Em
pl
oy
ed
U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
U
ne
m
pl
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ed
In
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ti
ve
In
ac
ti
ve
 
-0.036
(3.3)**
-0.034
(3.1)**
0.063
(3.2)**
0.062
(3.5)**
-0.095
(4.2)**
0.008
(0.3)
-0.028
(1.0)
-0.221
(13.1)**
-0.050
(3.8)**
-0.201
(10.5)**
0.020
(0.9)
-0.164
(7.5)**
-0.208
(19.4)**
0.073
(5.3)**
0.016
(7.6)**
-0.006
(3.5)**
0.025
(3.3)**
-0.004
(1.2)
-0.010
(5.3)**
0.009
(2.7)**
0.002
(0.5)
-0.003
(0.2)
0.005
(1.6)
-0.078
(19.6)**
-0.000
(0.1)
-0.014
(6.2)**
-0.027
(8.2)**
0.018
(7.3)**
0.260
(20.7)**
-0.022
(1.7)*
0.015
(0.6)
-0.119
(5.5)**
-0.086
(3.0)**
0.166
(4.8)**
0.217
(6.3)**
0.364
(12.2)**
0.094
(6.1)**
-0.371
(16.1)**
0.099
(3.4)**
-0.135
(3.7)**
0.145
(10.0)**
0.135
(9.0)**
0.179
(20.4)**
-0.078
(9.8)**
-0.014
(0.6)
-0.081
(3.9)**
0.029
(2.6)*
0.162
(7.6)**
0.174
(5.6)**
0.240
(3.1)**
0.077
(4.5)**
-0.445
(58.7)**
0.032
(1.9)*
-0.099
(8.8)**
0.101
(12.3)**
0.115
(1.8)*
0.033
(7.8)**
0.011
(2.7)**
-0.038
(3.6)**
-0.015
(1.9)*
-0.009
(1.8)*
0.001
(0.1)
0.003
(0.3)
0.012
(0.7)
0.005
(1.3)
-0.029
(11.3)**
0.009
(1.4)
0.213
(6.7)**
-0.001
(0.3)
0.009
(2.0)*
0.016
(7.0)**
0.003
(2.1)*
-0.008
(2.9)**
-0.001
(0.2)
0.001
(0.4)
0.006
(1.8)*
0.015
(2.4)*
0.076
(1.6)
0.003
(1.6)
-0.060
(17.9)**
0.006
(3.2)**
0.044
(5.9)**
-0.003
(2.2)*
0.001
(0.5)
-0.257
(24.2)**
0.045
(3.9)**
-0.040
(1.8)*
0.071
(3.6)**
0.018
(0.8)
-0.175
(7.0)**
-0.192
(9.2)**
-0.156
(9.2)**
-0.050
(3.7)**
0.601
(20.2)**
-0.128
(5.1)**
0.087
(2.7)**
0.064
(5.2)**
0.054
(4.1)**
-0.211
(22.9)**
0.080
(9.4)**
-0.003
(0.1)
0.086
(3.8)**
-0.019
(1.6)
-0.177
(7.9)**
-0.191
(6.0)**
-0.312
(4.3)**
-0.085
(4.7)**
0.583
(76.9)**
-0.038
(2.1)*
0.069
(4.8)**
-0.072
(7.8)**
-0.033
(3.6)**
Young persons (25–34)Youth (15–24)
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Sex (ref. woman)
Location (ref. rural)
Married
Living with a partner
Children
Educational attainment 
(ref. no education)
Vocational training
School attendance
Foreign language
Other unemployed in the household
Other employees in the household
Other self-employed in the household
Man 
Urban 
 
Primary education
Secondary education
University education
Table B3.4 Regression results for adults
 
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. 
Significance levels: 
* significant at 5 per cent; 
** significant at 1 per cent.
Self-employedEmployedUnemployedInactive 
-0.031
(2.9)**
-0.098
(9.8)**
-0.026
(1.6)
0.058
(4.0)**
-0.177
(8.2)**
-0.020
(1.1)
-0.079
(4.5)**
0.240
(12.1)**
-0.089
(6.8)**
-0.272
(8.6)**
0.037
(2.6)**
-0.176
(5.0)**
-0.232
(22.7)**
0.111
(7.5)**
0.171
(15.2)**
0.009
(0.8)
0.091
(5.7)**
-0.129
(8.5)**
-0.012
(4.3)**
0.085
(9.3)**
0.069
(13.5)**
0.023
(17.0)**
0.109
(8.6)**
0.119
(2.0)*
0.049
(3.1)**
-0.178
(4.2)**
0.008
(17.3)**
-0.074
(4.9)**
0.014
(6.7)**
0.007
(3.3)**
-0.009
(2.1)*
0.003
(1.3)
-0.006
(2.9)**
-0.001
(0.3)
-0.004
(2.1)*
-0.014
(12.1)**
-0.005
(2.1)*
-0.002
(0.2)
-0.003
(1.2)
0.097
(3.5)**
-0.001
(0.4)
-0.003
(1.0)
-0.154
(15.0)**
0.082
(7.8)**
-0.055
(3.4)**
0.069
(5.0)**
0.296
(10.3)**
-0.164
(10.7)**
-0.186
(15.3)**
-0.169
(11.3)**
-0.015
(1.1)
0.155
(2.5)*
-0.084
(6.0)**
0.258
(5.2)**
-0.025
(2.1)*
-0.035
(2.9)**
Adult (35 or more)
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AppENDIX C
 DETERMINANTS Of YOUTH lABOUR MARKET pERfORMANCE
Section C of this chapter analysed, among other things, the drivers of youth 
unemployment and inactivity (i.e. the proportion of youth that have fallen 
outside employment) from a macroeconomic point of view. The aim of 
this appendix is to explain how the model was constructed and present the 
detailed results of the exercise. 
The objective of the analysis is to examine the determinants of youth labour 
market performance in Kenya during the past 20 years. From a macroeco-
nomic point of view, the main determinants of the youth unemployment 
and inactivity rates are the aggregate demand and the size of the young 
labour force (i.e. the share of young people in their respective working-age 
population).51 Aggregate demand affects youth unemployment in the same 
way that it affects overall unemployment. A fall in aggregate demand will 
lead to a fall in the demand for labour in general and therefore for youth 
labour as well. Adult unemployment and employment rates are therefore 
commonly used as proxies of aggregate demand factors since they capture 
the overall effect. Likewise, the size of the youth cohort has a clear intuitive 
relationship with the youth status in employment: the higher the number 
of youth entering the labour market, the higher the number of jobs that 
will be needed to accommodate them. 
In this context, the question for analysis is related to the size of the elasticity 
of youth not in employment – i.e. unemployed and inactive youth – with 
respect to changes in their cohort size and in aggregate demand. In other 
words, what is the relative importance of each of the factors specifically for 
Kenya? With a view to assessing this relative importance, an econometric 
51 Relative cohort size and aggregate demand are not the only variables affecting youth non-employment rates. 
Institutional features of labour markets affecting their flexibility (in particular, wage setting) and the level 
of wages are likely to be important. In terms of labour market flexibility, centralized wage setting and other 
institutions and policies that make labour markets less flexible may make absorption of large youth cohorts 
more difficult and, therefore, the response of youth non-employment rates to changes in relative youth cohort 
sizes should be greater (Korenman and Neumark, 1997). In terms of wages, assuming that young and adult 
workers are close substitutes, the higher the wages of young workers, the higher the incentives of firms to 
hire their adult counterparts. Nevertheless, if young and adult workers are complementary – a more realistic 
assumption given that they respond to different skill requirements – then young workers’ wages will have no 
effect on adult wages or on the number of young labourers hired (O’Higgins, 2001). The level of wages has 
not been included in this analysis as the relationship is not clear-cut in the literature. 
Rate of youth not in employment 
Relative cohort size
Adult employment rate
Adult unemployment rate
Population aged 15 to 24 that is either unem-
ployed or in inactivity, as a percentage of the total 
population aged 15 to 24
Ratio of the population aged 15 to 24 over the 
population aged 25 or more
Population aged 25 or more that is employed as a 
percentage of the total population aged 25 or more
Population aged 25 or more that is unemployed 
as a percentage of the total labour force aged 25 
or more
KILM database 
(ILO, 2012b)
UN Population Division 
(UNDESA, 2011a)
KILM database 
(ILO, 2012b)
KILM database 
(ILO, 2012b)
Table C3.1 Definitions and sources of variables used in the regression analysis
 
Variable Definition Source
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analysis has been carried out to estimate the impact of aggregate demand 
and cohort size on the rate of Kenyan unemployed and inactive youth dur-
ing the past 20 years. 
The analysis draws on a time-series econometric model based on annual 
data for Kenya during the period 1990–2011. Labour market variables were 
gathered from ILO databases, demographic variables from UN Population 
Division databases and information on GDP from the World Economic 
Outlook database. A more detailed description of the variables and sources 
is presented in table C3.1.
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52 The impact of the relative cohort size on youth non-employment rate could also be affected by changes 
in school enrolment rates, since low employment-to-population ratio and low participation rate could be 
explained by high school enrolment. To take into account this possible effect, the model was estimated 
controlling for secondary and tertiary school enrolment; however, both variables yield non-significant results. 
Previous studies have found similar results, showing that the relative cohort size variable is largely unaffected 
by adding the youth enrolment rate as a control (Korenman and Neumark, 1997). Moreover, these results 
seem intuitively correct for the Kenyan case. Indeed, the statistical analysis carried out in this chapter shows 
that low employment-to-population ratios in the country do not seem to be explained by education since 
the tertiary school enrolment rate (which is the most direct substitute for youth employment) has remained 
persistently low, at 4 per cent in 2009.
The model estimated
Following Korenman and Neumark (1997), a model was estimated to assess 
the effects of labour demand and supply variables on the rate of youth 
not in employment. In its reduced form, the rate of youth not in employ-
ment depends on the adult unemployment and employment rates (which 
capture aggregate demand factors) and on the relative cohort size (which 
captures the demographic factor). In particular, the model is formulated 
as follows:
YNEt = β0 + β1RCSt + β2AUt + β3AEt +Ｅt
where YNE corresponds to the rate of youth not in employment (measured 
by the share of youth that are either unemployed or in inactivity in the total 
youth population); RCS corresponds to the relative cohort size (calculated 
as the ratio of the youth population over the adult population), AU cor-
responds to the adult unemployment rate and AE to the adult employment 
rate.52
All the variables are included in natural logarithms and have been tested for 
non-stationarity through the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
tests. In all cases, the tests rejected the null hypotheses of non-stationarity 
at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. 
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The results
The model was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The results of 
the exercise (estimated coefficients and levels of significance of variables) are 
presented in table C3.2. The first column reports OLS estimates control-
ling for possible heteroskedasticity using the robust option available. The 
second column reports OLS estimates adjusted for correlation of the error 
terms using the Newey-West procedure. A number of interesting results 
arise from the analysis.
The model shows that an increase in the youth working-age population rel-
ative to the adult one (relative youth cohort) is associated with an increase, 
albeit small, in the rate of youth not in employment. Indeed, the elastic-
ity of the rate of youth not in employment with respect to its cohort size 
is around 0.12, which means that a 10 per cent increase in the relative 
size of the youth population will translate into a 1.2 per cent increase 
in the number of youth who are either unemployed or inactive. These 
results are consistent with those predicted by the cohort crowding hypoth-
esis (Easterlin, 1961), although the estimated coefficient in this analysis 
is small in comparison with international standards – analyses carried out 
for the EU 15 and the OECD have found elasticities of the order of 0.5 
(Korenman and Neumark, 1997) and 0.6 (O’Higgins, 2003), respectively. 
However, as already pointed out in the main document, the growth rate of 
young people of working age has fallen during the past 10 years in Kenya, 
putting less and less pressure on employment creation. Therefore, intui-
tively, it seems correct for other factors to have a higher relative importance 
in determining the share of youth out of employment than the relative 
cohort size. Indeed, the same analysis carried out for the purposes of this 
study illustrates that the elasticity of the rate of youth out of employment 
with respect to the adult employment rate – representing aggregate demand 
factors – is considerably higher – of the order of 2. In other words, although 
the size of the youth cohort does have significant implications for the status 
of youth in the labour market, aggregate labour market conditions have 
greater influence. Consistent with the above, the model shows that both 
variables capturing the influence of aggregate demand factors – the adult 
unemployment and employment rates – have a large and significant impact 
Relative cohort size (lnRCS)
Adult unemployment rate (lnAU)
Adult employment rate (lnAE)
Constant
Table C3.2 Regression results 
 
Notes: All variables are controlled for non-stationarity. 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
R-squared: 98.1 per cent. 
OLS regression with Newey-
West standard errors
OLS regression with robust 
standard errors 
0.115
(1.78)*
3.523
(2.95)***
-2.810
(-14.86)***
9.134
(3.15)***
0.115
(2.11)**
3.523
(2.97)***
-2.810
(-16.48)***
9.134
(3.26)***
Rate of youth not in employment (lnYNE)
Significance levels: 
* significant at 10 per cent; 
** significant at 5 per cent; 
*** significant at 1 per cent.
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on the rate of youth out of employment. The model illustrates that a 1 per 
cent increase in the adult unemployment rate would produce a 3.5 per cent 
increase in the rate of youth out of employment. On the other hand, a 1 per 
cent decrease in the adult employment rate would produce an increase in 
the rate of youth out of employment of the order of 2.8 per cent. In other 
words, it is not so much the number of young people entering the labour 
market as the insufficiency of job creation measures which is keeping young 
people out of employment in Kenya.
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CHApTER 4 
INfORMAl-SECTOR EMplOYMENT: 
TRENDS AND pOlICY IMplICATIONS  
 INTRODUCTION53
Despite some improvements achieved in the overall performance of the 
labour market, informal-sector employment remains a key labour market 
challenge in Kenya. In 2011, employment among informal-sector enterprises 
constituted 64 per cent of total employment with agricultural self-employed 
and workers engaged in small-scale agricultural activities (many of which 
are informal) accounting for an additional 21 per cent of total employment. 
Moreover, employment in informal-sector enterprises has continued to rise 
over the past two decades – increasing by approximately 5.1 million in the 
past 10 years alone – and outstripping the growth in formal sector employ-
ment over this period.  
Although informal employment provides an important source of income for 
many individuals, the trend increase in informal-sector employment has had 
severe repercussions on workers and their families and has become a central 
determinant of poverty and income inequalities in Kenya. Section A of this 
chapter discusses the trends in informal-sector employment in Kenya, includ-
ing sectoral composition and relevant international comparisons. Section B 
assesses the determinants of informal-sector employment based on a database 
comprised of 22 developing countries in order to better understand the per-
sistent nature of informality in Kenya. Finally, the key policy challenges of 
informal-sector employment are discussed in section C. This last section also 
presents a number of country examples that could serve as a basis for action 
to improve outcomes related to informal employment in Kenya.
53 The authors would like to thank Carolina Lennon for valuable guidance on section B of this chapter. 
Research assistance provided by Marcus Cheng is also gratefully acknowledged.
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A INfORMAl-SECTOR EMplOYMENT: 
 TRENDS, COMpOSITION AND INTERNATIONAl COMpARISONS 
Informal-sector employment in Kenya 
has increased dramatically over the past two decades …
According to its international definition, informal employment compris-
es all informal jobs, regardless of whether they are located in formal- or 
informal-sector enterprises or in households (box 4.1). However, in this 
chapter, due to the limited availability of recent data, unless otherwise 
stated, informal employment refers only to employment in informal-sec-
tor enterprises54 (or informal-sector employment) as defined by the Kenya 
Economic Survey’s definition. It should be borne in mind that employment 
in the informal sector is only one subset of all informal employment and, 
as such, figures in this chapter are likely to underestimate total informal 
employment. For instance, some workers are employed in formal sector 
units, but without social security coverage or health benefits and should 
therefore technically be included in the informal employment group but 
are excluded in the case of Kenya.  
Over the past two decades, the growth of informal-sector employment 
in Kenya has significantly outpaced that of formal-sector employment. 
In particular, the share of informal-sector employment has grown from 
approximately 13 per cent of total employment in 1991 to 64 per cent in 
2011 (figure 4.1). In the past 10 years alone, informal-sector employment 
has grown by 5.1 million, while formal-sector employment has grown by 
432,000. Moreover, if the agricultural self-employed and workers engaged 
in small-scale agricultural activities – the bulk of which could be consid-
ered informal55 – are taken into account, total informal-sector employment 
would reach 85 per cent of total employment. The remaining 15 per cent 
comprises salaried employment in modern establishments56 (i.e. in formal-
sector enterprises
54 Defined by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics as small-scale activities (with fewer than ten employees) 
that are semi-organized, unregulated and use basic technologies. 
55 Although they are not categorized as part of the informal sector in Kenya.
56 The “modern sector” is defined by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics as the entire public sector and 
private enterprises and institutions that are formal in terms of registration, taxation and official recording 
(incorporated enterprises).
Box 4.1   Defining informality: Issues and considerations
 
According to the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS), the 
informal sector is an enterprise-based concept. It includes all workers in economic units 
who work in informal-sector enterprises, either in unincorporated informal own-account 
enterprises, which are owned and operated by own-account workers and which may 
employ contributing family workers and employees on an occasional basis, or in unin-
corporated enterprises of informal employers which employ one or more employees on 
a continuous basis and which may be defined as having fewer than a specified number 
of workers and/or non-registration of the enterprise or its employees. Under the 1993 
ICLS definition, individual countries can decide what size of unregistered units should 
be included in the informal sector and whether the agriculture sector and domestic 
workers should be included (Becker, 2004). 
In addition to employment in the informal sector, there may be persons employed 
outside the informal sector who are not subject to national labour legislation, income 
taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain benefits. These are workers in sit-
uations of informality and it is important to identify them. The 17th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians provided a definition of informal employment, which 
includes both employment in the informal sector and informal workers in the formal 
sector (whether employees or contributing family workers) as well as persons working 
in households, such as domestic employees and persons who produce goods for their 
own final use. 
Source: ILO, 1993; ILO, 2004.
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... driven mainly by the services sector and employment in rural areas ...
Regarding the sectoral distribution, important differences exist in terms 
of the weight of informal-sector employment. For instance, in the domi-
nant sector – trade, restaurants and hotels – informal-sector employ-
ment accounts for 96 per cent (figure 4.2, panel A). In 2011, this sector 
accounted for just over 60 per cent of all informal-sector employment with 
a corresponding share of the growth in informal-sector employment (figure 
4.2, panel B). In fact, with an annual average growth rate of 6.6 per cent 
between 2003 and 2011, the sector contributed 63 per cent of the total 
growth of employment in informal-sector enterprises. Similarly, only 10 
per cent of agriculture and forestry employment corresponds to employ-
ees working in formal-sector enterprises with the remainder either self-
employed or engaged in small-scale farming and pastoralist activities, most 
of which remain unregistered. 
* Own-account workers employed by formal-sector enterprises are categorized as being in formal employment 
and unpaid family workers (contributing family workers) in informal employment, irrespective of whether they 
work in formal- or informal-sector enterprises.57
Note: Non-categorized workers are estimated by deducting the combined total of formal, informal and mixed 
formal and informal employment (Kenya Economic Surveys) from total employment (KILM). Total employ-
ment is not reported annually by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and therefore these figures are 
estimated values. Figures in the bar chart represent the contribution of each segment to total employment in 
that year and are in percentages. 
Source: Kenya Economic Surveys; ILO, 2011a.
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While manufacturing’s share in informal-sector employment declined mod-
erately between 2003 and 2011 (from 21.6 to 19.7 per cent), it was the 
second largest contributor to informal-sector employment growth. In fact, 
the manufacturing sector, which is comprised of 87 per cent informal-
sector workers, contributed almost 17 per cent of the rise in informal-sector 
employment over the period. Meanwhile, community, social and personal 
services – in which just over half of all employees are informal-sector work-
ers – grew modestly and accounted for a little over 10 per cent of total 
informal-sector employment growth. 
57 According to the definitions provided by the 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) 
(Hussmanns, 2004).
figure 4.2  Employment in informal-sector enterprises by economic activity
Source: IILS estimates based on Kenya Economic Surveys, various years.
 panel A. Employment by status and by economic activity, 2011 (in thousands)
 panel B. Share of employment in informal-sector enterprises by economic activity 
 in 2003 and 2011 and in the change between 2003 and 2011 (percentages)
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
Trade, 
restaurants 
and hotels
Agriculture 
and forestry
Manufacturing Community,
 social 
and personal 
services
Other Transport and 
communica-
tions
Construction
100
80
60
40
20
0
2003 2011 2003-2011
Community, social and personal services
Trade, restaurants and hotels
Transport and communications
Manufacturing
Construction
Other
Share 
in total
Contribution 
to growth
Employees in formal-sector enterprises
Employees working in informal-sector enterprises, 
own-account and unpaid family workers in formal-sector enterprises
69.1%64.6%75.4%51.0%86.9%89.7%96.0%
21.6
9.3
58.7
4.5
2.9
3.0
19.7
9.7
60.3
4.5
2.6
3.1
16.7
10.4
62.9
4.5
2.2
3.3
127  
Chapter 4 Informal-sector employment : Trends and policy implications
 128
KENYA : MAKING QUAlITY EMplOYMENT THE DRIvER Of DEvElOpMENT
Another important aspect of the trends in informal-sector employment in 
Kenya is their regional distribution. Most of the informal-sector activities 
are located in rural areas, which are estimated to have absorbed 61 per 
cent of informal-sector employment in 2011. Despite this, over the past 
decade, informal-sector employment has moved from being purely rural 
to being increasingly concentrated in urban areas. Indeed, informal-sector 
employment in urban areas has doubled in the past 10 years, increasing by 
almost 5 percentage points – from 34.2 per cent of total employment in 
informal-sector enterprises in 2000 to 39 per cent in 2011.
… keeping informal-sector employment high in Kenya by international standards. 
Informal employment has become an important feature of many labour 
markets across the globe with recent studies showing that it accounts for 
over 40 per cent of total employment in two-thirds of emerging and devel-
oping countries (ILO, 2009; ILO, 2012a). Moreover, estimates of informal 
employment in different regions of the world show that informal employ-
ment in developing countries often accounts for between half and three-
quarters of non-agricultural employment. Even in advanced economies, the 
proportion of informal employment often reaches well over one-quarter of 
workers outside the agricultural sector (Huitfeldt and Jütting, 2009). 
The prominence of informal-sector employment in terms of its share in 
non-agricultural employment in Kenya, at 80 per cent in 2010, is relatively 
high by international standards (figure 4.3). Indeed, despite the fact that 
the figure excludes informal workers in the formal sector, it still ranks as 
one of the highest incidences of informal employment among 41 countries 
with available data.58 The figure is considerably higher than in other African 
countries, such as Uganda (68.5 per cent) and South Africa (32.7 per cent), 
as well as other developing and emerging countries, such as Bolivia (59.6 
per cent), Brazil (46.5 per cent) and Indonesia (40.8 per cent) where infor-
mal workers in the formal sector are also taken into account. Only India, 
at 83.6 per cent, has a higher incidence of informal employment as a share 
of non-agricultural employment. 
58 For Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine, figures correspond to employ-
ment in informal-sector enterprises (informal workers in the formal sector are excluded). For the other coun-
tries analysed, figures are estimates of overall informal employment.
figure 4.3  Share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment 
 in selected countries, 2010 (percentages)
Notes: For Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine, figures correspond to 
employment in informal-sector enterprises (informal workers in the formal sector are excluded). For the other 
countries analysed, figures are estimates of overall informal employment. Data for Bolivia, Brazil, Republic 
of Moldova, Sri Lanka, Turkey and the Ukraine correspond to 2009 and data for Zambia and Nicaragua cor-
respond to 2008.
Source: Kenya Economic Surveys; ILO, 2012b.
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B fACTORS INflUENCING INfORMAl-SECTOR 
 EMplOYMENT IN KENYA 
 
Informality is a multidimensional phenomenon that can only be fully under-
stood through a comprehensive approach that analyses its drivers and different 
forms. Cross-country studies of the determinants of informal employment 
reveal that the causes of informality are heterogeneous and therefore a variety 
of factors underlie the developments in informal employment. Indeed, these 
studies provide useful insight into the different factors that can affect the rela-
tive levels of informality in any economy. They include, but are not restricted 
to, (a) macroeconomic factors, (b) institutional settings and (c) individual 
characteristics (box 4.2).
Against this background, this section attempts to shed light on the factors 
that influence informal-sector employment (as a share of non-agricultural 
employment) in the specific case of Kenya. The purpose of this exercise is to 
gain a better understanding of the trend increase in informal-sector employ-
ment in the country and to present potential policy options that could allow 
this looming labour market challenge to be effectively addressed. To achieve 
this end, a principal component analysis (PCA) has been carried out for a 
panel of 22 developing and emerging countries with available information, 
considering a number of pertinent macroeconomic, social and institutional 
characteristics and drawing heavily on the existing body of literature.59
 
The analysis shows that nine of the principal components cumulatively explain 
roughly 90 per cent of the variation in country responses. However, only two 
of them are sufficiently correlated with the share of informal employment60 
in non-agricultural employment to be retained for the analysis (see Appendix 
A). The two retained components cumulatively account for almost half (48.7 
per cent) of the variation in country responses.61 Component 1 is explained 
principally by the sectoral distribution of a country’s economic activity, the 
59 This method allows the numerous variables in the data set to be rationalized into their principal compo-
nents, where each component is a linear weighted combination of the original variables included in the data 
set (Appendix A). 
60 In this section, data for all countries except Kenya have been gathered from ILO (2012b) and correspond 
to informal employment. For Kenya, however, information corresponds to informal-sector employment and 
has been gathered from the Kenya Economic Surveys, as in the rest of this report.
61 Component 1 explains 36.3 per cent of the variation in the original data and component 2 an additional 
12.4 per cent of the variance. The subsequent components do not yield useful insights for this analysis.
Box 4.2   Determinants of informal employment: Brief review of the literature
 
Macroeconomic: The sectoral composition of the economy is a relevant determinant 
of informal employment. Some sectors are more prone than others to experience high 
levels of informality – as shown by the case of the trade, restaurants and hotels sector in 
Kenya – and an increase or decrease in the relative importance of these sectors within the 
economy will lead to a corresponding increase or decrease in the overall level of informal-
ity. Some studies report a negative correlation between the size of the informal economy 
and certain forms of economic modernization, in particular, trade openness and trade 
liberalization, which reduce informality both directly and indirectly by promoting a 
shift to export-oriented sectors (Frankel and Romer, 1996; Rodrik et al., 2002; Dreher 
and Schneider, 2006; Rei and Bhattacharya, 2008). In contrast, empirical evidence 
from Latin America suggests that overall increases in the share of informality are mainly 
related to increases within sectors rather than sectoral shifts. Indeed, Bosch and Maloney 
(2006) find that 90 per cent of fluctuations in informality in Mexico during the 1990s 
can be attributed to changes in the extent of informality within sectors.
Institutional: Existing theories argue that the size of the informal economy is the result 
of a trade-off between the costs and the benefits of informality. In particular, specific 
institutional factors might discourage employers from starting up formal enterprises, 
such as explained by the legalist theory of informality championed by Hernando de Soto 
(De Soto, 1989). Indeed, a number of costs are associated with accessing the formal 
economy, such as: 
•	 the	cost	of	bureaucratic	procedures	and	permits	necessary	to	enter	an	industry;	
•	 the	cost	of	housing	(such	as	allocation	of	state	land,	building	permits,	etc.);	
•	 costs	associated	with	trade	(such	as	the	permits	required	to	open	a	shop	or	build	a	
market stall); and 
•	 the	cost	of	transport	access.	
It is not only the process of entering the formal sector that has associated costs, remain-
ing in the formal sector also entails charges, in particular costs relating to tax, non-tax 
legal matters and public utility charges. However, firms in the formal sector may enjoy 
benefits, such as better access to productive public goods in the form of an enabling legal 
framework and public infrastructures, etc. According to this theory of informality, this 
trade-off determines the size of the informal economy (Azuma and Grossman, 2002; 
Loayza, 1996). A number of empirical studies support this thesis and find a positive 
correlation between the size of the informal economy and the burden imposed by regula-
tions, the level of corruption and the stringency of employment protection legislation 
(Johnson et al., 1998; Dreher and Schneider, 2006; Botero et al., 2004). Other studies, 
however, maintain that the size of the informal economy is negatively correlated with the 
rule of law and the quality of the legal system, the efficiency of the public administra-
tion, and the presence of an efficient banking and financial system that guarantees access 
to credit (Friedman et al., 2000; Krakowski, 2005; Straub, 2005).
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Box 4.2   Determinants of informal employment: Brief review of the literature
 
Individual characteristics: A significant number of studies have explored the microeco-
nomic determinants of informality, finding that the probability of being in informal 
employment varies widely between categories of workers. Women are generally more 
likely than men to be in informal employment, as both salaried and self-employed work-
ers. This can be explained not only by the more restricted employment opportunities 
for women in the formal sector, but also by the fact that informal employment offers 
the possibility of greater flexibility, which women prefer as it allows them to reconcile 
their work commitments with family duties (Geldstein, 2000; Chant, 1991). Indeed, 
being married and having children increases the likelihood of women being in informal 
employment (Maloney, 2004; Perry et al., 2007). Other relevant individual determinants 
of informal employment appear to be educational attainment and age. Young workers 
with no or little educational attainment generally begin their careers as waged workers in 
informal-sector enterprises. When they accumulate the necessary experience, they often 
become self-employed, still within the informal sector. By contrast, young workers with 
higher levels of educational attainment have a greater probability of securing a formal 
sector job at the beginning of their careers and if they do move into the informal sector 
it is by choice and not due to the absence of employment opportunities in the formal 
sector (Maloney, 2004; Saavedra and Chong, 1999; Packard, 2007).
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income level of the country and the educational attainment of its population. 
A country with a higher score for component 1 can be identified as a lower 
income, agriculture-based economy in which most of the population lives 
in rural areas and has low literacy rates and low levels of educational attain-
ment. The results of component 1 also suggest that the level of corruption 
and challenges facing those attempting to carry on businesses are important 
considerations. Component 2 is derived from the variation in country figures 
relative to total and youth employment rates, notice period for redundancy 
dismissal and paid annual leave. The time required to start a business is also 
an important element of component 2. The purpose of the following section 
is to assess in greater detail the direction and intensity of the relationship 
between the variables within each principal component and the incidence of 
informal employment in Kenya.
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Institutional settings play a key role in explaining 
the importance of informal-sector employment in Kenya …
The above analysis suggests that informal employment is related to the state of 
institutional settings, such as the incidence of corruption and the conducive-
ness of regulatory environments to favourable business operations.62 Indeed, 
for the countries with available data, the incidence of corruption and the ease 
of doing business index show strong and positive correlations with compo-
nent 1 and the number of days required to start a business is positively and 
closely correlated with component 2, which in turn are highly correlated with 
the share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment.63 For 
example, in countries where at least 50 per cent of firms have reported that 
they have made informal payments to public officials64, informal employment 
accounts, on average, for more than 75 per cent of non-agricultural employ-
ment. Likewise, countries that require more than 40 days to start a business 
and/or are placed above 100 in the ranking on the ease of doing business 
index have, on average, a share of informal employment of more than 53 and 
66 per cent, respectively (figure 4.4). 
In the case of Kenya, the incidence of corruption is notably high. In fact, 
close to 80 per cent of firms reported having made informal payments to 
public officials in Kenya between 2005 and 2010 – almost 30 percentage 
points above the figures observed in some of Kenya’s sub-Saharan African 
neighbours, such as Tanzania (49.5 per cent) or Uganda (52 per cent). 
Moreover, Kenya faces a number of challenges in the process of starting 
and operating a business, which can deter formal-sector enterprise creation 
– especially for micro- and small-scale enterprises. Indeed, the World Bank 
report Doing Business 2013 estimates that starting a business in Kenya takes, 
on average, 32 days and involves approximately ten different administrative 
procedures – placing Kenya 126th out of 185 economies ranked according 
to ease of starting up a business. This is considerably lower in the ranking 
than other countries in the region (World Bank, 2013).
Despite the existing challenges and barriers to formalization and enter-
prise creation in Kenya, considerable improvements have been made in 
62 See Appendix A for exact specifications, detailed results and levels of significance of the different vari-
ables.
63 See Appendix A for component loading for these variables.
64 Figures used for the PCA analysis (and indicated hereafter) correspond to the averages of the variables for 
the period 2005–2010. This was done to exclude missing values and avoid measurement errors.
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figure 4.4   link between institutional settings and the share of informal employment 
 in total employment (percentages)
Note: Incidence of corruption is measured as the percentage of firms expected to make informal payments to 
public officials to "get things done" with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, and the like.
Source: IILS estimates based on ILO, 2012b; IMF, 2012; Kenya Economic Surveys; World Bank, 2011.
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recent years – starting a business is, on average, 35 days faster and more 
than 5 per cent cheaper than in 2009 (World Bank, 2013). This has been  
accomplished mainly due to Government efforts to reduce the time needed 
to approve and stamp the memorandum and articles of association required 
to create a business. Moreover, in 2010, all Registry of Companies records 
were digitized, which reduced – by more than six days on average – the time 
needed to complete the company deed and details. 
In 2010, the Kenya Revenue Authority also merged the income tax and 
value added tax registration procedures thanks to the adoption of a Personal 
Identification Number (PIN), which facilitated the process of operating a 
business with the Kenyan Revenue Authority. Applying for income tax and 
value added tax registration can now be done simultaneously on the tax 
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authority website. The introduction of the PIN also eliminated the need 
for entrepreneurs to travel to cities with tax authority offices.
… yet, the size of the informal-sector employment sector 
is also associated with the fact 
that Kenya remains predominately an agriculture-based economy.
In the group of countries analysed, the share of the rural population and 
the weight of agriculture in terms of both GDP and total employment are 
highly correlated with component 1, which in turn is highly and positively 
correlated with the share of informal employment in total non-agricultural 
employment (figure 4.5). In particular, the analysis shows that countries 
where informal employment accounts for over 60 per cent of non-agri-
cultural employment, as in the case of Kenya, are characterized by (on 
average): (a) a high concentration of their population living in rural areas 
(65.5 per cent); (b) the strong weight of the agricultural sector in terms 
of GDP (17.5 per cent); and (c) a high concentration of employment in 
primary sector related activities (50 per cent). In Kenya, where 80 per cent 
of non-agricultural employment is informal, more than 78 per cent of the 
population lives in rural areas and the agricultural sector accounts for 23 per 
cent of GDP. Moreover, despite the fall in employment in the agricultural 
sector during the past few years (by 7 percentage points between 2005 and 
2010), the sector still accounts for a higher share in total employment than 
the industrial sector – 25 per cent of jobs are located in the agricultural 
sector compared to only 15 per cent in the industrial sector. 
High levels of informal employment 
are also intrinsically linked to poverty and low income.
The incidence of informal-sector employment is also related to income-
related variables, including GDP per capita, minimum wages and pov-
erty headcount ratios, which are highly correlated with component 1. The 
analysis shows that in countries where informal employment accounts for 
over 60 per cent of non-agricultural employment, GDP per capita and 
monthly minimum wages are, on average, 3.5 and 5.5 times lower, respec-
tively, than in other countries. Moreover, in countries with a high incidence 
of informal employment, more than 65 per cent of the population lives in 
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poverty (below the international poverty line of US$2 per day) and more 
than 35 per cent in extreme poverty (below the international poverty line 
of US$1.25 per day). The relationship holds for Kenya, where 40 per cent 
of the population lives below the international poverty line of US$2 per day 
and more than 18 per cent live on less than US$1.25 per day (figure 4.6).
Of course, the relationship between poverty and informality is a complex 
one. As evidenced in Chapter 1, informal-sector workers earn, on average, 
less per month than the established international and national poverty lines. 
Thus, informal-sector employment in Kenya produces low-income work-
ers, reinforcing the persistence of poverty. However, poverty is also one of 
the main causes of informality. Indeed, in general, poor households have 
specific characteristics that increase their vulnerability to poverty and that 
limit employment opportunities (Rakowsky, 1994). In this sense, poverty 
actively contributes to the expansion of informality by preventing individu-
als from gaining access to better opportunities (Maloney, 2004; Gulyani 
and Talukdar, 2010). In other words, while informal-sector employment 
reinforces the persistence of poverty, poverty drives individuals into infor-
mal-sector employment. The conjuncture of the two creates a vicious circle 
where poverty and informality are mutually reinforced.
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figure 4.5   link between agriculture-based economic variables and the share of informal  
 employment in total employment (percentages)
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Source: IILS estimates based on ILO, 2012b; IMF, 2012; Kenya Economic Surveys; World Bank, 2011.
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figure 4.6   link between income-related variables and the share of informal employment 
 in total employment (percentages)
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figure 4.6   link between income-related variables and the share of informal employment 
 in total employment (percentages)
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C pOlICY OpTIONS GOING fORWARD
Informal employment in Kenya has continued to grow steadily since the 
1990s and currently accounts for a significant proportion of total employ-
ment. And, while it provides an important means by which many individu-
als derive their livelihoods, it is often associated with poverty, with informal 
workers earning, on average, less than the international and national poverty 
lines. The increasing trend in informal employment has several repercus-
sions for workers and their families and has become a central determinant 
of poverty and income inequalities in Kenya. Kenya’s Vision 2030 acknowl-
edges the fact that the informal sector must be supported in ways that will 
raise its productivity, improve its distribution and increase both jobs and 
incomes. It advocates the strengthening of informal trade (wholesale and 
retail) through investment in infrastructure, training and linkages to local 
and global markets (Republic of Kenya, 2007). However, additional efforts 
are needed to effectively shape a more inclusive labour market and improve 
the incomes of those in informal employment.
Promoting sustainable economic growth will be an important step in this 
direction. Indeed, much of the economic instability that the country has 
experienced during the past three decades has been due to the relatively 
high concentration of agricultural production. However, in addition to the 
necessary macroeconomic and structural measures discussed in Chapter 2, 
the Kenyan Government could build on recent progress and consider focus-
ing on two strategic objectives: first, promoting private sector development 
and the formalization of informal-sector enterprises and jobs; and, second, 
improving working conditions and the livelihoods of those in informal 
employment (by promoting labour rights and social protection floors). 
The rest of this section details steps that could be taken to facilitate these 
objectives. 
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1 pROMOTING pRIvATE SECTOR DEvElOpMENT 
 AND THE fORMAlIzATION Of INfORMAl-SECTOR 
 ENTERpRISES AND JOBS 
Removing or even just lowering the barriers to formalization can facilitate a 
progressive movement into the formal sector (World Bank, 2004). Although 
Kenya has made significant progress in recent years, notably regarding a 
number of administrative procedures and the time required to start a busi-
ness, further measures based on a number of international examples could 
be considered, including:
•	 Continuing to simplify the process of formalization: The introduction of the 
Personal Identification Number (PIN) in Kenya has been an important 
step forward but starting a formal business in Kenya remains relatively 
difficult by international standards. In Tanzania, the Government has 
taken steps to reduce barriers to formalization through a three-pronged 
approach based on reforms to business registration, business regulation 
(i.e. licensing) and revenue generation (i.e. taxation, fee collection, etc.) 
With this in mind, a multi-donor funded programme was created – 
Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania (BEST) – to imple-
ment the reforms. Thanks to this programme, business registration is now 
automatic following payment of a predetermined fee based on nationally 
adopted guidelines and enshrined in legislation to ensure absolute clarity. 
Similarly, the Government of Brazil passed the Individual Entrepreneur 
Law (Lei do Emprendedor Individual ) in 2009 to reduce the adminis-
trative and tax burdens on small businesses. The initiative facilitates the 
registration of micro-enterprises with up to one employee and allows 
entrepreneurs to collect a tax identification number (known as CNPJ), 
which exempts them from federal taxes – something that could be con-
sidered in Kenya as a complement to the PIN. 
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•	 Overcoming financial barriers to formalization: In the past decade, Brazil 
has successfully taken steps to make formalization possible by overcoming 
the financial barrier that it previously presented. In 1994, the Government 
established the Programme for the Creation of Employment and Income 
(Programa de Geração de Emprego e Renda Rural). This programme aims 
to extend credit to micro-enterprises, small enterprises, cooperatives 
and production initiatives in the informal sector. The main goal of the 
programme is to promote employment and income in enterprises that 
otherwise would have had little or no access to credit. The programme 
started by targeting informal enterprises in metropolitan areas – where 
unemployment rates were highest – but was later extended to rural areas 
as well.
•	 Strengthening property rights: Enforceable property rights serve as a legal 
framework to protect citizens and businesses which are officially reg-
istered with the state, thus encouraging entry into the formal sector. 
Moreover, officially recognized titles and deeds facilitate access to formal-
ized services, such as bank lending (i.e. official owners can leverage their 
properties), which in turn opens up new opportunities to increase the 
size of businesses. Peru has taken significant steps to strengthen property 
rights by setting up the Praedial Registration System, which offers a quick 
and inexpensive way to convert informal property in the hands of a large 
proportion of the population into legally recognized private property, as 
a source of capital for the grassroots development of these countries. 
•	 Bringing service delivery closer to business: Well-designed government 
decentralization processes could benefit formalization if they bring serv-
ice delivery closer to businesses and enable policies to quickly and more 
effectively react to local concerns. One way to achieve this is through 
the development of one-stop shops that unite government officials from 
different departments in one location to provide citizens with all the 
information, assistance and forms required for business registration start-
up procedures. This method of simplifying the administration of regula-
tion has been used successfully in a number of countries, such as Liberia 
and Uruguay. Liberia eliminated one procedure, which reduced busi-
ness start-up time by 14 days, introducing a one-stop shop in 2011 that 
brings all the agencies involved in the registration process together under 
a single roof. Uruguay cut the number of procedures by six, reduced 
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the time required to start a business by 58 days and the cost by 33 per 
cent through the use of a one-stop shop created in 2010 (World Bank, 
2013).
•	 Promote formal sector job creation through industrial policy: Making agricul-
ture a viable sector through coherent rural development policies, which 
include increased investment in transport, infrastructure and distribution 
networks, would enhance the scope for formal employment in the sec-
tor. Indeed, the development of rural productive non-farming activities 
reinforces the linkages between the agricultural sector and the broader 
economy, creating opportunities for formal employment. In addition, this 
could prevent displaced workers moving from the rural sector into urban 
informal-sector employment, which is a key problem in Kenya. An exam-
ple of this is the dynamic rural non-farming sector in China. It has been 
a major contributor to the country’s growth, increasing rural household 
income and contributing to rural development (Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 
2001).
2 DEvElOpING SOCIAl pROTECTION flOORS AS 
 A TOOl TO IMpROvE WORKING CONDITIONS Of WORKERS 
 IN INfORMAl-SECTOR EMplOYMENT 
In addition to having to cope with lower earnings, informal-sector work-
ers in Kenya often have limited social protection coverage. For instance, 
the percentage of the population not covered by medical insurance due to 
financial ressources deficit remains high, at 82 per cent, with households 
financing 41 per cent of all health-care expenditures through out-of-pocket 
payments (ILO, 2011b). Medical care coverage is an important considera-
tion for informal-sector workers as accidents and work-related diseases are 
often more widespread than in the formal sector. Importantly, this lack of 
protection also means that these workers are disempowered and are there-
fore unable to actively change their precarious situations. Good social pro-
visions can strengthen individual health and well-being of informal-sector 
workers, as well as providing the capacity to organize themselves and make 
demands for better overall conditions of work (ILO, 2011b). Some exam-
ples and areas for potential action are detailed below:
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•	 Access to health care for informal workers: Some developing countries have 
implemented schemes that provide access to health care for workers in the 
informal sector. For example, a mutual health scheme called UMASIDA 
was established in Tanzania as early as 1995 to minimize the problem of 
restricted access to health-care services by workers in the informal econ-
omy. UMASIDA is a mutual association that manages a health insur-
ance scheme in workers’ cooperatives in the informal sector in Dar es 
Salaam and, therefore, is a community-based insurance model, where the 
policyholders themselves are the owners and managers of the insurance 
programme. For a small premium (covering the member, a spouse and 
four children below the age of 18 years), members receive all necessary 
outpatient care. Care is provided at dispensaries or health centres owned 
by UMASIDA (see also McCord and Mutesasira, 2000).
•	 Health provision and empowerment of working women: The Self Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA) has specifically addressed the welfare of 
Indian women who work informally by establishing initiatives to ensure 
health, income security and empowerment. The approach of SEWA is 
founded on the recognition that lack of protection in the workplace is 
both a cause and a consequence of job and income insecurity (Lund, 
2009). The organization provides members with health education and 
preventive health care, such as immunization of children. It also provides 
curative care from their homes or health centres, where low-cost generic 
drugs are dispensed at cost price to members (Raval et al., 2000). SEWA’s 
efforts to supply working women’s health-care needs depend on linkages 
with other institutions of SEWA, including the SEWA Bank, childcare 
services and institutions for disaster management.
•	 Mixed national- and community-based health-care provision: One of the 
problems faced by developing countries in the attempt to extend social 
protection provisions to informal-sector workers is the financing aspect. 
In this respect, combining national and community-based social provi-
sions could be a better option for developing countries. In Ghana, for 
example, a mixed system combining elements of a compulsory national 
insurance scheme and community-based health insurance was intro-
duced. It is financed by individual contributions based on income and 
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a 2.5 per cent value added tax (VAT). Although the system has been 
beset by a number of problems, it has seen a significant increase in the 
number of informal-sector workers benefitting from the system. Indeed, 
the coverage rate of the population increased from 15 per cent to 38 per 
cent between 2005 and 2007, 24 per cent of which consisted of informal 
workers (ILO, 2011c).
•	 Non-contributory pensions in South Africa: Informal-sector workers are 
often not eligible for any kind of pension scheme, thus exacerbating 
poverty concerns. To address this issue, South Africa created a non-
contributory pension programme – now among the largest of this type 
of programmes, along with that of Brazil. Non-contributory pension 
programmes reduce poverty among the elderly and their households and 
enable investment in human and physical capital. Empirical evidence in 
South Africa shows that the state non-contributory pension scheme for 
elderly people not only reduces poverty and inequality, but is also used 
for income-generating purposes by the elderly themselves as well as other 
household members.
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AppENDIX A
 ANAlYSIS Of THE fACTORS INflUENCING 
 INfORMAl-SECTOR EMplOYMENT IN KENYA
Section B of this Chapter discussed the different factors that influence 
informal-sector employment in Kenya in order to understand the phenom-
enon and present potential policy options that could allow this looming 
labour market challenge to be effectively addressed. This discussion is the 
result of a principal component analysis (PCA) carried out for a group of 
22 countries, including Kenya. PCA is a multivariate statistical technique 
that allows the grouping of numerous economic, social and institutional 
variables in the database into predetermined categories (principal com-
ponents), where each component is a linear weighted combination of the 
original variables included in the dataset. The variables used in this section 
are drawn from the literature on the determinants of informality. See Table 
A4.1 for a description of the variables and sources used. 
The PCA’s procedure starts by seeking the linear combination of variables 
that produces the maximum possible variance. Finding this linear combina-
tion allows the first (principal) component to be established. The second 
component is the linear combination of the same variables having a maxi-
mum variance, subject to it being uncorrelated with the first component. 
In general, one can have as many components as variables, but the aim is to 
have a few components (usually the first ones) that explain a large propor-
tion of the total variance. Therefore, those components with an eigenvalue 
of less than 1 have been omitted. In the exercise carried out for the purposes 
of this chapter, nine principal components were retained. Table A4.2 shows 
the scores of each component, which are a measure of the degree of asso-
ciation between each variable and the component. Large positive numbers 
(maximum of 1) indicate a strong positive correlation with the underlying 
component while large negative numbers (minimum of –1) signify a strong 
negative correlation.
Informal employment
Real GDP growth
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
Value added in agriculture (% of GDP)
Value added in manufacturing (% of GDP)
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
GINI index
Prevalence of HIV (% of population aged 15–49)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars)
Rural population (% of total population)
Life expectancy at birth (years)
Poverty headcount ratio at US$1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)
Poverty headcount ratio at US$2 a day (PPP) (% of population)
Adult literacy rate (% of people aged 15 and above)
Tertiary school enrolment (% gross)
Secondary school enrolment (% gross)
Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population)
Informal payments to public officials (% of firms)
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
Ease of doing business (global ranking out of 185)
Internet users (per 100 people)
Time required to enforce a contract (days)
Time required to start a business (days)
Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)
Employment in industry (% of total employment)
Female labour participation rate (%)
Female employment-to-population ratio (%)
Total employment-to-population ratio (%)
Youth employment-to-population ratio, aged 15–24 (%)
Firing cost (weeks of wages)
Notice period for redundancy dismissal for a worker with 5 years of tenure (in salary weeks)
Notice period for redundancy dismissal for a worker with 20 years of tenure (in salary weeks)
Paid annual leave for a worker with 5 years of tenure (in working days)
Paid annual leave for a worker with 20 years of tenure (in working days)
Minimum wage for a 19-year-old worker or an apprentice (US$/month)
ILO, 2012b
IMF, 2012
World Bank, 2011
World Bank , 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
World Bank, 2011
Table A4.1 Definitions and sources of variables used in the pCA analysis
 
Variable Source
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Real GDP growth
Foreign direct investment
Value added in agriculture
Value added in manufacturing
High-technology exports
Exports of goods and services
GINI index
Prevalence of HIV
GDP per capita, PPP
Rural population
Life expectancy at birth
Poverty headcount ratio at US$1.25 a day
Poverty headcount ratio at US$2 a day
Adult literacy rate
Tertiary school enrolment
Secondary school enrolment
Age dependency ratio
Informal payments to public officials
Domestic credit to private sector
Ease of doing business
Internet users
Time required to enforce a contract
Time required to start a business
Employment in agriculture
Employment in industry
Female labour participation rate
Female employment-to-population ratio
Total employment-to-population ratio
Youth employment-to-population ratio
Firing cost
Notice period for redundancy dismissal for a worker 
with 5 years of tenure
Notice period for redundancy dismissal for a worker 
with 20 years of tenure
Paid annual leave for a worker with 5 years of tenure
Paid annual leave for a worker with 20 years of tenure
Minimum wage for a 19-year-old worker or an apprentice
Table A4.2 principal components’ scores
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0.60
0.16
0.01
-0.05
0.16
-0.33
-0.33
-0.07
0.09
-0.14
0.01
0.12
0.12
-0.03
0.28
0.13
-0.09
-0.07
-0.30
0.10
0.17
0.25
0.29
0.03
-0.02
0.10
0.06
0.04
-0.03
-0.30
0.05
0.06
0.03
-0.02
0.06
0.34
-0.03
-0.04
-0.38
0.37
0.32
0.38
0.40
0.05
0.01
-0.29
-0.08
-0.06
-0.05
-0.06
-0.06
0.27
-0.09
0.25
0.26
0.08
0.02
0.17
-0.15
-0.09
-0.23
-0.19
-0.12
-0.19
-0.18
-0.05
-0.05
-0.08
-0.14
0.20
0.39
-0.46
-0.04
-0.19
-0.55
-0.18
-0.05
0.22
0.10
0.06
-0.06
-0.04
0.02
-0.20
0.02
-0.10
-0.06
0.50
0.18
-0.22
0.06
0.19
0.18
-0.24
0.26
-0.10
-0.09
0.00
0.00
0.34
-0.18
-0.14
0.13
0.25
0.02
0.32
0.17
0.12
0.13
0.04
0.57
-0.27
-0.32
-0.16
0.17
0.21
0.00
0.05
0.04
0.10
0.04
-0.33
0.28
0.47
0.37
0.00
0.03
0.05
0.17
-0.07
-0.17
-0.15
-0.07
-0.01
0.39
0.47
0.43
0.04
0.18
0.19
0.01
-0.27
0.04
0.11
0.31
-0.06
-0.27
0.47
-0.22
0.20
-0.17
-0.31
-0.20
0.41
-0.05
0.17
-0.09
0.45
-0.16
-0.26
0.01
-0.45
0.31
-0.09
0.08
0.36
0.13
-0.08
-0.25
0.00
0.27
0.35
-0.28
-0.23
-0.22
-0.07
-0.36
-0.09
0.12
0.11
-0.15
0.52
0.11
0.17
-0.22
0.05
0.01
-0.08
0.06
0.15
-0.16
0.34
-0.15
-0.48
0.37
-0.04
-0.02
0.25
-0.14
-0.02
0.13
0.24
0.37
0.40
0.49
0.40
0.45
-0.02
0.40
0.36
0.28
0.69
0.01
-0.30
-0.40
0.47
0.22
0.29
0.11
0.01
0.14
-0.14
-0.19
0.33
0.15
-0.02
0.04
0.08
0.25
-0.26
0.39
-0.49
-0.09
-0.02
-0.03
0.59
0.55
0.41
0.32
-0.35
-0.14
-0.01
0.51
0.40
0.07
0.21
-0.05
-0.21
0.44
0.37
0.32
0.16
-0.15
-0.10
0.08
0.30
0.14
0.19
0.07
-0.22
0.03
-0.11
0.16
0.45
0.11
-0.07
0.34
0.63
-0.04
0.19
0.24
0.52
0.69
0.64
0.25
-0.57
-0.52
-0.65
-0.64
-0.18
0.19
0.01
0.88
-0.48
-0.15
-0.17
-0.35
0.49
-0.86
0.88
-0.81
0.90
0.91
-0.76
-0.83
-0.93
0.79
0.56
-0.19
0.56
-0.83
0.20
-0.11
0.89
-0.82
0.53
0.49
0.43
0.41
-0.27
0.25
0.29
0.36
0.09
-0.74
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The analysis shows that the nine principal components retained cumula-
tively explain almost the totality (89.6 per cent) of the variation in country 
responses; however, only the first two are significantly correlated with the 
share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment and there-
fore only these two have been retained for the analysis. The two compo-
nents retained, cumulatively account for almost half (48.7 per cent) of the 
variation in country responses,65 which is sufficiently high for the purposes 
of this study given that the subsequent components do not yield useful 
insights for the analysis.66, 67  
To shed light on the effect that each component has on the share of informal 
employment in the different countries – and most specifically in Kenya – 
figure A4.1 plots the scores of the components for the different countries68  
with the shares of informal employment as a percentage of non-agricultural 
employment in these countries. 
The analysis illustrates that agriculture-based economies with low socio-
economic development (i.e. scoring highly for component 1) are economies 
where the share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment 
is high (figure A4.1, panel A). Moreover, the results indicate that those 
countries with unfavourable institutional settings (i.e. scoring highly for 
component 2), are also countries where informal employment accounts for 
a higher share of non-agricultural employment (figure A4.1, panel B). For a 
more detailed explanation of the economic interpretations of these results, 
please refer to section B above.
65 Component 1 accounts for 36.3 per cent of the variation in the original data and component 2 an additional 
12.4 per cent of the variance. 
66 Weighted component loadings for the 15 variables related to component 1 are: 0.88 for value added in 
agriculture as a percentage of GDP; 0.89 for employment in agriculture as a percentage of total employment; 
-0.82 for employment in industry as a percentage of total employment; 0.56 for the level of corruption; 0.56 
for ease of doing business ranking (1 indicating the best possible place for doing business); 0.88 for the share 
of rural population in total population; 0.78 for the age-dependency ratio; -0.81 for life expectancy at birth; 
-0.86 for GDP per capita; -0.74 for the level of minimum wages; 0.90 for poverty head-count ratio at US$1.25 
per day and another 0.90 for poverty head-count ratio at US$2 per day; -0.76 for the adult literacy rate; -0.93 
for secondary school enrolment; and -0.83 for tertiary school enrolment.
67 Weighted component loadings for the seven variables related to the second component are: 0.68 for total 
employment-to-population ratio; 0.64 for the youth employment rate; -0.57 for notice period for redundancy 
dismissal of a worker with 5 years of tenure; -0.52 for notice period for redundancy dismissal of a worker 
with 20 years of tenure; -0.65 for paid annual leave in working days for a worker with 5 years of tenure; -0.64 
for paid annual leave in working days for a worker with 20 years of tenure; and 0.63 for the number of days 
required to start a business.
68 Component scores are calculated as the weighted average of all the explicative variables of each compo-
nent.
figure A4.1 principal component analysis scores and share of informal employment 
 in total employment (percentages)
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 panel A. Share of informal employment in total employment (percentages) and scores 
               for component 1
 panel B. Share of informal employment in total employment (percentages) and scores 
               for component 2
Note: Component scores are calculated as the weighted average of all the explanatory variables of each com-
ponent.
Source: IILS estimates based on ILO, 2012b; IMF, 2012; Kenya Economic Surveys; World Bank, 2011.
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CHApTER 5 
ENSURING pOlICY COHERENCE 
AND COMpREHENSIvENESS   
 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters highlighted a number of areas in which measures to 
improve labour market and social outcomes could be implemented. Attaining 
a more inclusive growth model is possible, provided that effective policies are 
put in place in a coherent and comprehensive manner. Against that back-
ground, this chapter will discuss the importance of developing a national 
employment strategy that is integrated into the country’s growth and devel-
opment plans. Importantly, the report has shown that there are a number 
of disadvantaged groups in Kenya who have not benefited from recent job 
growth. In this context, section A highlights the need for an employment 
strategy to be centred on concerted efforts to address the labour market and 
social challenges confronting youth and informal-sector workers. Section B 
discusses the importance of a complementary stable and conducive macr-
oeconomic framework in achieving employment and social goals. Finally, 
section C reviews the benefits of policy coherence and considers how the 
interaction among different policies can be improved in order to maximize 
the benefits of full and productive employment. 
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A NATIONAl EMplOYMENT STRATEGY: 
 AlIGNING lABOUR AND ECONOMIC GOAlS 
There is renewed recognition of the important role played by employment 
as a key driver of economic growth. Indeed, a number of studies now show 
that job-friendly policies have a positive effect on the economy because 
they are able to encourage income generation, thereby stimulating aggre-
gate demand and improving overall economic growth (ILO, 2003; 2012). 
The case of Kenya shows that too narrow a focus on economic growth in 
isolation, important though this aspect is, will not be sufficient to achieve 
quality job creation, continuous poverty reduction and sustainable devel-
opment. Improving employment opportunities – both by increasing the 
number of jobs available and by extending labour market access to the most 
vulnerable – is a vital step towards attaining these goals. 
A national employment strategy is, therefore, needed; a strategy that inte-
grates employment goals with strategic growth plans. This will allow for a 
more coherent and comprehensive framework that combines economic and 
labour market efforts with a view to enhancing the employment content 
of economic growth. Many countries have adopted national employment 
strategies in recent years (box 5.1). Policy-makers in Kenya could learn 
from the strengths and weaknesses of these initiatives for the development 
of their own strategy. The overall impact and success of such a strategy will 
depend on the degree to which it is embedded within national legislative 
and development frameworks. 
Source: Government of Ireland (2013); (2012); ILO and OECD (2011a); (2011b).   
Box 5.1 Employment strategies: learning from others 
The Irish Action Plan for Jobs: In February 2012, the Irish Government implemented a 
multi-year Action Plan for Jobs 2012, which puts employment-friendly policies at the 
heart of the recovery efforts. The objective of the plan is to increase the number of people 
in work from 1.8 to 1.9 million by 2016, reaching 2 million people by 2020. Key measures 
delivered in 2012 include:
•	 the	establishment	of	a	Micro	Finance	Loan	Fund	in	the	first	quarter	of	2012.	The	fund	
generated €90 million in additional micro-enterprise lending, benefitting 5,000 busi-
nesses and creating 7,700 jobs over a 10-year period;
•	 the	establishment	of	a	Temporary	Partial	Credit	Guarantee	Scheme	endowed	with	€450	
million to benefit 5,600 businesses and create 4,000 jobs; 
•	 a	second	call	for	expressions	of	interest	in	the	remaining	€125	million	of	the	Innovation	
Fund Ireland;
•	 a	cross-Government	Statement	on	the	Green	Economy	with	the	potential	to	create	
10,000 jobs;
•	 implementation	of	a	series	of	“pro-job”	tax	measures.
By the end of 2012, 249 actions had been implemented under the Action Plan 2012. The 
Plan helped to support net growth of almost 12,000 private sector jobs during 2012. In 
February 2013, the Action Plan for Jobs 2013 was launched. It contains 333 actions to be 
implemented in 2013 by 16 government departments and 46 agencies. This new phase 
builds on the progress made in 2012 in order to continue improving support for job-
creating businesses and remove the barriers to employment creation across the economy.
The Saudi Employment Strategy: In July 2009, Saudi Arabia’s Council of Ministers adopted 
the Saudi Employment Strategy. Although the launch of the strategy coincided with the 
slowdown of economic growth induced by the global economic and financial crisis, the 
preparation of the strategy started well before the crisis set in. The strategy, developed and 
implemented by the Ministry of Labour, presents a detailed and comprehensive set of meas-
ures aimed at redressing imbalances in the Saudi labour market – namely, a severe gender 
gap in the supply of labour as well as significant wage disparities between similarly educated 
Saudis and non-Saudis and the high unemployment rate of Saudis, especially youth – in 
the context of the Ninth Development Plan (2010–2014). 
The strategy sets out the following overall objectives: (i) to provide an adequate number of 
opportunities with appropriate terms of pay and conditions in an attempt to increase labour 
market participation and reach full employment; (ii) to increase the country’s competitive 
advantage based on the development of its national human resources; and (iii) to increase 
labour productivity to a level comparable with advanced OECD countries. 
The strategy covers a period of 25 years, but objectives have been carefully categorized 
depending on the time frame needed to implement specific policies necessary to achieve 
the overall goals. In the short term (2 years), the objective is to limit unemployment by 
offering incentives to private enterprises, enhancing skills and capacities and improving 
the employment information system of the country. In the medium term (3 to 5 years), 
the Government aims to promote employment-creation policies by encouraging participa-
tion and fostering greater productivity. In the long term, the goal is to achieve the overall 
objective – increasing competitive advantage for the economy through the enhancement 
of national capacities – through the reorganization and reconstruction of Saudi Arabia’s 
labour market. 
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Additional efforts are required to transform the current approach 
into a comprehensive national employment strategy …
The Kenyan Government has made considerable progress in its efforts to 
tackle labour market challenges through appropriate programmes, policies 
and labour market institutions. However, if a coherent strategy were adopt-
ed, in which these measures and other employment issues were fully inte-
grated in strategic development and growth plans, it would yield additional 
benefits. To date, while employment has been part of development plans, 
it has not played a central role. For example, in 2003, the Government 
implemented the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment 
Creation (ERS). This strategy set the vision of the country in terms of 
human development for the period 2003 to 2007. However, employment 
creation was neither one of the strategy’s pillars nor one of its five cross-
cutting themes (Republic of Kenya, 2003).
The new development plan, articulated in Kenya’s Vision 2030, covering 
the period 2008–2030 supersedes the abovementioned ERS and aims to 
improve the quality of life for all Kenyan citizens (from an economic, social 
and political perspective). It is anchored on ten main foundations: mac-
roeconomic stability; continuity in governance reforms; enhanced equity 
and wealth creation opportunities for the poor; infrastructure; energy; 
science, technology and innovation (STI); land reform; human resources 
development; security; and public sector reforms. As with the ERS, the 
employment challenge was not identified as one of the foundations of 
this strategic plan. It was, however, included as one of the priorities under 
“human resources development”, which intends to tackle the existing mis-
match between skills and job opportunities through lifelong training and 
education and to make additional efforts to raise productivity to interna-
tional levels (Republic of Kenya, 2011).
Although the ERS and Vision 2030 are important steps towards improving 
growth and development in the country, they do not specifically target 
the structural problems of the labour market. Vision 2030 sees labour 
market improvements as a by-product of the action taken to strengthen 
economic growth – with the aim of attaining a 10 per cent growth in 
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GDP – rather than through the implementation of labour market policies 
as a specific and mutually reinforcing measure. In general, the focus of the 
sectoral actions is on efficiency improvements that will, in turn, stimu-
late growth and employment. However, there are two concerns: first, that 
economic growth will not necessarily create the number of jobs needed to 
substantially decrease the existing high rates of inactivity and unemploy-
ment (SID, 2010) and, second, that the jobs created will not necessarily 
be either of higher quality or target those who are most in need. Moreover, 
few efforts have been made to develop further the universal social security 
floor, which has important implications for health, quality of life and  
the means of empowering the poor to actively improve their precarious 
situations.
… including measures that effectively tackle the challenges faced 
by youth and informal workers.
The report has shown that a number of groups are being disproportionally 
affected by the lack of employment creation and job precariousness. A com-
prehensive national employment strategy would therefore have to include 
measures to tackle the challenges facing disadvantaged groups. Specifically, 
youth unemployment and inactivity rates are particularly high compared 
both to international standards and to their adult counterparts. Moreover, 
informal-sector employment has continued to rise over the past two dec-
ades and currently constitutes a sizeable share of total employment in the 
country. Within the national employment strategy it would therefore be 
advisable to introduce additional measures both to increase the employ-
ability of youth, thereby fostering greater labour force attachment among 
this key cohort, and to promote the formalization of firms and jobs while 
improving the living and working conditions of those engaged in informal-
sector employment.
Importantly, the ability of policy-makers to improve the effectiveness of 
existing (and new) programmes depends very much on a proper evaluation 
framework. Generally, however, little is known about the effectiveness of 
existing measures. First, there is a need to gather and monitor pre- and 
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post-programme information and outcomes, including such aspects as 
cost, employment status, earnings, demographic information and edu-
cational level. Second, it is critical to continue to monitor participants 
over longer periods. Given that in many cases the benefits (and finan-
cial returns) of programmes, in particular training for youth, accrue over 
time, monitoring participants and outcomes beyond programme exit (say 
for 3–5 years) should be part of any monitoring and evaluation strat-
egy. Finally, the Government should also establish at the outset clear and 
measurable objectives in terms of expected outcomes, in both the short 
and long term.
1 YOUTH AND THEIR STRIvE TO fIND JOBS
As Chapter 3 has shown, young people have not shared equally in the 
benefits of recent economic and employment rate growth. In fact, youth 
accounted for less than 19 per cent of total employment in 2012 although 
they made up over 35 per cent of the working-age population. Moreover, 
the gap between youth and adult employment rates reached 43 percentage 
points in 2012, placing Kenya among the countries with the highest dis-
parities between youth and adult rates in the region and among the lowest 
in terms of employment rates for youth. 
Due to the sluggish rate of youth employment creation, the struggle to 
find jobs and dissatisfaction with their living conditions and their role in 
society more broadly, some young people have become discouraged and 
have started to leave the labour market entirely. Keeping young people 
out of the labour market clearly has significant detrimental consequences 
for individuals, but it also has negative effects on social, economic and 
development prospects for the country as a whole. An integrated employ-
ment policy plan is needed to create opportunities for young people while 
reducing poverty and allowing youth to be part of the economic and social 
development of the country. 
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 The analysis has shown that the two biggest challenges faced by working-
age youth are lack of job opportunities and their low eligibility for the 
few jobs that are available. Efforts to date have focused on the latter issue, 
particularly in terms of general training and primary and secondary edu-
cation. Moving forward, however, more attention must be given to job 
creation measures and the effect of labour market policies in attaining this 
goal. In fact, while overall employment has been growing – albeit at a slow 
pace – the gains have been made mainly by adults rather than by youth. 
This is reflected in the lower youth employment elasticity (0.4) relative to 
the overall employment elasticity observed in the country (0.9). Measures 
to support demand for youth labour need to be better aligned with labour 
market realities; that is, they should focus on tertiary education and voca-
tional training – key factors explaining the difference between the likeli-
hood of adults and young people finding a job (see Chapter 3).
2 INfORMAl-SECTOR EMplOYMENT: 
 AN IMpORTANT SOURCE Of lIvElIHOOD fOR THE MAJORITY 
 Of THE COUNTRY’S pOpUlATION 
Employment creation during the past decade has been mainly concen-
trated in urban informal-sector enterprises at the expense of agricultural 
self-employed and workers employed in small-scale agricultural activities 
(see Chapter 4). Moreover, the informal economy has tended to accommo-
date most of the growing labour force in urban areas. The increasing trend 
in informal-sector employment has significant repercussions for workers 
and their families and has become a central determinant of poverty and 
income inequalities in Kenya. Among the factors that have contributed to 
the growth of informal-sector employment, the most important include: (i) 
the presence of unfavourable institutional settings, which constitute entry 
barriers into the formal economy; (ii) unstable economic performance and 
the high concentration of production in agriculture; and (iii) the prevalence 
of low income levels and poverty.
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Despite the current challenges that Kenya faces in reaching a more inclusive 
labour market, some improvements have already been made (such as the 
time and cost of starting up a business being reduced by 35 days and 5 
per cent, respectively, since 2009). Moreover, the new Constitution estab-
lished in 2010 (box 5.2) could bring about the political stability necessary 
for attaining sustainable growth and enabling the creation of formal sec-
tor employment. Likewise, the fact that this new Constitution establishes 
mechanisms to ensure fair access to land titles is a key factor in eliminating 
one of the main entry barriers into the formal economy.
Box 5.2  The 2010 constitutional reform in Kenya  
 
On 4 August 2010, 67 per cent of Kenyan voters confirmed the transition to a new 
Constitution in a national referendum. This Constitution was ratified on 27 August 
2010, replacing the first Constitution of Kenya, which was established in 1963. With 
a turnout rate of more than 72 per cent of all registered voters, the result proved a sig-
nificant step towards rebuilding trust in the Government amid the controversies and 
the wave of violence that ensued after the disputed 2007 presidential election. The new 
Constitution aims to enhance equality and inclusive citizenship, thereby addressing one 
of the main drivers of the persistent high levels of social unrest, which is a manifestation 
of the perception of exclusion and unfair distribution of national resources, such as land. 
The main objectives of the new Constitution include the following themes:
•	 Establishing national values and principles of governance: These values and principles 
include enhanced participation of people, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, non-
discrimination and protection of the marginalized. Thus, the new Constitution seeks 
to ensure that all citizens are treated equally and fairly, thereby addressing the strong 
sense of exclusion among certain groups of citizens.
•	 Reforming the electoral system: The new Constitution also introduces changes to the 
electoral system with a view to ensuring that the voices of all segments of society are 
fairly represented in the government.
•	 Creating devolution mechanisms to enhance fairness in the sharing of national resources: 
The new Constitution establishes a system of devolution of governance so that all 
citizens – many of whom feel marginalized, neglected and discriminated against on 
the basis of their ethnicity – can participate meaningfully in governmental decision-
making at the local level. 
•	 Establishing mechanisms to ensure fairness in land administration: The land law regime 
in Kenya is poorly coordinated and gives excessive power to administrators without 
establishing mechanisms to ensure fairness between potential beneficiaries, since being 
a beneficiary is usually dependent on personal access to political power. Corruption 
is therefore rife in government agencies that administer land. To address these issues, 
the new Constitution establishes a National Land Commission (NLC) to conduct 
investigations into historical land injustices and recommend appropriate compensa-
tion. Moreover, the law enables a review of all grants and dispositions of public land 
to establish their legality. However, the new Constitution only extends constitutional 
protection to legally acquired land rights. 
Source: Akech (2010).  
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B fOSTERING A MORE STABlE MACROECONOMIC ENvIRONMENT
Job-friendly policies have an enormous potential to generate economic 
growth and, as such, should be at the centre of development and growth 
strategies. However, in Kenya this potential is constrained by the macroeco-
nomic instability arising from the persistence of long-standing structural 
weaknesses and the recurrence of short-term shocks. Indeed, a stable mac-
roeconomic framework is an essential prerequisite for sustained economic 
growth, a dynamic labour market and continued development. During the 
past three decades, Kenya’s economic stability has been affected by a series 
of crises arising from droughts, the volatility of commodity prices and a 
climate of political instability. 
Current vulnerabilities will have to be tackled before the country can 
achieve higher and more sustainable rates of economic growth that will 
allow adequate employment creation to take place. Indeed, the average 
annual economic growth experienced during the past two decades has been 
insufficient to generate improvements in employment. In fact, if growth 
continues at 3.1 per cent over the next 4 years (the average annual growth 
during the past two decades) there will be a shortage of 1.1 million jobs 
by 2015. Indeed, Kenya will require an annual rate of economic growth of 
about 5 per cent to absorb the growing working-age population; however, 
even this growth rate would not guarantee adequate youth job creation, 
given the lower youth employment elasticity. The youth job gap would only 
be closed – assuming that the actual youth employment elasticity remains 
constant – if the average GDP growth rate increased progressively to reach 
10 per cent in 2015 (which is the objective of Kenya’s Vision 2030 stra-
tegic plan) to produce a total surplus of around 1.9 million jobs by 2015. 
However, given Kenya’s average GDP growth, attaining such a sustainable 
rate of growth seems a daunting task without special attention being given 
to addressing the prevailing structural vulnerabilities.
A perception of high political risk continues to hinder investment and the 
development of new businesses. This arises because economic uncertainty 
increases in the face of political risk due to an upsurge of expectations 
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regarding rising inflation and interest rates, which slow down private invest-
ment and growth. Addressing the persistently high inflation rate in Kenya 
is also a prerequisite to achieving macroeconomic stability. However, while 
an inflation-centric macroeconomic policy could rejuvenate growth, it is 
unlikely to create employment and make economic growth more inclusive 
and equitable.
Strengthening export competitiveness will allow Kenya to gain access to 
new markets, such as Asia, and to reduce climate condition vulnerabilities. 
A strong focus on stimulating labour and total factor productivity will be 
essential to ensure that the Kenyan labour market is competitive in global 
terms. This will require a renewed emphasis on investment targeted towards 
improving labour productivity which will also attract foreign direct invest-
ment. It is important for the Government to recognize that improvements 
to labour productivity will not necessarily reduce labour demand. In fact, 
the experiences of the East Asian economies show that employment and 
growth in labour productivity need not be a zero-sum game.
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C ENSURING COHERENCE AMONG pOlICIES
Mutually reinforcing economic, employment and social policies have the 
potential to ensure effective growth prospects and sustainable development. 
Yet, policies are often conceived and implemented by a variety of different 
institutions and ministries in response to diverse imperatives. The impor-
tance of improving the interaction between different policies is increasingly 
vital if full and productive employment is to be achieved. In this respect, 
Kenya could benefit from better aligning macroeconomic and social goals 
and placing employment issues at the heart of the overall strategic growth 
and development plans. The current economic paradigm has proceeded 
without enough attention being paid to the social dimension and to the 
potential economic gains of effective labour market policies and related 
institutions. 
The election that took place at the beginning of March 2013 opened a 
window of opportunity in terms of demonstrating to the world that politi-
cal stability can be achieved during an election year – in contrast to the 
violence that broke out during the last election in 2007/08. Moreover, the 
devolution of responsibility to 47 new counties could, if properly imple-
mented by the new Government, pave the way for a more equitable model 
of development. The new Government will, however, have to work closely 
with both workers* and employers**. Indeed, effective social dialogue can 
ensure the best possible design of reforms and increase the likelihood of 
equitable and sustainable policies being implemented. 
* Through COTU. 
** Through the FKE.
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This report on Kenya, published under 
the series Studies on Growth with Equity, 
examines how employment and social 
policies can contribute to a more stable 
and equitable growth pattern. Indeed, 
growth in Kenya has been character-
ized by considerable volatility due in 
part to a narrow growth base and weak 
investment patterns. This has adversely 
affected formal job creation and ham-
pered improvements in living standards. 
The disconnect between growth and job 
creation has been particularly acute for 
young Kenyans, despite considerable 
efforts by the government to support 
youth employment.
Moving forward, the challenge for Kenya 
is to establish a more job-centred macr-
oeconomic framework that addresses the 
current vulnerabilities. Yet, as evidenced 
by the experience of the most recent 
expansionary period, GDP growth in 
and of itself is not enough to ensure 
labour market and social improvements. 
One alternative is for policy-makers to 
develop a national employment strategy 
that integrates employment goals with 
strategic growth plans. Particular empha-
sis is merited on stimulating job creation 
for youth, facilitating the creation of 
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formal-sector enterprises and improv-
ing the working conditions of workers 
in informal-sector employment. To that 
end, this report highlights a number 
of policy areas and recommendations 
intended to help guide the government 
and social partners in achieving growth 
with equity.
 
